The climate confusion: implications of the EU Emissions Trading Directive for the UK Climate Change Levy and climate change agreements by Sorrell, Steve
 
The Climate Confusion
 
Implications of the EU Emissions 
Trading Directive for the UK 
Climate Change Levy and Climate 
Change Agreements 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Sorrell 
 
Environment & Energy Programme 
 
 
 
November 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research funded by the European 
Commission under the project  
Interaction in EU Climate Policy (INTERACT) 
Acknowledgements 
This research has been supported by the European Commission under the project Interaction 
in EU Climate Policy (INTERACT).1 The INTERACT project is co-ordinated by SPRU 
(Science and Technology Policy Research) at the University of Sussex, and involves partners 
in France, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands. The project is studying the conflicts and 
synergies between different climate policy instruments at the national and EU levels, with 
particular reference to emissions trading. The present report forms one part of the UK case 
study. 
 
The author would like to thank the many individuals who gave up their time to be 
interviewed for this project. These include representatives from the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Confederation of 
British Industry, UK electricity generators, manufacturing industry, and energy brokerage 
and advisory companies. Thanks also to the attendees at a SPRU workshop on the 
‘Implementation of the EU Emissions Trading Directive in the UK’, held in June 2001, 
together with attendees at workshops on the same topic organised by the UK Carbon Trust 
and the Ad Hoc Group on Energy Taxation Strategy (AHGETS). Finally, thanks to Phillipe 
Quiron (CIRED), Simone Schucht (CERNA) and Joachim Schleich (FhISI) for help with the 
algebra. The usual disclaimers apply. 
                                                 
1 EVK2-2000-00613. 
Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................. I 
CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................................................... II 
TABLES AND FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... V 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS......................................................................................................... VII 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 1 
KEY FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................................... 1 
ORIGINS OF THE CLIMATE CONFUSION ................................................................................................................ 2 
UNDERSTANDING THE CLIMATE CONFUSION....................................................................................................... 3 
CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT SCOPE ............................................................................................................... 4 
CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................... 5 
CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT OPERATION ....................................................................................................... 6 
CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT TIMING.............................................................................................................. 8 
REDUCING THE CONFUSION – POLICY OPTIONS................................................................................................... 8 
ELIMINATING THE CONFUSION – POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................... 9 
1. ORIGINS OF THE CLIMATE CONFUSION .............................................................................................. 1 
1.1 REPORT STRUCTURE ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 STATUS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE..................................................................................................................... 3 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE CLIMATE CONFUSION................................................................................... 7 
2.1 REGULATORY IMPACT AND COST INCIDENCE................................................................................................ 7 
2.1.1 Identifying cost incidence..................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.2 Economic rent .................................................................................................................................... 10 
2.1.3 The impact of a trading scheme on product prices ............................................................................ 11 
2.2 INTERACTION AND DOUBLE REGULATION ................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.1 Policy interaction............................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.2 Double regulation .............................................................................................................................. 15 
2.3 OWNERSHIP OF EMISSIONS AND DOUBLE COUNTING ................................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Trading scheme designs ..................................................................................................................... 17 
2.3.2 Ownership and control of emissions .................................................................................................. 18 
2.3.3 Double slippage ................................................................................................................................. 20 
2.3.4 Double coverage ................................................................................................................................ 21 
2.3.5 Double crediting ................................................................................................................................ 22 
2.3.6 The scale of the problem .................................................................................................................... 23 
2.4 DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND EQUIVALENCE OF EFFORT........................................................................ 24 
2.4.1 Differential treatment......................................................................................................................... 24 
2.4.2 Equivalence of effort .......................................................................................................................... 26 
2.5 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................. 29 
3. CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT SCOPE............................................................................................ 31 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 31 
3.2 OVERLAPS IN SECTORAL COVERAGE........................................................................................................... 32 
3.3 OVERLAPS IN SITE COVERAGE..................................................................................................................... 41 
3.3.1 CCL boundaries ................................................................................................................................. 43 
3.3.2 IPPC boundaries................................................................................................................................ 44 
3.3.3 CCA boundaries ................................................................................................................................. 46 
3.3.4 EU ETS boundaries............................................................................................................................ 47 
3.3.5 Overlaps in regulatory boundaries .................................................................................................... 49 
3.3.6 Combinations of regulatory influences at a single site ...................................................................... 50 
3.4 OVERLAPS IN EMISSIONS COVERAGE .......................................................................................................... 54 
3.5 INDIRECTLY AFFECTED TARGET GROUPS .................................................................................................... 56 
3.5.1 CCL.................................................................................................................................................... 56 
 iii
3.5.2 CCAs .................................................................................................................................................. 57 
3.5.3 EU ETS............................................................................................................................................... 58 
3.5.4 Incentives for lower carbon emissions from electricity generation.................................................... 59 
3.6 ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF THE TARGET GROUPS .......................................................................................... 61 
3.7 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................. 67 
CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT OBJECTIVES.................................................................................... 68 
4.1 A NOTE ON ENERGY PRICES ........................................................................................................................ 68 
4.2 CCL OBJECTIVES........................................................................................................................................ 69 
4.2.1 Quantitative objectives....................................................................................................................... 69 
4.2.2 Qualitative objectives......................................................................................................................... 70 
4.3 CCA OBJECTIVES ....................................................................................................................................... 72 
4.4 EU ETS OBJECTIVES .................................................................................................................................. 75 
4.4.1 Quantitative objectives....................................................................................................................... 75 
4.4.2 Qualitative objectives......................................................................................................................... 77 
4.5 STRINGENCY OF OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................... 77 
4.5.1 Stringency of the EU ETS................................................................................................................... 77 
4.5.2 Consistency with technological potential and IPPC.......................................................................... 78 
4.5.3 Differential treatment and equivalence of effort ................................................................................ 79 
4.6 CONFLICTS BETWEEN OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 80 
4.6.1 Coal.................................................................................................................................................... 80 
4.6.2 Nuclear............................................................................................................................................... 83 
4.6.3 Domestic consumers........................................................................................................................... 83 
4.5 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................. 84 
5. CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT OPERATION................................................................................. 86 
5.1 GROUP 1: CCL ONLY.................................................................................................................................. 87 
5.1.1 Double Regulation ............................................................................................................................. 87 
5.1.2 Multiple objectives ............................................................................................................................. 88 
5.1.3 Market distortions .............................................................................................................................. 90 
5.1.4 ‘Backup’ regulation ........................................................................................................................... 91 
5.1.5 Implications for revenue raising ........................................................................................................ 92 
5.1.5 Summary............................................................................................................................................. 93 
5.2 GROUP 2: EU ETS AND CCL ..................................................................................................................... 93 
5.2.1 Double regulation .............................................................................................................................. 93 
5.2.2 Double regulation as a substitute for allowance auctioning.............................................................. 95 
5.2.3 Summary............................................................................................................................................. 97 
5.3 GROUP 3: CCA ONLY ................................................................................................................................. 97 
5.3.1 Implications for electricity, no CCA trading...................................................................................... 99 
5.3.2 Implications for electricity, with CCA trading ................................................................................. 103 
5.3.3 Summary........................................................................................................................................... 110 
5.4 GROUP 4: EU ETS AND CCA................................................................................................................... 111 
5.4.1 Implications for fuel, no CCA trading.............................................................................................. 112 
5.4.2 Implications for fuel, with CCA trading........................................................................................... 116 
5.4.3 Summary........................................................................................................................................... 122 
5.5 MULTI CRITERIA EVALUATION ................................................................................................................. 123 
5.6 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ 126 
6. CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT TIMING ....................................................................................... 128 
6.1 EU ETS.................................................................................................................................................... 128 
6.2 KYOTO...................................................................................................................................................... 128 
6.3 CCL AND CCAS ....................................................................................................................................... 129 
6.4 THE UK OPT-OUT ..................................................................................................................................... 130 
6.5 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ 131 
7. REDUCING THE CONFUSION: POLICY OPTIONS............................................................................ 132 
7.1 GROUP 1: CCL ONLY................................................................................................................................ 133 
7.1.1 Option 1a: modify the CCL rate for electricity ................................................................................ 133 
7.1.2 Option 1b: remove the CCL on electricity ....................................................................................... 134 
7.1.3 Option 1c: remove the CCL on electricity and make it a carbon tax ............................................... 136 
 iv
7.2 GROUP 2: CCL AND EU ETS ................................................................................................................... 138 
7.2.1 Option 2a: remove the CCL on electricity ....................................................................................... 138 
7.2.2 Option 2b: remove the CCL on electricity and exempt Group 2 from the CCL ............................... 139 
7.3 GROUP 3: CCA ONLY ............................................................................................................................... 140 
7.3.1 Option 3a: remove the CCL on electricity ....................................................................................... 141 
7.3.2 Option 3b: remove the CCL on electricity and change the CCA target to fuel only ........................ 142 
7.3.3 Option 3c: remove the CCL on electricity, change the CCA target to fuel only and allow opt-in to 
EU ETS...................................................................................................................................................... 143 
7.4 GROUP 4: CCA AND EU ETS................................................................................................................... 146 
7.4.1 Option 4a: replace the CCAs with the EU ETS and exempt Group 4 from the CCL ....................... 147 
7.4.1 Option 4b: allow Group 4 installations to opt-out of the EU ETS and continue with their CCL 1 As.
.................................................................................................................................................................. 149 
7.5. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................................... 152 
8. ELIMINATING THE CONFUSION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS............................................. 155 
8.1 PRINCIPLES ............................................................................................................................................... 155 
8.2 RECOMMEDATIONS................................................................................................................................... 156 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................. 158 
 v
Tables and Figures 
FIGURE E.1 CONFUSION OVER INSTRUMENT SCOPE: OVERLAPS BETWEEN THE TARGET GROUPS FOR THE EU ETS, 
IPPC, CCL AND CCAS.................................................................................................................................. 5 
TABLE E.1 CATEGORISING THE POTENTIAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE EU ETS AND THE CCL/CCA PACKAGE7 
TABLE E.2 SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MODIFYING THE CCL/CCA PACKAGE OR THE EU ETS........ 9 
TABLE 1.1 KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSED EU ETS........................................................................................... 4 
FIGURE 1.1 IMPACT OF AN ENERGY TAX ON FUEL PRICES ........................................................................................ 9 
FIGURE 1.2 ECONOMIC RENT FROM CARBON ALLOWANCES .................................................................................. 11 
FIGURE 1.3 COSTS TO AN INDIVIDUAL FIRM WITH ALLOWANCE AUCTIONING........................................................ 12 
FIGURE 1.4 DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FROM OVERLAPPING POLICIES ................................................................. 24 
TABLE 1.2 INDUSTRIAL ELECTRICITY AND GAS PRICES IN THE EU AND G7, COMPARED TO UK PRICES (1999)..... 28 
FIGURE 3.1 EU ETS AND CCL/CCA TARGET GROUP INTERACTIONS ................................................................... 32 
TABLE 3.1 DEFINITION OF IPPC REGULATED ACTIVITIES, INDICATING THOSE COVERED BY THE EU ETS............ 35 
TABLE 3.2 SECTORAL OVERLAPS BETWEEN IPPC, THE CCL, THE CCA, AND THE EU ETS.................................. 37 
FIGURE 3.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TARGET GROUPS FOR IPPC, CCL AND CCAS ............................................. 38 
TABLE 3.3 DISTINGUISHING OVERLAPPING TARGET GROUPS FOR IPPC, THE CCL AND CCAS ............................. 38 
FIGURE 3.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TARGET GROUPS FOR THE EU ETS, IPPC, CCL AND CCAS....................... 39 
TABLE 3.4 DISTINGUISHING OVERLAPPING TARGET GROUPS FOR THE EU ETS, IPPC, CCL AND CCAS .............. 40 
FIGURE 3.4 A GENERAL SITE IN THE INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL OR PUBLIC SECTOR ............................................ 41 
TABLE 3.5 ESTIMATES OF THE 1990 UK BOILER STOCK BY SITE THERMAL INPUT CAPACITY (% OF TOTAL) ......... 43 
FIGURE 3.5 POSSIBLE REGULATORY BOUNDARIES FOR A CCL ELIGIBLE SITE ....................................................... 44 
FIGURE 3.6 POSSIBLE REGULATORY BOUNDARIES FOR AN IPPC INSTALLATION ................................................... 46 
FIGURE 3.7 POSSIBLE REGULATORY BOUNDARIES FOR A CCA FACILITY .............................................................. 47 
FIGURE 3.8 POSSIBLE REGULATORY BOUNDARIES FOR EU ETS PARTICIPANT...................................................... 49 
TABLE 3.6 POSSIBLE AREAS OF COVERAGE OF IPPC, CCL, CCAS AND EU ETS WITHIN A TYPICAL INDUSTRIAL 
SITE.............................................................................................................................................................. 49 
TABLE 3.7 POSSIBLE AREAS OF COVERAGE OF IPPC, CCL, CCAS AND EU ETS WITHIN A SIMPLIFIED TYPICAL 
INDUSTRIAL SITE .......................................................................................................................................... 50 
TABLE 3.8 ALLOWABLE COMBINATIONS OF IPPC, CCL, AND CCA...................................................................... 51 
TABLE 3.9 ALLOWABLE COMBINATIONS OF IPPC, CCL, CCA, AND TYPE OF COMBUSTION PLANT...................... 52 
TABLE 3.10 ALLOWABLE COMBINATIONS OF IPPC, CCL, CCA, TYPE OF COMBUSTION PLANT AND EU ETS 
MEMBER....................................................................................................................................................... 53 
BOX 3.1 IPPC AND GHG EMISSION CONTROL....................................................................................................... 55 
TABLE 3.11 COVERAGE OF DIRECT EMISSIONS BY IPPC, THE CCL, THE CCA, AND THE EU ETS........................ 55 
TABLE 3.12 COVERAGE OF FOSSIL FUEL COMBUSTION IN ALL SECTORS OTHER THAN ELECTRICITY GENERATION.56 
TABLE 3.13 ILLUSTRATIVE BREAKDOWN OF ELECTRICITY COSTS (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL) ................................. 58 
TABLE 3.14 INCENTIVES FOR LOWER CARBON EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRICITY GENERATION................................. 60 
TABLE 3.15 COVERAGE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES BY IPPC, THE CCL, THE CCAS AND THE 
EU ETS ....................................................................................................................................................... 61 
TABLE 3.16 ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY SECTOR 1998............................................................................................ 62 
TABLE 3.17 ESTIMATED EMISSIONS COVERAGE OF THE CCL, CCA AND EU ETS COMPARED TO TOTAL UK GHG 
EMISSIONS (MTC EQUIVALENT)................................................................................................................... 64 
TABLE 3.18 ESTIMATED EMISSIONS COVERAGE OF THE CCL, CCA AND EU ETS COMPARED TO TOTAL UK GHG 
EMISSIONS (MTC EQUIVALENT)................................................................................................................... 65 
TABLE 3.19 ESTIMATED EMISSIONS COVERAGE OF THE CCL, CCA AND EU ETS COMPARED TO TOTAL UK GHG 
EMISSIONS (% OF TOTAL IN EACH COLUMN)................................................................................................. 65 
TABLE 3.20 SUMMARY OF EMISSIONS COVERAGE OF THE CCL, CCA AND EU ETS (MTC EQUIVALENT)............ 66 
TABLE 4.1 ENERGY PRICE INDICES FOR THE UK INDUSTRIAL SECTOR................................................................... 68 
TABLE 4.2 CCL RATES AND EQUIVALENT CARBON TAX RATES ............................................................................. 70 
TABLE 4.3 ETSU ASSUMPTIONS ON TYPICAL PAYBACK CRITERIA BY SECTOR ...................................................... 73 
TABLE 4.4 CONVERSION FACTORS FOR GRID PURCHASED ELECTRICITY USED IN THE CCAS ................................. 75 
TABLE 4.5 ILLUSTRATIVE IMPACT OF FULL ALLOWANCE AUCTIONING TO THE UK GENERATORS, WITH A 
£10/TONNECO2 CLEARING PRICE AND NO REVENUE RECYCLING.................................................................. 81 
FIGURE 4.1 GENERATION PRICE ADVANTAGE OF NEW CCGT OVER EXISTING COAL FIRED STATION FOR DIFFERENT 
LEVELS OF PRICES IN ALLOWANCE AUCTION ................................................................................................ 82 
FIGURE 5.1 OVERLAPPING DIRECT TARGET GROUPS FOR THE EU ETS AND CCL/CCA PACKAGE ........................ 86 
BOX 5.1 BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY .......................................................................................................... 90 
TABLE 5.1 ILLUSTRATIVE IMPACTS ON UNIT ENERGY COSTS UNDER A COMBINATION OF THE CCL AND EU ETS 
WITH 100% AUCTIONING (P/KWH)............................................................................................................... 94 
 vi
TABLE 5.2 HOW CHANGES IN OUTPUT, ENERGY INTENSITY AND CARBON INTENSITY AFFECT THE ATTAINMENT OF 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF CCA TARGET.............................................................................................................. 99 
TABLE 5.3 ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION OF IMPORTED ELECTRICITY TO TOTAL CCL COSTS FOR THE CHEMICAL AND 
FOOD AND DRINK SECTORS......................................................................................................................... 101 
TABLE 5.4 ALLOWANCES VERSUS CREDITS ......................................................................................................... 104 
FIGURE 5.2 DOUBLE COUNTING OF ELECTRICITY EMISSIONS WITH COEXISTENCE OF EU ETS AND CCAS, WHEN 
THE CCAS HAVE ABSOLUTE TARGETS ....................................................................................................... 106 
FIGURE 5.3 HOW TRADING WITH RELATIVE TARGETS CAN LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN TOTAL EMISSIONS ............. 108 
FIGURE 5.4 INTERFACING THE EU ETS AND THE CCAS ..................................................................................... 110 
TABLE 5.5 COVERAGE OF EU ETS AND CCA AT A SINGLE SITE ......................................................................... 112 
FIGURE 5.5 DOUBLE COUNTING WITH SIMULTANEOUS PARTICIPATION IN AN ALLOWANCE BASED AND CREDIT 
BASED TRADING SCHEME, WHEN BOTH SCHEMES HAVE ABSOLUTE TARGETS............................................. 119 
BOX 5.2 MODELS FOR ORGANISING CCA TRADING IN THE UK ETS................................................................... 121 
BOX 5.3 GENERIC OBJECTIVES FOR POLICY INSTRUMENTS.................................................................................. 123 
TABLE 5.6 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE: GROUP 1 (CCL ONLY) .............................................................................................................. 124 
TABLE 5.7 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE: GROUP 2 (CCL & EU ETS) ..................................................................................................... 124 
TABLE 5.8 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE: GROUP 4 (CCA & EU ETS) ..................................................................................................... 125 
TABLE 5.9 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE: GROUP 3 (CCA ONLY).............................................................................................................. 125 
TABLE 5.10 CATEGORISING THE OPERATIONAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE EU ETS AND THE CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE ................................................................................................................................................... 126 
TABLE 7.1 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE: GROUP 1 (CCL ONLY) .............................................................................................................. 133 
TABLE 7.2 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 1A: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ..... 134 
TABLE 7.3 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 1B: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ..... 136 
TABLE 7.4 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 1C: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ..... 137 
TABLE 7.5 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE: GROUP 2 (CCL & EU ETS) ..................................................................................................... 138 
TABLE 7.6 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 2A: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ..... 139 
TABLE 7.7 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 2B: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ..... 140 
TABLE 7.8 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED CCL/CCA 
PACKAGE: GROUP 3 (CCA ONLY).............................................................................................................. 141 
TABLE 7.9 OPTIONS EXAMINED FOR GROUP 3 ..................................................................................................... 141 
TABLE 7.10 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 3A: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ... 142 
TABLE 7.11 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 3B: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ... 143 
TABLE 7.12 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 3C: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ... 146 
TABLE 7.13 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COEXISTENCE OF THE EU ETS WITH AN UNCHANGED 
CCL/CCA PACKAGE: GROUP 4 (CCA & EU ETS) ................................................................................... 147 
TABLE 7.14 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 4A: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ... 149 
TABLE 7.15 MULTI CRITERIA ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 4B: CHANGES COMPARED TO COEXISTENCE SCENARIO ... 152 
TABLE 7.16 SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MODIFYING THE CCL/CCA PACKAGE OR THE EU ETS ..154 
 
 vii
Abbreviations and acronyms 
AAU  Assigned Amount Unit 
ACE  All Cost Effective 
CBI  Confederation of British Industry 
CCL  Climate Change Levy 
CCA  Climate Change Agreements 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CER  Certified Emission Reduction 
CHP  Combined Heat and Power 
DEFRA Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DETR  Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry 
ECA  Enhanced Capital Allowance 
EEBPP  Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program  
EEC  Energy Efficiency Commitment 
EPA  Environmental Protection Act 
ERU  Emission Reduction Unit 
ETS  Emissions Trading Scheme 
ETSU  Energy Technology Support Unit 
ETSU  Energy Technology Support Unit (now incorporated into  
EU ETS EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
EU  European Union 
FGD  Flue Gas Desulphurisation  
Future Energy Solutions at AEA Technology) 
GHG  Greenhouse Gas 
IET  International Emissions Trading  
IPPC  Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
JI  Joint Implementation 
LAAPC Local Authority Air Pollution Control  
LCP  Large Combustion Plant 
LCPD  Large Combustion Plant Directive 
LEC  Levy Exemption Certificate  
MCA  Multi Criteria Appraisal 
NETA  New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
RO  Renewables Obligation 
ROC  Renewables Obligation Certificate 
SDC  Sustainable Development Commission 
UK ETG UK Emissions Trading Group 
UK ETS UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
UKCP  UK Climate Programme  
 1
Executive Summary 
Key Findings 
• The proposed EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is incompatible with existing UK 
climate policy. There are a number of number of reasons for this, but of particular 
importance is the differing treatment of emissions from electricity generation  
• The Climate Change Levy (CCL) and Climate Change Agreements (CCAs) took several 
years to negotiate and were anticipated to remain stable until 2013. But the EU ETS could 
be introduced as early as 2005. Coexistence of the two is probably untenable. While there 
are a number of options for modifying the CCL/CCA package, all involve trade-offs and 
all are likely to opposed by various groups.  
• The potential interactions between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA package are complex 
and raise four key issues: a) the economic impact upon different groups and the extent to 
which this depends upon the method of allowance allocation; b) ‘double regulation’ and 
the extent to which this is seen as imposing unfair burdens on particular groups; c) the 
‘ownership’ of carbon emissions and the ‘double counting’ problems that arise if 
ownership is disputed; and d) the differential treatment of target groups and the difficulties 
of demonstrating ‘equivalence of effort’. 
• There are considerable differences in the scope of the instruments, in terms of the sectors, 
sites, portions of sites and individual emission sources that are directly or indirectly 
affected. As a consequence, any policy options are likely to create problems of double 
regulation and differential treatment. 
• There are also differences in the timing of the instruments, which is one reason why the 
UK has sought an opt-out of Phase 1 of the EU ETS (2005-2007). A major overhaul of 
UK climate policy will be required by at least 2007, and most probably before that date. 
• The CCA targets are different in form and probably weaker than those required under the 
EU ETS, which creates problems for opt-out provisions. Also, the CCL/CCA package has 
multiple objectives, including protecting domestic consumers and UK coal producers, 
promoting energy efficiency and avoiding a ‘windfall’ to nuclear power. The political 
importance of these objectives is changing, but each is threatened by the EU ETS.  
• Allowance prices in the EU ETS could be driven to low levels if the scheme is interfaced 
to other trading schemes and/or the international carbon market after 2008. This could 
justify the retention of the CCL and/or the CCAs as a ‘backup’ to ensure some degree of 
domestic action. Alternatively, interfaces between the EU ETS and the international 
carbon market could be strictly controlled. This issue is of critical importance to the future 
shape of UK and EU climate policy. But the UK has only limited control over the 
evolution of the EU ETS and forecasts of future allowance prices are highly speculative. 
• The existing UK policy mix is excessively complex and the relationship between different 
instruments is poorly understood. Any changes should aim to simplify this mix and to 
improve economic efficiency. Policy development should be based upon clear principles 
and long-term goals. The CCAs should be seen as a transitional measure only. In the long 
term, organisations in the public, commercial and industrial sectors should either be 
paying a carbon tax (on fuel consumption only) or participating in the EU ETS. 
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Origins of the climate confusion 
Over the last three years, the UK has developed a complex, elaborate and interdependent set 
of climate policies which are intended to deliver both the UK’s Kyoto obligations and its 
domestic target of a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2010. Some elements of this policy 
mix, such as the Climate Change Levy (CCL), represent a significant political achievement 
given the strength of industrial opposition, while others, such as the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme (UKETS) and the Renewables Obligation (RO), are important and innovative policy 
experiments. This policy mix is now fully operational, delivering emission reductions and 
attracting interest from around the world. But parallel to these developments, the European 
Commission has been developing the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP). This 
proposes a wide range of instruments and initiatives and includes as its centrepiece a draft 
Directive for a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme (the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
or EU ETS) which will cover some 45% of EU emissions. If this proposal is approved, it will 
create the largest and most ambitious trading system ever implemented. The design of the EU 
ETS represents a pragmatic compromise between economic efficiency and political 
acceptability and there appears to be a good chance that it will be introduced in 2005 as 
planned. But it is fundamentally incompatible with existing UK climate policy. 
 
If the Directive goes ahead as planned, the UK government will be faced with a choice 
between either accepting the coexistence of the EU ETS with UK climate policy, or replacing 
or modifying a number of policy instruments only a couple of years after they were 
introduced. The first option leads to double regulation, complexity and additional cost 
burdens for affected groups, while the second implies changing a complex and finely 
balanced policy mix which took several years to negotiate and was anticipated to remain 
stable until 2013. Neither option is attractive and both will attract opposition. The extent of 
disruption will depend on the nature of the changes that are proposed, but at the time of 
writing the UK government does not appear to have given a great deal of thought to the 
specific options available. 
 
This report provides an in-depth exploration of the potential interactions between the EU ETS 
and the UK Climate Change Levy (CCL) and Climate Change Agreements (CCAs). While 
the EU ETS has implications for a number of climate policy instruments, it is the impact on 
the CCL/CCA package that is of greatest importance. The aim of the report is to explore the 
nature of the issues that arise from this interaction, to identify ways in which conflicts can be 
avoided and to provide practical suggestions for the future development of UK climate 
policy. 
 
If the EU agrees to a start date of 2005 for the EU ETS, the UK government will need to 
consider options for reforming the CCL and CCAs immediately. Delaying the introduction of 
the EU ETS by one year will give only limited breathing space before major changes need to 
be made. Even if the UK is successful in securing an opt-out of the Directive up to 2008, it 
will still be faced with a major overhaul of climate policy well before the planned end date of 
the existing CCAs. There is a need, therefore, for a debate on the preferred shape of climate 
policy during the first Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012) and beyond. It is this which 
should form the basis of future policy development and not short-term expedients. This report 
aims to contribute to this debate. 
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The potential interactions between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA package can be confusing. 
The report charts a course through this confusion by examining in turn: 
 
• the scope of the instruments, where scope means the sectors, sites, portions of sites and 
individual emission sources that are directly or indirectly affected; 
• the objectives of the instruments and the extent to which these reinforce or conflict with 
one another; 
• the operation of each instrument and the interactions between them assuming that they 
exist in parallel; and 
• the timing of the instruments in relation to each other and the Kyoto commitment period,  
 
Following this, the report explores the options that are available to make the implementation 
of the EU ETS more effective, equitable and politically feasible. On the basis of this analysis, 
the final section makes some specific recommendations on the future development of UK 
climate policy.  
Understanding the climate confusion 
The potential interaction between the EU ETS and the EU ETS raises four generic issues: 
• Regulatory impact and cost incidence: The issue here is the economic impact of different 
policy instruments and the extent to which the costs will be borne by consumers, 
employers, suppliers or shareholders. This can best be estimated through economic 
modelling, but different approaches can lead to very different results. For emissions 
trading, a central issue is how the allowances are distributed. Free allocation amounts to a 
subsidy to participating firms, while auctions allows the government to raise revenue 
which may be used to compensate affected groups and improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the scheme. An important result from economic theory is that, while the 
choice between auctioning and free allocation may lead to different costs for the 
participating firms, there should be no difference in the costs passed on in product prices. 
So for example, electricity consumers will face the same increase in electricity prices, 
regardless of whether allowances are allocated free to electricity generators or whether 
they are required to purchase them in an auction. Whether this theoretical result will hold 
in practice, however, is open to question. 
• Interaction and double regulation: The issue here is the extent to which any apparent 
‘double regulation’ will be seen as imposing unfair burdens upon particular target groups. 
While ‘double regulation’ is a negative term, there may be many instances where the 
interaction between policy instruments may be either acceptable or positively beneficial. 
To assess whether this is likely to be the case in any particular instance, it is necessary to 
examine the multiple objectives of each instrument and the obligations and incentives they 
place upon individual target groups. 
• Ownership of emissions and double counting: The issue here is the ‘ownership’ and 
‘control’ of carbon emissions and the problems that arise if ownership is disputed. For 
example, the EU ETS gives the ownership of emissions from electricity generation to 
power stations, while much of UK climate policy gives the ownership to electricity 
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consumers. Ownership disputes fall into three categories: a) double slippage, where the 
regulatory coverage of emissions is lost; b) double coverage, where two instruments give 
ownership of the same physical emissions to two separate parties, or to the same party 
under two separate terms; and c) double crediting, where disputing claims over the 
ownership of emissions allow two separate carbon allowances or carbon credits to be 
generated from a single abatement action. Each type of problem introduces complexity 
into the regulatory situation and double crediting may threaten the environmental integrity 
of an emissions trading scheme.  
• Equivalence of effort: The issue here is the extent to which different groups are treated 
differently by environmental policy instruments and whether the obligations imposed upon 
one group can be deemed equivalent to those imposed upon another. Differential treatment 
may be challenged on legal, political or environmental grounds and is of central 
importance in the political debate over environmental policy. Demonstration of 
equivalence of effort may be required as a means to avoid differential treatment when an 
installation, company, sector or Member State is exempted from a particular policy 
instrument. But in practice, differences in the scope, form and stringency of policy 
instruments may make equivalence of effort extremely difficult to assess. 
 
Different policy options have different implications for each of these issues and any option 
will involve trade-offs between efficiency, equity and political feasibility. This points to the 
need for multi-criteria assessment of policy options with explicit weighting of policy 
objectives.  
Confusion over instrument scope  
The scope of both the CCAs and the EU ETS is based on that of the Integrated Pollution & 
Prevention Control (IPPC) Directive. Despite this, there are considerable differences in scope 
which are likely to create problems of differential treatment and double regulation. The 
differences occur at four levels: 
 
• Sectoral coverage: Differences in the sectoral coverage of the CCL, CCAs, IPPC & EU 
ETS suggest that individual sites in the public, commercial, manufacturing and energy 
sectors may face one of ten combinations of the four instruments (Figure E.1). While the 
importance of each of the labelled regions in Figure E.1 varies, each contains real sites and 
real physical emissions. 
• Site coverage: Differences in the coverage of individual technologies within an individual 
site expands the number of possible combinations of instrument coverage from ten to 
eighteen. The differences relate in particular to the coverage of combustion plant and 
process plant emissions and to the size of the main combustion plant. 
• Emissions coverage: Further complications are introduced by the differences in coverage 
of CO2 versus other GHGs, combustion versus non-combustion CO2 emissions, and 
combustion emissions from different fossil fuels.  
• Electricity coverage: A final layer of complexity is provided by the differing incentives 
each instrument creates for reducing emissions from electricity generation. Each 
instrument gives a different mix of direct and indirect incentives to both the supply and 
demand side of the electricity market, with the result that each instrument incentivises a 
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different mix of abatement options. Particular complications are introduced by the 
inconsistent treatment of electricity from various renewable sources. 
Figure E.1 Confusion over instrument scope: overlaps between the target groups for the EU 
ETS, IPPC, CCL and CCAs 
Confusion over instrument objectives  
The core objective of the three instruments is the same: the reduction of carbon emissions 
from the target groups. But they differ in terms of their relative stringency and the importance 
they give to various subsidiary objectives 
 
The stringency of the EU ETS is at present unclear and the proposed allowance allocation 
criteria include both top-down and bottom up elements which are potentially contradictory. 
But there is a strong possibility that the targets required under the EU ETS will be more 
stringent than those currently applicable under the CCAs (quite apart from the fact that these 
will be absolute, rather than relative targets). This has important implications for either the 
use of CCAs targets as a basis for allocation in the EU ETS, or the use of opt-in or opt-out 
options within the EU ETS at the national, sector, company or installation level.  
 
The stringency of the EU ETS will be determined in the first instance by the size of the cap. 
But an important complication is the possibility of interfacing the EU ETS to other trading 
schemes or to the Kyoto mechanisms after 2008. A combination of the withdrawal of the US 
from Kyoto, the surplus ‘hot air’ in the allocations to Russia and the Ukraine, and the 
generous sink provisions negotiated at Marrakesh has created the possibility of very low 
carbon prices after 2008. In this context, any interface between the EU ETS and the 
international carbon market could have the effect of reducing the EU ETS allowance price 
and substituting allowance purchase for domestic abatement  
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The design of the CCL/CCA package reflects multiple objectives, including the desire to 
protect domestic consumers, energy intensive industry, and UK coal producers, together with 
promoting energy efficiency and avoiding a ‘windfall’ to nuclear generators. Each of these 
objectives is threatened by the introduction of the EU ETS, although in each case the political 
importance of the objective has changed since the CCL was introduced and is likely to have 
changed further by 2005 or 2008. In particular, a nuclear ‘windfall’ may now be positively 
helpful to government objectives given the current financial problems of British Energy. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the proposed Directive raises major issues of UK energy policy 
(particularly supply security) and social policy (particularly fuel poverty). 
Confusion over instrument operation 
In practice, it is very unlikely that the EU ETS could coexist with an unchanged CCL/CCA 
package. But the ‘coexistence’ scenario provides a useful framework to explore the potential 
interactions between the instruments. The report examines these interactions in turn for four 
separate target groups, which are each affected by a different combination of instruments: 
 
• Group 1: CCL only; 
• Group 2: CCL and EU ETS; 
• Group 3: CCA only; 
• Group 4: CCA and EU ETS. 
 
The interactions for each Group are complex and include several overlapping examples of 
double regulation, double coverage and double crediting. The interactions can be grouped 
into four categories: 
 
• price - price: where the indirect impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices is additional to 
the direct price impact of the CCL; 
• price - target: where the indirect impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices is additional 
to the direct impact of a target under the CCAs; 
• target - price: where the direct impact of an emissions target under the EU ETS is 
additional to the direct price impact of the CCL; 
• target - target: where the direct impact of a target under the EU ETS is additional to the 
direct impact of a target under the CCAs. 
 
Table E.1 summarises the interactions within these four categories. 
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Table E.1 Categorising the potential interactions between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA 
package 
Type of 
interaction 
EU ETS CCL/CCA 
package 
Category 
price - price indirect price direct price Group 1 electricity 
price - price   Group 2 electricity 
price - target indirect price direct target Group 3 electricity 
   Group 4 electricity 
target - price direct target direct price Group 2 fuel 
target - target direct target direct target Group 4 fuel 
no interaction - - Group 1 fuel 
 - - Group 3 fuel 
 
The scale and consequences of each interaction depends upon a range of factors, the most 
important of which is the allowance price in the EU ETS. If the allowance price is very high, 
double regulation could lead to substantial economic impacts for affected groups and 
therefore create pressure to modify the CCL/CCA package. Conversely, if the allowance 
price is very low, the economic consequences of the double regulation could be relatively 
small and therefore acceptable. But forecasts of future allowance prices are highly 
speculative. 
 
Of similar importance is the underlying trends in industrial energy prices. For example, gas 
prices increased by 18% in real terms between 1995 and 2001, while electricity prices fell by 
23%. Recent reductions in wholesale electricity prices have created a crisis in electricity 
generation and there seems little prospect that electricity prices will increase substantially in 
the near future. The reduction in industrial electricity prices between 2000 and 2002 more 
than offset the price increase from the CCL. 
 
In a context of low energy prices and low allowance prices, there may be some appeal in 
retaining some or all of the CCL/CCA package unchanged, in order to maintain downstream 
incentives to improve energy efficiency (the ‘backup’ scenario). This would also ensure the 
continuation of policy initiatives currently funded by the CCL such as Enhanced Capital 
Allowances (ECAs). Allowance auctioning in the EU ETS could provide an alternative 
source of revenue to the CCL, but in practice it is unlikely that more than a fraction of 
allowances will be auctioned, even in Phase 2. The UK government opposes auctioning in the 
EU ETS, despite the economic arguments in its favour. But theory suggests that the 
consequences of the price-price and price-target interactions in Table E.1 should be 
independent of the method of allowance allocation. 
 
The coexistence of the EU ETS and CCL/CCA package is likely to create substantial 
administrative complexity for the energy intensive companies in Group 4, who would have 
two separate regulatory targets and would be simultaneously participating in two separate 
trading schemes. This seems a clear case of redundancy in regulation. But in other instances, 
the choice is not so clear-cut. For example, the double regulation of electricity for Group 1 
sites may be considered acceptable in order to incentivise downstream electricity efficiency. 
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Confusion over instrument timing 
There are important differences between the timing of the EU ETS, the CCL/CCA package 
and the Kyoto commitment period. The EU ETS is in phase with Kyoto, but is due to begin 
well before the CCAs end. In contrast, the CCAs extend beyond the end of the Kyoto 
commitment period, but targets are only negotiated up to 2010. The timing of the CCAs is 
established but the timing of the EU ETS is uncertain and could be subject to delay. The 
CCAs also include emissions trading provisions as part of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
(UK ETS), but at present this scheme does not extend beyond 2006. In addition, the 
possibility of trading allowances prior to the commitment period and banking allowances into 
the commitment period may create difficulties for Member State compliance. 
 
The situation would be greatly simplified if the UK could negotiate an opt-out of the EU ETS 
up to 2008, thereby postponing the point at which changes need to be made. The fact that the 
UK is one of the few Member States which is on course to meet its burden sharing 
obligations may provide a rationale for this. It is unlikely, however, that the UK could secure 
an opt out beyond 2008, and this could be counterproductive if it restricts the access of UK 
companies to the international carbon market. 
 
The issues raised by a transition to the EU ETS in 2005 are identical to those raised by a 
transition in 2008 - it is merely the political context that would have changed.  
Reducing the confusion – policy options 
Both the CCL/CCA package and the EU ETS may be modified in a variety of ways to reduce 
the negative impacts of interaction. While any changes to the CCL/CCAs are the 
responsibility of the UK government (although subject to clearance under State Aid rules), 
modifications to the EU ETS require agreement at the EU level. 
 
All options involve trade-offs, so the evaluation will depend upon the relative weight given to 
different policy objectives. The desirability of particular options may also depend on 
contextual factors which are uncertain or unknown.  
 
The report examines two or more policy options for each of the four Groups listed above. The 
selection is not exhaustive, but is intended to illustrate the difficulties that arise and the nature 
of the trade-offs that can be made. Each option is appraised using a multicriteria framework, 
with equal weight given to environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative 
simplicity, impacts on industrial competitiveness and political acceptability. The appraisal 
compares the option with the coexistence scenario. The results are summarised in Table E.2. 
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Table E.2 Summary evaluation of options for modifying the CCL/CCA package or the EU 
ETS 
Options Description Score 
Group 1 Coexistence scenario 14 
1a Modify CCL rate for electricity 14 
1b Remove CCL on electricity 16 
1c As for 1b, and make CCL a carbon tax 18 
Group 2 Coexistence scenario 12 
2a Remove CCL on electricity 14 
2b As for 2a and exempt Group 2 from CCL 15 
Group 3 Coexistence scenario 10 
3a Remove CCL on electricity 9 
3b As for 3a and change CCA to fuel only 11 
3c As for 3b and allow opt-in to EU ETS 13 
Group 4 Coexistence scenario 7 
4a Replace CCA with EU ETS and exempt from CCL 12 
4b As for 4a and allow opt-out from EU ETS 8 
Note: The total score is the sum of the individual scores for each of five evaluation criteria, where: 1 = 
very poor, and 5 = very good. 
 
The multicriteria assessment is subjective and in practice different stakeholder groups may 
both different scores to each option and give different weightings to each criteria. 
Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that: 
 
• All of the options offer an improvement on the coexistence scenario. In other words, 
leaving the CCL/CCA package unchanged is likely to be the worst possible option. 
• The majority of the options improve economic efficiency at the expense of environmental 
effectiveness. But most of the options which improve economic efficiency also improve 
political acceptability. 
• Allowing opt-ins to the EU ETS can offer a number of advantages, particularly if 
combined with restrictions on the fungibility of EU ETS and UK ETS allowances. In 
contrast, the opt-out option scores badly on all criteria except political acceptability. 
• Removing the CCL from electricity offers a number of advantages, as does exempting EU 
ETS participants from the CCL. 
Eliminating the confusion – policy recommendations 
The report recommends that greater priority should be given to economic efficiency and 
administrative simplicity when developing policy options. The principles and considerations 
which underlie this choice are as follows: 
 
• Need for change: The EU ETS will provide the framework for trading in the long-term, 
whether the UK joins in 2005 or 2008. But coexistence of the EU ETS with the existing 
CCL/CCA package appears untenable. This means that evaluation of possible changes to 
the CCL and CCAs needs to begin now. 
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• Goals: The development of policy options should not be based upon short-term 
expedients, but upon clear principles and long-term goals. For climate policy, a stable an 
effective policy framework is required during the commitment period. This means that 
policy should be developed by working back from where we want to be in 2008, rather 
than making minor adaptations to the existing mix.  
• Complexity: The existing UK policy mix is excessively complex and the relationship 
between different instruments is poorly understood by individual target groups. Hence, 
any changes should aim to simplify this mix and not to add further complexity. 
• Objectives: The objectives of individual policies should be clear. At present, the efficiency 
of the CCL is undermined because it is trying to meet several objectives at once in a 
manner that is far from transparent. Whether or not all these objectives are sensible, it 
should be possible to achieve several of them by combining a more efficient price 
instrument with supplementary measures to ameliorate unwanted impacts on, for example, 
the fuel poor. 
• Carbon pricing: Energy users in all sectors should pay for carbon emissions, whether 
through taxation or emissions trading. In the long term, organisations in the public, 
commercial and industrial sectors should either be paying a carbon tax or participating in 
a trading scheme. The CCAs should be seen as a transitional measure only. Supplementary 
policies will be required to address other barriers to energy efficiency and to achieve other 
policy objectives (e.g. promoting renewables). But for each target group, only a single 
instrument should be used for carbon pricing.  
• Revenue raising: Revenue recycling should be used to enhance the economic efficiency, 
environmental effectiveness and political acceptability of a carbon tax (as with the CCL). 
Similar benefits are only possible with the EU ETS if allowance auctioning is used. A 
pragmatic solution is to auction a small proportion of the allowances initially, and to 
increase that proportion over time. While industrial opposition to allowance auctioning is 
understandable, there appears to be no good reason why the UK government should 
continue to oppose any allowance auctioning in the EU ETS. 
• Electricity: The treatment of electricity emissions is of central importance. The EU ETS 
gives ownership of these emissions to electricity generators (direct allocation), while UK 
climate policy gives ownership to electricity consumers (indirect allocation). The former is 
preferable because: first, it gives ownership of electricity emissions to the companies 
directly responsible for the control of those emissions, thereby incentivising both fuel 
switching and energy efficiency; and second, it facilitates cross-border electricity trade in 
the EU. 
• Targets: Absolute targets are to be preferred over relative targets because of their greater 
environmental integrity and consistency with the national emission targets under Kyoto. 
The argument that absolute targets provide a ‘cap on growth’ is difficult to defend in the 
context of global carbon trading and projections of low allowance prices.  
• Trading: Allowance based trading (i.e. EU ETS) is to be preferred over baseline and credit 
trading (i.e. CCAs) due to its greater economic efficiency, lower transaction costs and 
consistency with the Kyoto framework. 
• Supplementaritry: A combination of the US withdrawal from Kyoto, excessive ‘hot air’ 
and generous sink provisions means that the international carbon market during the first 
commitment period is likely to be oversupplied. This creates a real risk that abatement in 
the EU will be achieved through purchasing cheap hot air rather than through domestic 
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action. But domestic abatement may be incentivised by either restricting the interface 
between the EU ETS and the international carbon market, or by retaining (or establishing) 
‘backup’ regulations for EU ETS participants. This is an important and difficult policy 
choice for the UK, since future allowance prices are highly uncertain and the UK has only 
limited control over the future evolution of the EU ETS. However, since both the 
Commission and other Member States would like the EU ETS to encourage domestic 
abatement, there appears a good chance that the import of hot air into the EU ETS will be 
restricted. This suggests that ‘backup’ regulations should be abandoned as they are likely 
to undermine economic efficiency, be more complex to administer and lead to additional 
costs for the target groups. 
 
These principles and considerations lead to the following recommendations for changes to the 
policy mix when the EU ETS is introduced:  
 
• The CCL should be removed from electricity and extended to all fossil fuels. The CCL 
should replace excise duties on oil products. 
• The basis of the CCL should change from energy to carbon content. 
• The level of the fuel-only CCL should be increased and the existing programmes funded 
by the CCL should continue.  
• Eligible installations should join the EU ETS and their existing CCA agreements should 
be terminated. 
• CCA facilities not eligible for the EU ETS should renegotiate their agreements such that 
the targets relate to fuel consumption only. 
• Participants in the EU ETS should be exempt from the CCL. 
• Before 2008, any trading between the UK ETS and the EU ETS should be controlled by a 
Gateway. After 2008, there should be no trading between the two schemes 
 
The analysis has also suggested that opt-in provisions at the installation or sector level could 
be a valuable addition to the EU ETS, while opt-out provisions at this level appear 
undesirable. A preferable approach may be to expand the sectoral coverage of the EU ETS 
over time.  
 
The recommendations are conditional upon restrictions being placed on the import of hot air 
into the EU ETS. If these conditions are not met, ‘backup’ regulations should again be 
considered. 
 
The changes proposed above will be far more difficult to implement by 2005 than by 2008. A 
national opt-out of Phase 1 therefore appears an attractive alternative as a transitional 
measure. 
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1. Origins of the climate confusion 
The traditional approach to environmental policy making focuses on the design, development 
and implementation of individual policy instruments. In turn, analysts spend much time 
studying the relative merits of different approaches and in advocating market-based 
alternatives to traditional regulations. But the policy space is becoming increasingly crowded. 
Multiple instruments are employed to meet multiple objectives, leading to inevitable 
interactions. While this interaction can be complementary and mutually reinforcing, there is 
also the risk that different policy instruments may interfere with one another and undermine 
the objectives, operation and credibility of each.  
 
Nowhere is this more the case than within climate policy. Over the last three years, the UK 
has developed a complex, elaborate and interdependent set of climate policies which are 
intended to deliver both the UK’s Kyoto obligations and its domestic target of a 20% 
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2010. Some elements of this policy mix, such as the Climate 
Change Levy (CCL), represent a significant political achievement given the strength of 
industrial opposition, while others, such as the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UKETS) and 
the Renewables Obligation (RO), are important and innovative policy experiments. This 
policy mix is now fully operational, delivering emission reductions and attracting interest 
from around the world. But parallel to these developments, the European Commission has 
been developing the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) (CEC, 2001b). This 
proposes a wide range of instruments and initiatives and includes as its centrepiece a draft 
Directive for a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme (the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
or EU ETS) which will cover some 45% of EU emissions (CEC, 2001a). If this proposal is 
approved, it will create the largest and most ambitious trading system ever implemented. The 
design of the EU ETS represents a pragmatic compromise between economic efficiency and 
political acceptability and there appears to be a good chance that it will be introduced in 2005 
as planned. But it is fundamentally incompatible with existing UK climate policy. 
 
If the Directive goes ahead as planned, the UK government will be faced with a choice 
between either accepting the coexistence of the EU ETS with UK climate policy, or replacing 
or modifying a number of policy instruments only a couple of years after they were 
introduced. The first option leads to double regulation, complexity and additional cost 
burdens for affected groups, while the second implies changing a complex and finely 
balanced policy mix which took several years to negotiate and was anticipated to remain 
stable until 2013. Neither option is attractive, both will attract opposition and both run the 
risk of stranded investment. The extent of disruption will depend on the nature of the changes 
that are proposed, but at the time of writing the UK government does not appear to have 
given a great deal of thought to the specific options available. 
 
This report is one of three which examine the complex interactions between the EU ETS and 
selected instruments within UK climate policy.2 The focus of this report is the interaction 
between the EU ETS and the UK Climate Change Levy (CCL) and Climate Change 
Agreements (CCAs). The aim of the report is to: 
 
                                                 
2 The first report explores the interaction between the EU ETS and the Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control (IPPC) Directive, the Renewables Obligation (RO), and the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) 
(Smith, 2002a). The third report will explore the interaction between the EU ETS and the UK Emissions 
Trading Scheme.  
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• explore the potential interactions between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA package; 
• explore the nature of the issues that arise and to identify ways in which conflicts can be 
avoided and synergies created; 
• improve understanding of policy interaction, both in general terms and between these 
specific instruments; and 
• develop suggestions for the future development of UK climate policy. 
The CCL is a downstream energy tax, while the CCAs are negotiated agreements with energy 
intensive manufacturing industry. The reason for grouping them together is that they operate 
as a package: the incentive for adopting a CCA is exemption from 80% of the CCL, while the 
penalty for failing to meet the targets under the CCAs is a return to paying the full rate of the 
CCL.3 
 
The close linkage of the CCL and the CCAs means that it is impossible to discuss the future 
development of one instrument without at the same time discussing the future development of 
the second. For example, one option to facilitate the introduction of the EU ETS is to make 
electricity exempt from the CCL. But this would mean that CCA companies would no longer 
receive any benefit from adhering to their electricity targets.4 A modification to the CCAs is 
likely to be required, but this could be costly, time-consuming and unpopular. It therefore 
follows that any policy options that are developed must consider the CCL/CCA package as a 
whole, and not just each instrument individually. 
 
The situation is further complicated by the trading provisions that have been developed for 
the CCAs. These mean that the CCA companies are also a part of the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme (UK ETS) (Sorrell, 2001a). However, the trading provisions are an addition to the 
basic negotiated agreements and were only finalised after the core elements of the agreements 
had been established (Smith, 2001). This report will discuss the implications for the CCA 
trading provisions, but the implications for the wider UK ETS, and in particular the ‘direct 
participants’, will be discussed in a separate report. 
1.1 Report structure 
The remainder of this section describes the current status and likely evolution of the proposed 
EU Directive. Section 2 introduces four generic themes that are particularly relevant to the 
interaction between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCAs. These are:  
 
• regulatory impact and cost incidence; 
• interaction and double regulation;  
• ownership of emissions and double counting; and  
• equity, competitiveness and equivalence of effort. 
 
                                                 
3 Further details on the CCL and CCAs are given in Smith (2001) and Sorrell (2001a). This report builds upon 
the characterisation and analysis presented in these earlier reports. 
4 Strictly, that component of their targets that relates to electricity consumption. 
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Sections 3-5 provide a detailed examination of the potential interaction between the EU ETS 
and the existing CCL/CCA package, assuming that the EUETS is implemented while the 
CCL/CCA package remains unchanged. In practice, this is very unlikely, but the assumption 
provides a useful framework for analysis. These sections aim to identify how and why the 
two policies affect each other, and the impact on directly and indirectly affected target 
groups. The analysis is broken down into three stages:  
 
• Section 3 examines the overlaps in the scope of the instruments, where scope means the 
sectors, sites, portions of sites and individual emission sources that are affected by each 
instrument. 
• Section 4 examines the overlaps in the objectives of the instruments and assesses the 
extent to which these reinforce or conflict with each other. 
•  Section 5 examines the interaction between the operation of each instrument and assesses 
whether the instruments are likely to be reinforcing, neutral or conflicting if they coexist. 
 
Section 6 examines the timing of the proposed EU ETS, both in relation to the CCL/CCA 
package and to the Kyoto commitment period, and examines the desirability of the UK opting 
out of the EU ETS in the period up to 2008. Following this, section 7 explores the options 
that are available to make the implementation of the EU ETS more effective, equitable and 
politically feasible. These options relate both to modifying the Directive itself (e.g. 
introducing opt-in provisions) and modifying the design and operation of the CCL and CCAs. 
The objective here is to explore the issues that arise under different policy options and to 
identify ways in which conflicts can be avoided. This allows conclusions to be drawn about 
policy interaction in general terms, as well as making specific policy recommendations. 
 
Finally, section 8 provides a summary of the key themes and conclusions. 
1.2 Status of the EU Directive 
The analysis of the EU ETS in this report uses the proposals in the published draft Directive 
(CEC, 2001a), the main elements of which are summarised in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Key elements of the proposed EU ETS 
Design feature  
Timing 
• 1st period 2005-2007 
• 2nd period 2008-2012, to coincide with the first Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period. 
Type of target • Absolute targets for all facilities. 
Sectors included 
• All combustion plant >20MW thermal input, including power generators 
• Oil refineries, coke ovens, non-ferrous metals, cement clinker, pulp from timber, 
glass and ceramics 
• NOT chemical, food and drink or waste incineration sectors 
Size of market • 4000-5000 installations 
• 45% of EU carbon dioxide emissions 
Allocation 
• Free during 1st period (2005-2007) 
• Possible partial or full auctioning 2008-2012 
• National allocation plans to be reviewed by EU for potential state aid. 
Greenhouse Gases 
• Only CO2 in 1st period.  
• Other gases could be brought in for 2nd period, but more work on monitoring 
protocols is required. 
Emission 
reduction projects 
• EC will prepare a separate instrument on project-based mechanisms. 
• Could include projects eventually depending on environmental integrity. 
Links with Kyoto 
mechanisms 
• Designed to be compatible with Kyoto emission trading. 
• Kyoto Protocol project mechanisms likely not included in first EU compliance 
period. This will depend on the development of international rules. 
Links with other 
schemes 
• Mutual recognition of allowances with other systems is possible (e.g., Accession 
Countries) 
Land-based 
sequestration 
(sinks) 
• Ineligible. 
Monitoring 
Reporting 
Verification 
• Common monitoring, verification and reporting obligations to be elaborated. 
• Verification through third-party or government authority. 
Allowance 
tracking 
• Linked/harmonised national registries with independent transaction log. 
• To be based on Kyoto Protocol registry guidelines and US Acid Rain Program. 
Compliance 
• 50 Euro/ton penalty across EU, or twice the market price, whichever is higher 
(2005-2007) 
• 100 Euro/Ton penalty across EU, or twice the market price whichever is 
higher(after 2008) 
Banking 
• Banking across years within each compliance period 
• Member States can determine banking from first compliance period (2005-2007) 
to first Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008-2012). 
Review of system 
design  • Review in 2006. 
Source: CEC (2001a); Irving (2002) 
 
The proposed Directive is the subject of intense negotiation and it is likely that changes will 
be made before it is finally implemented. At the time of writing (October 2002), several 
amendments have been proposed by the European Parliament, but these have not been 
accepted by the Commission (ENDS, 2002a). Ministers failed to reach agreement at the 
Environment Council meeting in October 2002, so the Directive will now be debated at the 
December meeting. If agreement is not reached, the prospects of Phase 1 of the scheme 
beginning in 2005 look fairly slim. But even if agreement is reached, it will still be a major 
challenge to get all the domestic legislation in place in time for a 2005 start. Problems may 
arise with allowance allocation, both within and between Member States, and with modifying 
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existing legislation such as the CCL/CCA package. As a consequence, the proposed start date 
of 2005 for Phase 1 of the EU ETS may be optimistic. 
 
The elements of the proposed Directive that have proved particularly contentious during the 
negotiation process include the following: 
 
• National opt-out: The Directive is intended to be mandatory in the 2005-2007 period, but 
this is opposed by the UK and Germany. These hold a large share of the total number of 
votes and if one or two smaller Member States join them, they will have a blocking 
majority. Germany wants to opt-out of the scheme up to 2008, in order to protect its 
negotiated agreements, but is more open to a mandatory scheme post 2008. A national opt-
out up until 2008 is also preferred by the UK government, in order to avoid modifications 
to its existing policy framework. But in both cases, the requirement that national industry 
is ‘regulated by other policies and measures that represent at least a similar economic 
effort in terms of emissions abatement.’ (CEC, 2000) is likely to prove challenging to 
demonstrate.  
• Sector/company/installation opt-in or opt-out: An alternative to a national opt-in/opt-out is 
to allow individual sectors/companies/installations to choose whether or not to join the 
scheme. For example, the UK would like opt-in provisions to allow direct participants in 
the UK Emissions Trading Scheme to be able to join the EU scheme since, at present, all 
would be excluded. There are a number of means through which this could be achieved, 
but all create a range of problems and are likely to increase the burden of administering 
the scheme. 
• Sectoral coverage: A number of Member States consider that the proposed sectoral 
coverage is inadequate. In particular, there is a view that the chemicals sector should also 
be included (although this is opposed by Germany). There is, however, broad support for 
regulation under IPPC as the basis for inclusion. 
• Gas coverage: The proposal to confine the pre-2008 scheme to CO2 has been subject to 
some criticism. The Commission argues that monitoring protocols are inadequate for other 
GHGs, but the UK argues that adequate monitoring protocols are already being used 
effectively in the UK ETS. 
• Allocation: This will inevitably be highly controversial. At present, there is no consensus 
on the overall CO2 limits, the rules for allocation between individual installations, or the 
sole use of free allocation5 in the initial period. Most Member States want free allocation, 
but the European Parliament has proposed auctions for 15% of the allowances. 
Furthermore, the allocation criteria listed in Annex 3 of the Directive are potentially 
contradictory.  
• Interfaces: Many business groups would like to see the scheme opened up to Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and to 
Emission Reduction Units from Joint Implementation (JI) projects during Phase 1, while 
during Phase 2 they would like access to Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from 
International Emissions Trading (IET). The Commission has promised a second Directive 
on interfaces to JI and CDM, but both the Commission and the European Parliament are 
                                                 
5 The term ‘grandfathering’ is often used to refer to free allocation. But it is more precise meaning is free 
allocation of permits on the basis of historic emissions (hence the idea of inheritance). Permits can be allocated 
free according to other rules, such as emission benchmarks, which may not include any reference to historic 
emissions. 
 6
opposed to the import of AAUs since they would like the Directive to ensure emission 
reductions within the EU, rather than encourage the purchase of ‘hot air’. The European 
Parliament has voted to exclude CERs from the scheme during Phase 1, and to prevent the 
import of CERs or ERUs from sink or nuclear projects during Phase 2. But given the 
likely fungibility of international carbon commodities after 2008, such rules may be 
difficult to apply. Furthermore, the Commission has proposed potential bilateral interfaces 
with other emissions trading schemes which may themselves have different rules for 
interfacing with the international market. Any such interfaces run the risk of reducing 
allowance prices and thereby reducing the incentive for domestic emission reductions. 
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2. Understanding the climate confusion 
To analyse the potential interaction between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA package, it is 
necessary to examine four generic themes: 
• regulatory impact and cost incidence; 
• policy interaction and double regulation; 
• ownership of emissions and double counting; 
• differential treatment and equivalence of effort 
 
This section explores each of these themes in turn, building upon earlier work from the 
INTERACT project (Sorrell, 2001b).  
2.1 Regulatory impact and cost incidence 
A key issue is the likely economic impact of a proposed policy instrument upon different 
groups, including consumers, shareholders, suppliers and employees. To estimate this with 
any confidence would require economic modelling, but some general comments may be 
made. 
2.1.1 Identifying cost incidence 
Two important distinctions are: 
 
• between short-run and long-run costs; and 
• between direct and indirect impacts. 
 
In the short-run, capital is fixed and the scope for behavioural change is limited. For example, 
firms faced with an energy price increase may have only limited scope for reducing energy 
consumption through improved housekeeping. In the long-run, however, all inputs are 
variable. Firms may substitute capital for energy through new investment. The time horizon 
over which this can be achieved will depend upon the nature of the technology - for example, 
power stations have longer lifetimes than domestic appliances. This means that the short-run 
versus long-run distinction may be more usefully seen as a continuum - the relevant question 
is the cost impacts for a particular group over a specified period of time. If the cost impacts 
are large, existing capital may become uneconomic (‘stranded assets’). And in all cases, 
changing factor prices may stimulate technological innovation. 
 
Individual policy instruments directly affect a particular target group by imposing rules and 
obligations on that group. For example, the EU ETS requires participants to meet an 
emissions cap. These obligations will impose costs on the target group and may incentivise 
behavioural change, such as investment in energy efficiency. In turn, these costs may be 
passed on to other groups, such as shareholders and consumers. For example, the costs 
resulting from the emissions cap on electricity generators may be passed on to electricity 
consumers in the form of higher electricity prices. These groups are indirectly affected by the 
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policy instrument. But the causal chain flows further, extending ultimately throughout the 
economy. For example, firms faced with higher electricity prices may pass a portion of these 
costs on in higher product prices and this in turn will have impacts on consumption, 
investment and welfare.  
 
In determining cost impacts, we must therefore distinguish whether direct or indirect impacts 
are being considered, and the time period over which these are being assessed. Partial 
equilibrium economic models confine attention to direct impacts,6 while general equilibrium 
models take into account full indirect impacts throughout the economy. Both may 
accommodate behavioural change over different time periods, although the results will 
depend finely on the model’s scope, structure and assumptions (e.g. assumed elasticities). 
Input-output models take both direct and indirect impacts into account, but cannot 
accommodate behavioural change. Different techniques can lead to very different results.7  
 
At each point in the economy, economic actors can pass the costs resulting from a policy 
instrument either forwards to buyers or backwards to suppliers of factor inputs (Cramton and 
Kerr, 1998). For example, industrial companies subject to an energy tax may either increase 
product prices (pass to consumers), reduce the consumption or unit price paid for supply 
inputs (pass to suppliers) or reduce dividends and capital gains (pass to shareholders). In each 
case, the extent to which costs can be passed on will depend upon the market situation of the 
firm and the elasticities of demand and supply. An individual firm in a competitive product 
market is a price taker, and faces a horizontal demand curve. If this firm faces a price 
increase while other firms do not, there will be no scope for it to increase its product prices - 
the cost increases must be absorbed by lower returns. However, if all firms in a particular 
product market face a similar price increase, a portion will be passed on to consumers (unless 
demand is perfectly elastic) while a portion will be borne by firms. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1 which shows the impact of an energy tax on the market for fuel.  
                                                 
6 In the example given here, the direct impacts here would include the electricity price increases faced by 
industrial consumers, but would not follow the economic consequences of the resulting increase in product 
prices. 
7 For example, the regressive impact of energy taxes is generally estimated to be less in general equilibrium 
studies than in partial equilibrium studies (Caslert and Rafiqui, 1993). 
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Figure 1.1 Impact of an energy tax on fuel prices 
 
Prior to imposing the tax, quantity Q1 of fuel clears the market at price P1. The government 
then imposes a specific8 tax, t, which means that the price of consumer pays must exceed the 
net price the seller receives per unit sold by t. This leads to a consumer price P2, a supplier 
price Ps and a reduction in the volume of fuel sold to Q2. At this point: 
 
• the government receives revenue equivalent to A+D; 
• there is a loss in consumer surplus equivalent to A+B (consumer surplus = difference 
between consumer valuation and price paid); 
• there is a loss in producer surplus equivalent to D+C (producer surplus = difference 
between total revenue and total cost); 
• there is a dead-weight loss equivalent to B+C (dead-weight loss = (change in producer 
surplus + change in consumer surplus) – government revenue) 
 
Consumer prices do not increase by the full value of the tax, t. Instead, they only increase by 
(P2-P1). The size of this price increase will depend upon the relative elasticities of demand 
and supply. The fraction of the tax that is borne by consumers is given by: 
 
 Es / (Es + Ed) 
 
Where Es = elasticity of supply ((dQ/Q)/(dP/P)); and Ed = elasticity of demand. 
 
                                                 
8 A specific tax uses a fixed per unit rate for all levels of consumption (e.g. p/kWh). An ad valorem tax, such as 
VAT, would use percentage rates. This is an important distinction for energy taxes as unit energy price (p/kWh) 
reduces as consumption levels increase. A specific tax would have a greater impact on large energy users than 
an ad valorem tax.  
Impact of an energy tax on fuel prices
Price S
     P1
     P2
D
Q1 Quantity of fuel
A
D
B
C
Q2
     Ps
Tax raises consumer price to P2.  Suppliers receive Ps
Quantity consumed reduces to  Q2
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level:
t
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Again, in the short-run demand for fuel may be relatively inelastic. But in the longer run, 
consumers can invest in new and more energy efficient equipment 
2.1.2 Economic rent  
Climate policy aims to reduce carbon emissions through reducing fossil fuel consumption. It 
attaches a price to carbon emissions, either explicitly or implicitly, which reflects an 
emerging scarcity in a resource – the ability of the atmosphere to absorb CO2 emissions. This 
effectively translates into an emerging scarcity in fossil fuel resources which are currently 
required as an input to production. Economic rent is defined as the difference between what 
firms are willing to pay for an input less the minimum amount necessary to buy and use that 
input. The producer surplus, illustrated in Figure 1.1, is that sum of economic rents earned 
from all scarce inputs. The fuel tax erodes producer surplus by reducing the economic rent on 
fossil fuel inputs. A portion of the rent is captured by the government in the form of revenue, 
which may be recycled in a variety of ways. For example, the revenue could be used to 
reduce government borrowing, reduce labour, consumption or capital gains taxes, or 
compensate directly affected groups. This in turn will have indirect effects throughout the 
economy. A number of studies have suggested that overall gains in economic efficiency may 
be achieved through using the revenues to reduce other forms of (‘distortionary’) taxation 
(Parry, 1997). This has become know as the ‘double dividend’ debate (Pezzey and Park, 
1998). 
 
These considerations are particularly important to the choice between auctioning and free 
allocation of permits in an emissions trading scheme. Allowances represent a new input to 
production whose supply is fixed. As illustrated by Figure 1.2, the price of allowances is 
determined by the intersection between the demand and supply curves and the economic rent 
is equal to the entire value of the allowances. Since this may greatly exceed the total 
expenditure on compliance by all participating firms (typically by a factor of ten or more), the 
capture of this rent is a question of the utmost political importance. With free allocation of 
permits, this economic rent is allocated free to participating firms, while with auctions, the 
economic rent is captured by government (unless the auction revenues are redistributed to the 
bidders). Since the revenue generated by auctions may be used either to reduce other forms of 
taxation, and thereby improve overall economic efficiency, or to compensate affected groups, 
auctions tend to be strongly advocated by economists (Cramton and Kerr, 1997).9 But 
industry is equally strongly opposed to any auctioning proposals and considerations of 
political feasibility have dictated that free allocation remains the preferred choice in all 
existing and proposed schemes to date. A potential compromise that balances the objectives 
of efficiency, equity and political feasibility is a hybrid scheme, in which a proportion of the 
allowances are allocated free and the rest auctioned. Pezzey (2002) has explored this in detail 
and recommends that firms receive enough free permits so that their shareholders suffer no 
significant overall loss of welfare. 
                                                 
9 Auctions have the additional benefit of providing a clear price signal for allowances. But this is secondary to 
the issue of economic rent and revenue raising. 
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Figure 1.2 Economic rent from carbon allowances 
2.1.3 The impact of a trading scheme on product prices 
An important and (to non-economists) counterintuitive result from economic theory is that, 
while the choice between auctioning and free allocation may lead to different costs for 
individual firms, there should be no difference in the costs passed on in product prices. This 
result rests on a number of assumptions including: 
• all firms in a particular product market are covered by the allowance program;  
• firms are profit maximising and take rational decisions about entry and exit;  
• there is perfect competition (no market power) in both the product and allowance market;  
• product prices are not subject to economic regulation (an important assumption for the 
electricity industry); and  
• the capital market is perfect.  
With an auction, firms incur costs for abatement plus the allowances purchased in the auction 
which are used to cover residual emissions (area OPAC in Figure 1.3). Both are real 
accounting costs. With free allocation, firms only incur abatement costs (area ACD), 
including the net cost of any acquisition of allowances. But the allowances used to cover 
residual emissions have an opportunity cost in that they could be sold on to the allowance 
market. The assumption is that this opportunity cost will be treated identically to real 
accounting costs in a firm's pricing decisions. Firms will treat their use of allowances to cover 
emissions as if this incurred a cost even if the firms received the allowances for free.  
Economic rent from carbon
allowances
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Figure 1.3 Costs to an individual firm with allowance auctioning 
 
With both free allocation and auctions, the choice to increase output (and consequently 
emissions) has a cost equal to the market price of allowances multiplied by the consequent 
emissions. This is an opportunity cost with for freely allocated allowances and a ‘real’ 
accounting cost with auctioned allowances. The rational firm should treat these in an identical 
manner. Viewing the situation another way, the wealth consisting of grandfathered 
allowances represents a lump-sum profit which should not influence product pricing decisions 
Product pricing should be based upon marginal costs, not historic costs. In the long-run 
equilibrium: 
 
• the marginal abatement cost of all firms will be equal, and equal to the market price of 
allowances; 
• the product price will be equal to long-run marginal cost, where this cost includes 
opportunity costs; 
 
This result may be demonstrated algebraically. We have: 
 
Profit = P(q)*q - CF - CV(q) - A[AB] – PP*AU - PP*[E(q) - AU – AB – G] 
 
Where:  
P(q) = the firms inverse demand curve,  
q = product quantity,  
E(q) = unconstrained emissions for output q 
CF = fixed costs,  
CV(q) = variable costs 
AB = Abated Emissions 
Costs of auctioned allowances
Cost MC
Emissions
Allowance
price
Control
costs
Cost of
residual 
emissions
Original emissions = OC;  Emissions after permit scheme =OD
Uncontrolled costs with permit scheme = OPBC
Costs after permit  scheme = Control costs ADC + Allowance costs OPAD = OPAC
At the optimum,  marginal abatement costs = permit price for all sources
P
O
A B
CD
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A[AB] = abatement cost, which is increasing in abated emissions AB 
AU = number of allowances purchased at auction 
PP = allowance price in auction which is equal to allowance price in allowance market 
(perfect information assumption) 
G = no. of freely allocated allowances 
 
The number of allowances that have to be bought or can be sold on the allowance market is 
then just [E(x)-AU-AB-G], the last term in the equation. 
 
For auctioning G = 0, while for free allocation AU=0. 
 
The firm faces the problem to maximise total profits and to cover all emissions through 
primary allocation (auction or grandfathering), abatement, or purchasing emissions on the 
allowance market. Since the firm is assumed to be a price taker in both the product and 
allowance markets, it takes P and PP as given and picks output q and abated emissions AB to 
maximise profits. Hence, for maximising profits, we take (partial) derivatives with respect to 
output q and with respect to abated emissions AB and equate both to zero: 
 
(1) P(q) + q*dP(q)/dq - dCV(q)/dq - PP*dE(q)/dq = 0 
 
(2) –dA/dAB + PP = 0 
 
 
If the firm is a price taker in the product market, then dP(q)/dq = 0 and the product price is 
fixed at P. We can rewrite (1) as: 
 
(1)’ P = dCV(q)/dq + PP*dE(q)/dq  
 
Where: P = product price 
 
Equations (1) and (1)’ show that firms chose output such that the marginal production costs 
plus the marginal costs for covering emissions associated with the additional output are just 
equal to the product price. From equation (2) we see, that optimising firms choose the level of 
abatement such that the marginal costs of abatement are equal to the price of allowances in 
the market, i.e. firms abate up to the point where they are indifferent between abating 
internally or buying on the market. Since the price of allowances PP is equal for all firms, in 
equilibrium, marginal abatement costs are equal across all firms. Thus, emissions trading 
results in an efficient allocation of resources in the economy.  
 
The important point is that G does not feature in either equation. In other words, the level of 
freely allocated emissions (G), which is fixed and not a function of current output, does not 
affect the company’s decisions. This implies that a firm which is required to acquire all its 
permits through an auction (G=0) will not take any different decisions on either output (q) or 
abatement (AB) compared to a firm which receives permits free of charge. The equation 
shows that the firm will always regard higher emissions as costs. Higher emissions mean 
foregone allowance sales, which is an opportunity cost.  
 
 
In theory, therefore, the difference between auctioning and free allocation lies in the capture 
of the economic rent, rather than the cost increases for consumers. With free allocation, the 
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economic rent is captured by the participating firms. This is equivalent to a lump sum subsidy 
and will increase the value of the participating firms, thereby making shareholders wealthier. 
With auctioning, the economic rent is captured by the government and may be used in a 
variety of ways throughout the economy, including compensating affected groups. But the 
price impact for the consumers of the firms products will be identical in both cases. The price 
impact results solely from the emission target (i.e. the scarcity value of carbon) and the 
corresponding abatement costs. 
 
Whether this counterintuitive result holds in practice will depend upon the validity of the 
assumptions behind the economic model. For example, agency problems and other factors 
within firms may move them away from profit maximising behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) or a firm may be able to exercise market power. In the US Acid Rain Program the 
participating electricity generators were subject to utility regulation, which distorted product 
pricing by valuing allowances at historic cost (zero) rather than opportunity cost (Sorrell, 
1994). In the case of the UK, the electricity generation market is liberalised with relatively 
limited market concentration, so neither of the last two problems should apply.  
 
The result may also not hold in practice as a consequence of political objections to firm’s 
pricing decisions. As indicated above, free allocation is equivalent to a lump sum subsidy 
from the government to the participating firms which acts to increase shareholder wealth. But 
in theory the pricing decisions made by the firms ignore this subsidy. Consumers face the 
same price impacts as in an auctioning scheme, but without the compensating use of auction 
revenues. This may be viewed politically as a form of double charging. Consumers pay once 
as taxpayers, in creating the subsidy, and a second time as consumers in purchasing the 
sector’s products. The difficulty here is that the subsidy does not result from explicit use of 
taxpayers money, but results instead from the social creation of scarcity (carbon emissions) 
and the foregoing of the corresponding economic rent (in the form of auction revenues) that 
result from this scarcity. The ‘inequity’ of this arrangement is therefore less obvious than 
with an explicit subsidy. 
 
In practice, political objections to product pricing decisions may be relatively weak. First, it 
may be difficult to demonstrate the explicit link between the emissions cap and final product 
prices - industry will have private information on production costs and many other factors are 
likely to complicate the picture. Second, the processes by which government could intervene, 
such as through competition law, will be indirect, inefficient, time-consuming and costly. 
2.2 Interaction and double regulation 
2.2.1 Policy interaction 
In a crowded policy space with multiple policy instruments, it is very likely that individual 
target groups will be directly or indirectly affected by more than one instrument. For 
example, energy intensive manufacturing installations in the UK are currently; i) regulated 
under the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive; ii) subject to targets 
under the CCAs; iii) paying 20% of the CCL; and iv) incurring additional costs for electricity 
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as a result of the Renewables Obligation.10 These four instruments all have a primary or 
subsidiary objective of reducing carbon emissions and all are affecting energy intensive 
manufacturing installations. 
 
If we expanded this list to include the other environmental policy obligations that affect 
energy intensive manufacturing installations (e.g. the Large Combustion Plant Directive) the 
picture would become more complex. And it would become very complex indeed if we 
included all the other, non-environmental policy instruments that also affected these 
installations (e.g. competition policy). In principle, policy instruments that are targeted at 
very different objectives should be relatively free of interaction. But a notable feature of 
climate change is that energy use is implicated in practically all economic activities and 
hence affected by a wide range of government policies. For example, policies to improve air 
quality by reducing the sulphur content of fuel will lead to increased energy use and hence 
increased CO2 emissions from oil refineries. This means that there is very likely to be both 
interaction between climate policy instruments (internal interaction), and interaction between 
climate and non-climate policy instruments (external interaction). In both cases we may have:  
• interaction between policy objectives: where the achievement of the objectives of one 
policy is likely to affect the achievement of the objectives of another policy; and 
• interaction between policy obligations and incentives: where the operation of one policy is 
likely to affect the operation of another policy.  
Since all actions imply opportunity costs there is a sense in which no two policies are entirely 
neutral. Indeed, the cumulative burden of regulation is a common focus of complaint by 
business and is used as a rationale for deregulation, even where the measures are targeted at 
different problems. But in the INTERACT project, our focus is on the (internal) interaction 
between individual climate policy instruments. 
2.2.2 Double regulation 
Double regulation may be loosely defined as: ‘a situation where an individual target group is 
affected by two or more instruments that have very similar objectives.’ 
 
The term suggests that there is redundancy in the policy mix and that having two or more 
instruments operating together to achieve a similar objective is unnecessary and is leading to 
excessive costs. An example could be where a participant in a carbon emissions trading 
scheme is also subject to an energy or carbon tax, where both have the primary objective of 
reducing CO2 emissions. This situation already exists in the UK (direct participants in the UK 
ETS remain subject to the CCL) and may well become more common with the future 
implementation of the EU ETS. 
 
The European Commission, in the development of the European Climate Change Programme 
(ECCP), has stated that is wishes to ‘...set up a coherent and co-ordinated framework of 
policy instruments, avoiding double or multiple regulation…..’ (CEC, 2001b). Unfortunately, 
the ECCP does not consider policy interaction in a systematic way and instead simply lists 
the policies it would like in addition to the EU ETS. 
 
                                                 
10 The Renewables Obligation gives targets to electricity suppliers to purchase a certain quantity of renewable 
electricity, rising to 10% of the total in 2010. Since renewable electricity is more expensive than fossil fuel 
electricity, the additional costs will be passed on to electricity consumers. 
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‘Double regulation’ is a negative term, but some forms of double regulation may be 
acceptable to the parties involved. For example, compliance with the UK Renewables 
Obligation in 2010 is expected to lead to an average electricity price increase for all types of 
consumer of 4.4% compared to 1999. At the same time, many of these consumers will be 
paying the CCL on electricity consumption, which at the current rate of 0.43p/kWh leads to 
an average 13.7% increase in electricity prices above 2001 levels for industrial consumers 
(3.135p/kWh). Taking both instruments together, the total increase in electricity prices for 
industrial consumers is likely to exceed 15%.11 Since both the CCL and the Renewables 
Obligation have a primary objective of reducing CO2 emissions, this could be viewed 
negatively as double regulation. But in practice, this has not been the case. The coexistence of 
these two measures has proved broadly acceptable.12 There are two reasons for this: 
 
• Multiple objectives: Each instrument has multiple objectives, and the full set of objectives 
could not be achieved by either instrument acting alone. For example, the objectives of the 
Renewables Obligation include encouraging the innovation and diffusion of renewable 
energy technologies, reducing technology costs, improving energy security and 
ameliorating conventional pollution problems such as acid rain. Reducing carbon 
emissions is only one objective and while the Renewables Obligation aims to encourage 
economic efficiency in renewables deployment, it recognises that renewable energy does 
not offer the lowest cost carbon abatement option in the short-term. Government support 
of renewable electricity is justified by these wider policy objectives and the acceptance of 
the Obligation suggests that these have legitimacy. 
• Reinforcing incentives: The net effect of the two instruments acting together may be 
greater than either acting alone. For example, electricity from ‘new renewable’ sources is 
exempt from the CCL, and this may act as an important demand side boost to renewables 
to complement the supply side obligation on electricity suppliers. The net result may be 
faster, greater or lower cost deployment of renewables than would have been achieved by 
the Obligation acting alone. 
 
The term ‘double regulation’ therefore oversimplifies a complex reality. There may be many 
instances where double regulation is either acceptable or positively beneficial. To assess 
whether this is the case it is necessary to examine (Sorrell, 2001b):13 
• The nature of the objectives: The objectives of each policy must be systematically 
compared, taking into account the likely changes required of the target groups to meet the 
policy objectives. Each pair of objectives may then be classified as: a) counterproductive, 
where the achievement of one objective is likely to undermine the achievement of another; 
b) neutral, where the achievement of one objective is likely to have no or minimal effect 
on the achievement of the second objective; or c) reinforcing, where the achievement of 
one objective is likely to reinforce the achievement of another. In practice, this judgement 
is one of degree, distinguishing objectives which are slightly counterproductive from those 
which are inherently incompatible. 
                                                 
11 This assumes that the additional costs incurred by suppliers in purchasing renewables are passed on equally to 
all electricity consumers. But some of the costs may be recouped by selling renewable electricity at a premium 
price, while at the same time renewables are exempt from the CCL. The precise impact on individual consumers 
and for individual kWh of electricity may therefore be different. 
12 Which is not to say that the policy process was entirely straightforward. For an account of the political 
debates leading up to the introduction of the CCL, see Smith (2002b). 
13 In some cases, this analysis could use quantitative modelling, but this report will use qualitative methods. 
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• The nature of the obligations and incentives: Each instrument imposes obligations and 
incentives on the target groups which will encourage behavioural change. As with 
objectives, the obligations and incentives may be compared to identify their degree of 
compatibility. This may be considered as lying on a continuum from mutually reinforcing 
to direct conflict.  
 
Hence, the objective is not to avoid ‘double regulation’, but to determine the circumstances in 
which interaction between two policies is either acceptable or unacceptable. This involves the 
evaluation of particular policy options against specified evaluation criteria, such as economic 
efficiency and political acceptability. In particular, the interaction should not be perceived to 
be placing an unfair burden on particular target groups.  
 
Taking the example of the EU ETS, it is not immediately obvious that a participant in the 
trading scheme should be exempt from the CCL. To assess whether this is desirable will 
require an analysis of the overall objectives of each policy and of the nature of the obligations 
and incentives, including the size of the resulting price signals and the corresponding 
economic impacts. This is one of the objectives of this report. 
2.3 Ownership of emissions and double counting 
2.3.1 Trading scheme designs 
There are two broad choices in the design of cap and trade schemes for CO2 emissions:  
• Upstream: An upstream scheme requires fossil fuel producers, together with processors 
and transporters to surrender allowances for the CO2 emissions embodied in the fuel 
processed, transported or sold by them. Participants include oil refineries, coal producers 
and gas processing plants. Nearly all emissions from fossil fuels would be covered. 
• Downstream: A downstream system requires fossil fuel users to surrender allowances for 
their emissions. Users could include electricity generators, industrial plants and 
commercial facilities. Administrative considerations are likely to confine this type of 
system to larger users and hence only a portion of fossil fuel emissions would be covered. 
 
A hybrid scheme is also possible. In this, large users would be required to hold allowances 
for their emissions, while smaller energy users would be covered upstream by requiring fuel 
producers to surrender allowances for the fuels consumed by these users. In this way, 
comprehensive coverage of fossil fuel emissions could be achieved. 
 
Each option has pros and cons, but the upstream scheme presents particular difficulties as it 
would effectively place a cap on the market for fossil fuels. If fossil fuel demand is inelastic 
in the short term, fuel prices may rise significantly, with negative effects for all classes of 
consumer including householders. The economic and equity consequences may be considered 
unacceptable, particularly for low income consumers. If allowances were freely allocated, 
energy producers would be receiving an extremely valuable asset, equivalent to a lump sum 
subsidy, which may be hard to justify in the context of high price rises.14 Energy consumers 
                                                 
14 A similar subsidy is implied by free allocation of allowances to fuel consumers in a downstream scheme, but 
here there may be a stronger argument that the subsidy is required to compensate for economic losses. 
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on the other hand, would be required to pay extra costs for their entire fuel purchases, in 
contrast to a downstream scheme with free allocation where consumers would only pay for 
the additional allowances required for compliance. From the perspective of consumer an 
upstream scheme with free allocation is similar to a carbon tax, but with the level of the ‘tax’ 
being unpredictable and without revenue recycling to the affected groups.15 As a 
consequence, most practical policy proposals to date, including the EU ETS, have focused on 
downstream schemes. The Norwegian proposals are an exception, as these are for a hybrid 
scheme (Hassellknippe, and Hoibye, 2000). 
 
If a downstream scheme is chosen, there is a further choice required on the treatment of 
electricity generation (Zapfel and Vanio, 2001): 
• Direct allocation: Here, carbon allowances are allocated to electricity generators based on 
fossil-fuel use, with energy using organisations being required to hold allowances for on-
site fossil fuel use.  
• Indirect allocation: Here, carbon allowances are allocated to electricity consumers based 
upon electricity consumption and an assumed carbon intensity of electricity production 
and distribution. Energy users then hold allowances for both electricity consumption and 
the direct use of fossil fuels. Electricity generators are exempt from the trading scheme.  
Direct allocation has been chosen for the EU ETS. Here, electricity prices will rise to reflect a 
portion of the marginal abatement cost for scheme participants. Electricity consumers 
participating in the trading scheme will make abatement decisions (i.e. choose between 
energy efficiency, substitution between electricity and fossil fuel, cogeneration, and use of 
the allowance market) based upon: a) an electricity price which has internalised the cost of 
carbon abatement; and b) the price of carbon allowances relating to their on-site use of fossil 
fuel. 
 
In contrast, the UK ETS and the CCAs have chosen indirect allocation. This follows the 
political objective of preventing electricity cost rises from being passed on to domestic 
consumers. This would be hard to avoid if allowances were required for fossil fuel inputs to 
electricity generation. 
2.3.2 Ownership and control of emissions 
Ownership 
As with upstream and downstream, both direct and indirect allocation have advantages and 
disadvantages and each option is internally consistent. But problems arise when attempts are 
made to either:  
• make a transition from one type of scheme to another; or  
• trade fuel, electricity or allowances between participants in two different types of trading 
scheme.  
This is because the ownership of emissions may become disputed. ‘Ownership’ here is 
defined as the legal right to make use of a portion of the atmospheric commons as a sink for 
carbon emissions. Emission limits, whether fixed or tradable, are therefore understood as a 
                                                 
15 If allowances are freely allocated there is no revenue to recycle.  
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form of property right over the atmospheric commons. Here, ownership is understood as 
having three elements (Furubotn, and Richter, 1997, p77): 
• ius utendi: the right to make use of an asset; 
• ius fruendi: the right to appropriate the returns from an asset; and  
• ius abutendi: the right to change the form, substance and location of an asset, including 
sale to another at a mutually agreed upon price.  
 
Fixed emission limits represent a limited form of property right over the use of the 
atmospheric commons. They give the holder the rights of ius utendi and ius fruendi but, since 
the emission limit is not tradable, they do not provide the right of ius abutendi. In contrast, 
allowances in an emissions trading scheme can be considered a fuller form of property right 
as they provide the holder with all three dimensions of ownership, including the right to sell 
the allowances and to benefit from the proceeds of that sale.  
Control 
In the simplest situation, the owner of an asset has full control over its use, which in turn 
dictates the income or utility derived from the asset. For example, an individual normally has 
full control over the use of her motor car. In more complex situations there is a separation 
between ownership and control. For example, stockholders have ownership of a company, 
but the responsibility for day-to-day operation and investment decisions is in the hands of the 
company managers.16 In the case of emissions trading, downstream schemes and schemes 
with direct allocation allocate the ownership of the allowances to those organisations that 
have direct control over emissions (e.g. fuel users; electricity generators). In contrast, 
upstream schemes and schemes with indirect allocation allocate the ownership of the 
allowances to those organisations that have only indirect control over the corresponding 
emissions (e.g. fuel suppliers; electricity consumers).  
 
The relative allocation of ownership and control has important implications for the operation 
of a trading scheme, including the incentives created for participants and the corresponding 
investment and behavioural changes. This is particularly important for the treatment of 
electricity. Here, electricity generators have full and direct control over the carbon intensity 
of electricity generation through investment and operational decisions, such as fuel switching. 
However, generators have only indirect and partial control over total electricity demand, 
through changes in electricity prices.17 Changes in demand will lead to changes in emissions, 
but these changes derive from the operational and investment decisions of electricity 
consumers. These in turn face electricity costs which include the generation cost of electricity 
which has internalised the market price of carbon, together with the costs associated with 
other upstream and downstream regulatory interventions. In this respect, the generators are no 
different from any other participants in a downstream trading scheme: all participants have 
only partial control over the demand for their product and all participants may have product 
demand influenced by other factors including environmental regulations. 
 
In contrast, electricity consumers have full and direct control over their electricity demand, 
through investment and operational decisions such as energy efficiency, but have no control 
                                                 
16 This ‘principal-agent’ situation is the basis of an extensive economic literature (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
17 A cap on generator emissions may incentivise generators to engage in demand-side management activities, if 
these can reduce demand and hence emissions at a lower cost than supply-side efficiency improvements or fuel 
switching. But this raises a number of complex issues regarding the structure of the electricity industry. 
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over the carbon intensity of electricity generation. Partial control could be envisaged through 
the use of ‘carbon labelling’ of electricity, but at present this option is not available in the 
UK. Instead, the carbon intensity of imported electricity is typically estimated using a fixed 
emission factor (see section 4.3). An important consequence of this is that there is likely to be 
a discrepancy between the estimated emissions calculated using the fixed carbon intensity 
factor, and the actual emissions from electricity generation. This discrepancy may be 
expected to increase with time. 
Ownership disputes 
Disputes over the ownership of emissions may arise both with traditional regulations, using 
fixed emission limits, and with emissions trading schemes. A dispute over ownership may 
arise, for example, where a source has a fixed emission limit and is at the same time 
participating in an emissions trading scheme. Both the fixed and the tradable emission limit 
given the source ownership rights over a portion of the atmospheric commons: if in this 
situation, a single source has been give two separate and overlapping property rights. 
However, this situation may equally be viewed as a particular type of double regulation. The 
more interesting situations result from disputes over ownership between two emissions 
trading schemes – for example, situations where an individual source is simultaneously 
participating in two emissions trading schemes. It is these situations which will be explored 
here. The problems that result can be grouped under three broad headings (Zapfel and Vanio, 
2001): 
• double slippage;  
• double coverage; and  
• double crediting.  
 
The following sections discuss each of these problems in turn. 
2.3.3 Double slippage 
This is where the regulatory coverage of emissions is lost. It is particularly relevant to the 
trading of electricity between participants of two national trading schemes, where one has 
indirect accountability for the emissions from electricity generation and the other has direct 
accountability  
 
Suppose country A has a trading scheme with indirect accountability, and country B has a 
scheme with direct accountability. And suppose country A exported electricity to country B. 
Emissions from country A would have increased as a consequence of the fossil fuel used in 
electricity generation. But no entity would have surrendered allowances as the generators in 
country A are not covered by the trading scheme and the electricity is not consumed by 
scheme participants. Similarly, no entity in country B would have surrendered allowances 
since their electricity consumers are not accountable for the emissions from electricity 
generation. The emissions are ‘missed’ by both trading schemes. Note that this would not 
have been the case if the electricity had been consumed in country A by participants in the 
trading scheme, since these would have surrendered allowances.  
 
The importance of this problem can be overstated. If the electricity had been consumed in 
country A by some entity other than a participant in the trading scheme, then the same 
problem would result. This is because country A does not have full coverage of emissions 
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from electricity generation. Emissions can be ‘lost’ within country A because of the 
incomplete coverage of its emissions trading scheme. 
 
However, this scenario would be important for two neighbouring EU countries that have large 
inter-country electricity flows. The emissions associated with the exported electricity may be 
substantial, but neither the exporter or the importer would be liable. This could distort 
competition in the generation market – for example, electricity imports from country A could 
displace electricity from the national generators in country B, because the price of the latter 
includes carbon abatement costs but the price of the former does not. Cross-border trade in 
electricity is becoming increasingly important in the EU as the electricity market is being 
opened up to full competition. The possibility of double slippage and competitive distortions 
to the electricity market in this context is one of the primary reasons the Commission has 
proposed a harmonised EU trading scheme with direct allocation to electricity generators 
(Zapfel and Vaino, 2001). 
2.3.4 Double coverage 
This is the mirror image of the above scenario. Suppose country B exported electricity to a 
company in country A which was a participant in the latter’s’ trading scheme. Electricity 
generators in country B would need to surrender allowances to cover the emissions associated 
with this electricity. And the company purchasing the electricity in country A would also 
need to surrender allowances. In other words, two sets of carbon allowances would be 
surrendered for the same quantity of electricity. The emissions associated with that electricity 
would be covered twice by two separate trading schemes. 
 
The allowances surrendered by the generator in country B would accurately reflect the 
associated emissions (assuming adequate monitoring etc.). In contrast, there would be a 
discrepancy between the allowances surrendered by the purchasing company and the actual 
emissions associated with the electricity, since the allowance calculations would be based 
upon an estimated emission factor for the generation mix in country A, not country B. This 
discrepancy between estimated and actual emissions is an inherent risk of an indirect system 
that estimates emissions from electricity consumption using a fixed emission factor. 
Moreover, it is worse for cross-border trade in electricity as the emission factor refers to a 
different national electricity system. But in this case, the discrepancy problem is 
overshadowed by the fact that emissions are covered twice (double coverage). 
 
A similar scenario is possible if energy commodities (coal, oil, gas etc.) are traded between 
two countries, where one has an upstream trading scheme and one has a downstream scheme. 
Suppose country A had the upstream scheme, and country B the downstream scheme and that 
country A was exporting fossil fuel to country B. Fossil fuel exporters in country A may have 
to surrender allowances (to A’s government) corresponding to the carbon content of the 
coal/oil/gas, while downstream consumers in country B may also need to surrender 
allowances (to B’s government) corresponding to the carbon emissions from the fuel. As 
before, two sets of carbon allowances would be surrendered, this time for the same quantity 
of fossil fuel. In this case, there is no discrepancy problem but there is still a double coverage 
problem. 
 
In practice, the above scenario is less likely than double coverage of electricity emissions. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Parties are accountable for the carbon content of fuels they 
produce and import, but not for the carbon content of fuels they export (since these lead to 
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emissions in another country). This means that, in the above scenario, the fossil fuel exporter 
in country A was not need to surrender allowances for fossil fuel exports and the emissions 
would only be covered once. Since fossil fuel import/exports can be relatively easily tracked, 
implementing this should not present a major administrative difficulties. In contrast, it is 
much more difficult to account for cross border electricity trade since here the allowances are 
surrendered by generators when generating the electricity, while the electricity is traded by 
separate supply companies.18 In principle, compensation mechanisms would be required 
which linked the volume of electricity exported to the generation from individual plants. 
2.3.5 Double crediting 
The third situation is where two sets of carbon allowances are generated from a single 
abatement action. Again, suppose country B has a trading scheme with indirect 
accountability, and country A has a scheme with direct accountability. Suppose further that 
an electricity generator in country A was exporting electricity to a company that was 
participating in country B’s trading scheme. If the purchasing company reduced its electricity 
consumption, this would: a) free up allowances in country B’s scheme that are owned by the 
purchasing company; and b) free up allowances in country A’s scheme that are owned by the 
generator (since less electricity is generated, emissions are reduced). In this case, two sets of 
carbon allowances are freed up, or ‘generated’ from a single abatement action. The avoided 
emissions are ‘credited’ twice in two separate trading schemes. 
 
Similar types of double crediting problem may arise if: i) an upstream trading scheme was 
introduced in a country which had an existing downstream trading scheme; or ii) a trading 
scheme with direct allocation was introduced in a country which had an existing trading 
scheme with indirect allocation (assuming, in both cases, that the existing scheme was left 
unchanged). The second of these situations is exactly that currently faced in the UK. The EU 
ETS is a cap and trade scheme with direct allocation. But the UK already has baseline and 
credit policy instruments with indirect allocation. These instruments allow for the generation 
of carbon credits from projects that reduce electricity demand. They include not only the 
CCAs but also the direct participants in the UK ETS, the project based element of the UK 
ETS, and the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) on electricity suppliers (Sorrell, 2001a; 
Smith, 2002a). These instruments effectively give the ‘ownership’ of emissions associated 
with electricity generation to electricity consumers (indirect allocation). In contrast, a cap and 
trade scheme gives the ‘ownership’ of emissions to electricity generators (direct allocation). 
Coexistence of the two leads to both double coverage and double crediting problems. And 
coexistence will occur if the EU ETS is introduced in the UK, without first changing these 
existing policy instruments. 
 
The problem is most clearly illustrated by the current proposals for emission reduction 
projects in the UK (Begg et al 2002). These are baseline and credit arrangements analogous 
to JI and the CDM, but for projects within the UK. One of the priority sectors for such 
projects is the non-domestic building sector (public, commercial and industrial buildings). 
Projects that reduce energy (fuel or electricity) use in these buildings may be eligible for 
carbon credits. The number of credits is calculated from the difference between actual energy 
consumption and an estimated counterfactual baseline. The carbon associated with electricity 
                                                 
18 Problems could be avoided here if the ownership of the allowances was placed in the hands of electricity 
suppliers. Then it would be relatively simple to make the electricity exports exempt from the requirement to 
surrender allowances. However, allocating allowances to electricity suppliers creates a separation between the 
ownership and control of emissions and consequent difficulties with the operation of the trading scheme. 
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consumption in these projects is calculated using a fixed emission factor, similar to that used 
for direct participants in the UK ETS (Sorrell, 2001a). But at some point in the future the UK 
may join the EU ETS. If so, UK electricity generators will be required to hold allowances for 
their fossil fuel consumption. If the emission reduction project continues after this date, we 
will have a situation in which: a) the project is generating credits from reductions in 
electricity demand, which are allocated to the project developer; and b) the reduced electricity 
demand is also freeing up allowances from electricity generation, which are allocated to the 
generators. Again, two sets of carbon allowances have been generated, or ‘freed up’, from a 
single abatement action.  
 
Similar problems apply to the coexistence of the EU ETS with the CCAs, direct participants 
in the UK ETS and the Energy Efficiency Commitments. In each case the same problem does 
not apply at present since the electricity generators are not participating in the UK ETS. They 
do not have allowances and hence no allowances are freed up.  
2.3.6 The scale of the problem 
Each of the above problems is theoretically possible in situations where either a transition is 
being made from one type of trading scheme to another, or participants in two separate 
trading schemes trade fuel, electricity or allowances with each other. As with double 
regulation, the relevant question is: does this matter?  
 
The question is particularly important for double crediting, as in some circumstances this may 
violate the environmental integrity of an emissions trading scheme. If this is the case, one 
response could be that double crediting was unacceptable in principle. If so, this would 
seriously constrain the options for making a transition from one trading scheme to another, or 
for linking trading schemes. For example, it may not be possible to introduce the EU ETS 
into the UK without first changing the CCAs, Energy Efficiency Commitment and UK ETS. 
 
At the other extreme, double crediting could be seen as a price worth paying for facilitating 
either the introduction or linking of trading schemes. A relevant analogy here is the existence 
of ‘hot air’ in trading schemes. Both the Kyoto framework itself, and the UK ETS have 
included some ‘hot air’ in the initial allocation. While this runs the risk of damaging the 
public credibility and environmental integrity of emissions trading, it has also greatly 
facilitated political consensus. Hot air has been seen as a quid pro quo for persuading both 
countries and companies to accept a binding emissions cap. In a similar manner, a small 
amount of double crediting could be seen as an acceptable price to pay to gain political 
acceptance of a particular policy option. 
 
In practice, much is likely to depend upon the likely scale of the double crediting and the 
timescale over which it is anticipated to persist. For example, if only a small number of 
relatively small scale emission reduction projects are expected, the double crediting described 
above may be considered to be largely irrelevant. Conversely, if very large projects are 
expected, which will generate credits over a long period of time (e.g. life extension of nuclear 
power stations), then double crediting may be considered a serious problem. An assessment 
of the acceptability of double crediting may therefore require some quantitative estimates of 
the likely scale and timeframe. This may be easier to do for some policy options than for 
others. 
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2.4 Differential treatment and equivalence of effort 
2.4.1 Differential treatment 
The political debate over environmental regulation is dominated by concerns over 
distribution consequences and the potential impact on industrial competitiveness. Interest 
groups seek to minimise the impact of regulation, often to the detriment of economic 
efficiency or environmental protection. For climate policies targeted at industry, a primary 
focus of complaint is the differential treatment of companies or sectors. Typically, there are 
three areas where this concern may arise: 
 
• between individual companies affected to different degrees by a particular policy; 
• between companies affected by a policy and those not affected within the same country; 
• between companies affected by a policy and companies in other countries which may be 
either unregulated or subject to different policies.  
 
Of particular relevance here is the fact that differential treatment may result from individual 
companies being targeted by more than one policy. In Figure 1.4 for example, companies in 
area B are affected by policies 1 and 2, while companies in area A are only affected by policy 
1. 
Figure 1.4 Differential treatment from overlapping policies 
Differential treatment from
overlapping policies
Policy 1 only
A
Policy 1 & 2
B
Policy 2 only
C
Target groups of regulatory instruments
 
 
Differential treatment is only relevant to competitor companies. So, for example, the fact that 
carbon emissions from the UK brewing industry are regulated more strictly than carbon 
emissions from the UK mechanical engineering industry should not be of concern. Similarly, 
the importance of differential treatment will depend upon the extent to which the sector or 
companies are exposed to international competition. The Dutch proposals for a national 
emissions trading scheme make a distinction between sheltered and exposed sectors, with the 
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latter defined as having exports exceeding 15% of domestic production or competing imports 
exceeding 15% of domestic demand (Dutch CO2 Trading Commission, 2002). In practice, 
exposure to international competition is a matter of degree. In addition, the impact of a policy 
on a sector’s competitiveness will depend upon (Ekins and Speck, 1998):  
 
• the nature, form and stringency of the policy;  
• the speed of introduction of the policy;19  
• the energy or carbon intensity of the sector’s product and the scope for substitution 
towards products with a lower environmental impact; 
• the opportunities available for improving energy efficiency; and  
• the scope for technological innovation. 
 
There are three grounds on which differential treatment could be a concern. First differential 
treatment may be subject to legal challenge under competition law at the national, EU and 
international (WTO) level. In this context, the EU internal market and associated state aid 
regulations are of particular importance. The political debate on the EU ETS has centred 
around the balance between harmonisation and subsidiarity and similar conflicts can be 
anticipated in the development of rules for allowance allocation (CEC, 2000; Egenhofer and 
Mullins, 2000). Article 87(1) on state aid in the EC Treaty states that: 
‘… any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
common market.’ 
This state aid rules are complicated by certain exemptions, including those for environmental 
protection (OJ, 2001) and require legal interpretation in individual cases. Also, the rules refer 
to the explicit provision of resources to companies, and do not cover the exemption of firms 
or sectors from emission reduction requirements where these are not mandatory under EU 
law. Similarly, national regulations that disadvantage (as opposed to advantage) a Member 
State company compared to companies in other Member States would not be incompatible 
with state aid rules. 
 
Differential treatment may also be challenged on political grounds if it is seen as creating 
competitive distortions. Political objections may carry weight even where competition law is 
not violated. The validity of such arguments is typically the subject of intense debate and it 
should be recognised that individual policies may damage the competitiveness of individual 
sectors while having a beneficial effect on the competitiveness of the economy as a whole. 
One difficulty here is that there is no unambiguous definition of competitive distortion. For 
example, if one Member State allocated permits for free and a second used auctioning, the 
firms in the first country will have improved their financial position relative to the second 
since they will have received a factor of production for free. But this cost advantage should 
have no impact on product prices. Firms with free allocation will have received a windfall 
profit, while firms that had to buy permits will have incurred a higher cash outflow and hence 
suffered a financial loss. So is this a competitive distortion? Woerdman (2002) has argued 
that ambiguity in EU law (particularly the state aid rules) makes it unclear whether such a 
                                                 
19 Gradual introduction can avoid stranded assets and allow more energy efficient capital goods to be installed as 
part of the normal investment cycle. 
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situation would be considered as creating a competitive distortion or not. But whatever the 
legal interpretation, such a situation would inevitably be challenged on political grounds. 
 
Finally, differential treatment may be challenged on environmental grounds if it appears to 
create a risk that pollution will be displaced from one sector to another, one country to 
another, or one type of installation to another. Empirical evidence suggests that investment 
decisions are overwhelmingly driven by factors other than environmental compliance costs, 
so this concern may be overstated (Jaffe et al 1995). However, since the costs associated with 
carbon abatement may exceed those for other pollutants, the scope for such displacement 
(carbon leakage) may be greater.  
 
Some forms of differential treatment may be challenged on a combination of legal, political 
and environmental grounds. For example, stricter regulations for new plant as compared to 
existing plant (as is normal under traditional regulation) may both inhibit entry into a market 
and slow the diffusion of cleaner technology. Similarly, differential treatment may create 
perverse incentives that undermine economic efficiency and increase pollution. For example, 
if organisations are eligible for a derogation on an energy tax if their energy use is above a 
certain threshold, there may be an incentive for them to increase their energy use until they 
cross that threshold. 
2.4.2 Equivalence of effort 
A related concept which has gained prominence during the development of the EU ETS is 
equivalence of effort. Here, the concern is to ensure that comparable companies in different 
Member States are required to undertake measures of equivalent effort to reduce carbon 
emissions: 
‘Regarding the distribution of the economic burden to mitigate GHG emissions between sectors and 
between companies within sectors the principle is that there should be an equivalence of effort 
between all companies whether they are part of the trading scheme or not. This means that 
companies outside the trading scheme should be subject to policies and measures that are equally as 
demanding as emissions trading.’ (CEC, 2000) 
One interpretation of ‘equally demanding’ could be equal percentage cuts in GHG emissions. 
But companies and national economies differ substantially in GHG intensity, abatement 
potential and obligations under the burden sharing agreement, so a more appropriate 
interpretation would be (approximate) equality in marginal abatement costs (€/tCO2). This is 
what an emissions tax or emissions trading scheme achieves (in theory), although the average 
or total costs faced by individual participants will differ. The flexibility in compliance offered 
by a trading scheme is not available under other types of regulation and this commonly leads 
to differential treatment according to the perceived ‘affordability’ of emission reduction. For 
example, the Air Framework Directive requires regulators to consider ‘…the economic 
situation of undertakings belonging to the category in question' (CEC, 1984). In principle, 
this means that the stringency of regulation may depend upon the competitiveness of a 
company or sector (Sorrell, 2002c).20  
                                                 
20 With this, it is possible to envisage two similarly polluting industrial processes in different sectors where 
more demanding techniques are required for one than for the other, reflecting their differing competitive 
positions. In other words, a higher level of environmental gain could be obtainable for a given level of total 
investment if the investment were differently distributed.  
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Demonstrating equivalence of effort 
Whatever interpretation is given, the demonstration of equivalence of effort is likely to pose 
severe practical difficulties. First, there may be substantial differences in the scope of 
different policy instruments. For example, suppose we were attempting to demonstrate the 
equivalence of existing negotiated agreements in one Member State with membership of the 
EU ETS in another. The negotiated agreements may cover both fuel and electricity use, while 
the EU ETS only covers fuel use. Similarly, the negotiated agreements may exclude process 
CO2 emissions, while the EU ETS include process emissions. It is difficult to see how 
instruments can be considered equivalent when their scope of coverage is so different. 
 
Second, there may be differences in the form of different policy instruments. For example, 
the negotiated agreements may have relative targets (energy use per unit of output), while the 
EU ETS has absolute targets (tonnes of carbon). There are three strong reasons why relative 
targets cannot be considered equivalent to absolute targets: 
 
• Absolute targets gives certainty in the environmental outcome (assuming adequate 
monitoring and enforcement etc.), while relative targets do not. With relative targets, 
increasing output will lead to increasing emissions.21  
• Absolute targets give scope for auctioning and hence revenue raising. The revenue may be 
used in a variety of ways to increase the economic efficiency of the scheme and to 
compensate affected groups. In contrast, relative targets implicitly use free allocation, so 
there is no scope for using revenue. 
• Relative targets effectively act as a subsidy on production (Gielen et al, 2002). For 
example, if we compare two trading schemes for the same industrial group with relative 
and absolute targets, emissions will be higher in the relative scheme for the same level of 
marginal abatement cost and allowance price. 
 
Finally, there may be differences in the stringency of different policy instruments, where 
stringency is defined in terms of marginal abatement costs. These, however, may be difficult 
to observe either ex ante or ex post. Industry has private information on abatement costs 
which is difficult and costly for the regulator to obtain. Furthermore, the motivation of the 
regulated party is to reduce the stringency of regulation by exaggerating estimates of 
abatement costs. This commonly leads to a gap between ex ante and ex post estimates of 
abatement costs (Bailey and Haq, 2001). While trading schemes provide a clear signal of 
marginal abatement costs in the allowance price, there is no comparable signal from measures 
such as negotiated agreements. Measuring and estimating abatement costs for such 
instruments is likely to prove burdensome for national regulators. It is considerations such as 
these which have led the Commission to propose a mandatory and harmonised emissions 
trading scheme, and to exclude the possibility of opting-in or opting-out of the scheme at a 
national, sector or company level.22 For example, in commenting on the opt-in option, the 
2000 Green Paper noted that: 
 ‘...a differentiated implementation strategy would be highly complex to manage. In this case, the 
Community would have to have an active role in overseeing what the Member States were doing, 
and in evaluating the effect on competition between comparable companies in different Member 
                                                 
21 In this respect, the relative target is similar to an emissions tax, but without the certainty of emissions control 
costs that a tax provides. 
22 Earlier drafts of the Directive included opt-out provisions, but these were excluded from the published version 
in 2001 (CEC, 2001a). 
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States. If different member States were to include different sectors and different gases, the various 
combinations could be too numerous to be able to ensure coherence and transparency.’ (CEC, 2000) 
Importance of equivalence of effort 
Given these difficulties, it is important to ask whether the prominence given to equivalence of 
effort is appropriate. While it is true that differences in regulatory stringency may distort 
competition, this has to be set in the context of a host of other differences in both factor 
prices (e.g. energy, raw materials, labour) and broader fiscal and regulatory requirements 
(e.g. corporation tax). While harmonisation is proceeding in some of these areas in the EU, 
progress is relatively slow (e.g. energy taxes). This suggests that the differences in factor 
prices are likely to remain.23 As an example, Table 1.2 shows industrial electricity and gas 
prices in the EU and G-7 countries expressed as a percentage of UK prices. This illustrates 
that Swedish electricity prices were only half those in the UK, while Japanese industrial 
electricity prices were more than twice UK levels. Variations in gas prices were smaller, and 
both electricity and gas prices may converge in the EU with further liberalisation of energy 
markets.  
Table 1.2 Industrial electricity and gas prices in the EU and G7, compared to UK prices 
(1999) 
 Industrial electricity prices 
(% of UK prices) 
Industrial gas prices 
(% of UK prices) 
Austria 121 143 
Belgium 84 120 
Denmark 105  
Finland 77 129 
France 72 136 
Germany 104 173 
Greece 77  
Ireland 92 159 
Italy 146 159 
Luxembourg   
Netherlands 96 114 
Portugal 144  
Spain 91 129 
Sweden 51  
   
Canada 54 66 
Japan 207 396 
US 62 111 
UK prices 3.92p/kWh 0.56 p/kWh 
Source: DTI (2002) 
 
In a similar manner, exchange rate fluctuations can dwarf for the impact of environmental 
regulations. For example, the deterioration in the terms of exchange as a result of the 
appreciation of sterling against European currencies increased the cost of exporting to Europe 
by between £22 billion and £29 billion between 1997 and 1999 (ECOTEC, 1999). This 
compares to the total of only £1 billion raised by the CCL. This problem has been mitigated 
                                                 
23 The constant search for lower factor prices is a fundamental source of competitive advantage. 
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in the EU by the introduction of the Euro, but remains an issue for the UK. In general, it is 
clear that high factor prices and unfavourable regulatory or fiscal treatment can act together 
to worsen competitiveness. But it is equally clear that the competitiveness impacts of 
environmental regulation can be exaggerated (Ekins and Speck, 1998). 
 
These issues are highly pertinent to examining implementation options for the EU ETS. For 
example, the UK would like to obtain an opt-out from the EU scheme up to 2008. This would 
mean that energy intensive UK industry would be subject to relative rather than absolute 
targets under the existing CCAs, and the UK electricity generators would not be regulated at 
all. Would the exemption of the UK generators violate internal market rules? Perhaps not, 
given that international electricity trade between the UK and the continent is relatively small 
and mostly consists of imports from French nuclear power stations. Similarly, would the 
relative targets under the CCAs be considered to be equivalent to the absolute targets taken 
on by competitor companies in other EU Member States?  
2.5 Summary  
Any analysis of the interaction between emissions trading schemes and other policy 
instruments raises difficult questions regarding four key issues: 
• Regulatory impact and cost incidence: The issue here is the economic impact of different 
policy instruments and extent to which the costs will be borne by consumers, employers, 
suppliers or shareholders. This can best be estimated through economic modelling, but 
since different approaches can lead to very different results this still leaves considerable 
scope for disagreement. For emissions trading, a central issue is the capture of the 
economic rent from allowance distribution. Free allocation amounts to a lump sum subsidy 
to participating firms, while auctions allows the government to capture the rent and to use 
the revenue to compensate affected groups and improve the economic efficiency and 
environmental effectiveness of the scheme. While auctioning will have wealth impacts for 
participants, the impact on product prices should be identical to that with free allocation. 
Whether this theoretical result will hold in practice, however, is open to question. 
• Interaction and double regulation: The issue here is the interaction between policy 
instruments and the extent to which any apparent ‘double regulation’ will be seen as 
imposing unfair burdens upon particular target groups. While ‘double regulation’ is a 
negative term, then may be many instances where policy interaction can be either 
acceptable or positively beneficial. To assess whether this is likely to be the case, it is 
necessary to examine the multiple objectives of each instrument and the obligations and 
incentives they placed upon individual target groups. 
• Ownership of emissions and double counting: The issue here is the ‘ownership’ and 
control of carbon emissions and the problems that arise if ownership is disputed. It is 
particularly important where participants in two separate emissions trading schemes are 
trading fuel, electricity or allowances with each other. In general, emissions trading 
schemes are likely to be more effective when the ownership of allowances is closely 
aligned with the control over emissions. Ownership disputes fall into three broad 
categories: a) double slippage, where the regulatory coverage of emissions is lost; b) 
double coverage, where two instruments give ownership of the same physical emissions to 
two separate parties, or to the same party under two separate terms; and c) double 
crediting, where disputing claims over the ownership of emissions allow two separate 
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carbon allowances or carbon credits to be generated from a single abatement action. Each 
type of problem introduces complexity into the regulatory situation and double crediting in 
particular may threaten the environmental integrity of an emissions trading scheme. But 
the importance of double crediting will depend upon the scale of the problem and in many 
cases it may be overlooked. 
• Equivalence of effort: The issue here is the extent to which different groups are treated 
differently by environmental policy instruments and whether the obligations imposed upon 
one target group can be deemed equivalent to those imposed upon another. Differential 
treatment may be challenged on legal, political or environmental grounds and is often of 
central importance in the debate over environmental policy instruments. Demonstration of 
equivalence of effort may be required as a means to avoid differential treatment when an 
installation, company, sector or Member State is exempted from a particular policy 
instrument. But in practice, differences in the scope, form and stringency of policy 
instruments may make equivalence of effort extremely difficult to assess. Furthermore, the 
importance of environmental regulations in determining the competitiveness of individual 
companies can easily be exaggerated. 
 
The assessment of the scale and importance of each issue is far from straightforward and 
often contentious. While quantitative modelling may help in the assessment of policy 
impacts, qualitative judgements are still required on the relative desirability of different 
policy options. This will inevitably involve trade-offs between economic efficiency, equity 
and political feasibility. For example, exempting firms with existing negotiated agreements 
from a trading scheme may enhance political feasibility, while at the same time undermining 
economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness. Any judgement on the desirability of a 
particular policy option will therefore require multi-criteria assessment with explicit 
weighting of policy objectives. 
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3. Confusion over instrument scope  
3.1 Introduction 
In this section and the following three sections we assume that the EU Directive is 
implemented without changing the CCL/CCA package. In other words, we ask: ‘what would 
happen if the EU ETS and the CCL/CCAs operated alongside each other?’ The aim is to 
identify how and why the policies affect each other and the impact on directly and indirectly 
affected target groups. 
 
Scope means the target groups affected by the each instrument. A directly affected target 
group has rules and obligations imposed upon it directly by the policy. An indirectly affected 
target group is influenced in some way by the behavioural changes made by the directly 
affected target group (e.g. by a change in market prices). So for example, electricity 
generators are directly affected by the EU ETS, while electricity consumers are indirectly 
affected as they face higher electricity prices as a consequence of the abatement measures 
taken by electricity generators. Indirect effects permeate throughout the economy. But here 
we will confine attention to the most immediate indirect impacts - primarily those relating to 
electricity markets.  
 
The interaction between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA package is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
It exhibits both the following forms: 
 
• Direct target group interaction: the target group directly affected by the CCL/CCA 
overlaps with the target group directly affected by the EU ETS; and 
• Indirect target group interaction: where:  
• the target group directly affected by the CCL/CCAs overlaps with the target group 
indirectly affected by the EU ETS; and 
• the target group indirectly affected by the CCL/CCAs overlaps with the target group 
directly affected by the EU ETS. 
 
These interactions differ in their relative importance. Most of what follows focuses on direct 
target group interaction. The most important indirect interactions relate to the treatment of 
electricity and are discussed more fully in section 3.5. 
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Figure 3.1 EU ETS and CCL/CCA target group interactions 
 
The target groups covered by the CCL and CCAs are outlined in Smith (2001) and Sorrell 
(2001a), while the target groups covered by the EU ETS are outlined in CEC (2001) and 
Sorrell & Smith (2002a). The following sections explore the nature of the overlaps between 
these groups under the following headings: 
 
• Overlaps in sectoral coverage. 
• Overlaps in emissions coverage. 
• Overlaps in site coverage. 
• Estimating the size of the target groups. 
• Indirectly affected target groups and the treatment of electricity. 
3.2 Overlaps in sectoral coverage  
The sectors directly affected by the EU ETS overlap with those directly affected by the CCL. 
They also overlap with the sectors directly affected by the CCAs, which in turn form a subset 
of those directly affected by the CCL. The sectoral coverage of the CCA is largely based on 
the overlap between the CCL and the IPPC Directive, so the scope of the latter also needs to 
be explored. These overlaps are summarised below. 
 
• CCL: The CCL applies to coal, gas and electricity use in the public, commercial, 
agricultural and industrial sectors. It does not apply to the transport and domestic sector, or 
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to energy used by very small firms which are classified as domestic.24 It also does not 
apply to the upstream energy sector, including power stations, and oil refineries. In other 
words, the CCL is a downstream energy tax, with electricity being taxed at the point of 
consumption in the public, commercial, agricultural and industrial sectors. Fuel use for 
electricity generation is exempt. The choice of a downstream electricity tax, rather than 
taxing the fuel used for electricity generation, derives from the political objective of 
shielding the domestic consumer from electricity price rises and has had profound 
consequences for the overall climate policy mix (section 4.2).  
• IPPC: The IPPC Directive regulates a range of industrial processes, normally with a 
minimum size threshold. The sectors in which these are located are termed IPPC sectors. 
Not all sites in these sectors will be covered by IPPC as many fall below the size 
threshold. Table 3.1 summarises the processes covered by IPPC and the relevant size 
thresholds. Note that IPPC regulates large combustion plant (LCP, defined as >50MW 
thermal input), a category which includes thermal power stations. LCP may occur in IPPC 
sectors and non-IPPC sectors and are also regulated under the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive (LCPD).25 
• CCAs: Sites that both pay the CCL and are regulated under IPPC are eligible for CCAs. 
But there are two important complications:  
• sites in an IPPC sector that fall below the IPPC size threshold may also become 
signatories to a CCA (i.e. there is no size threshold for the CCAs); and 
• sites in a small number of energy intensive sectors that fall outside IPPC (e.g. 
horticulture) are also eligible for a CCA. 
• EU ETS: The EU ETS applies to a subset of installations regulated by the IPPC Directive, 
as indicated in Table 3.1. It can be seen that the EU ETS excludes some IPPC sectors 
altogether (e.g. chemicals, waste management), and also excludes individual activities 
within the IPPC sectors that are covered (e.g. coal gasification is not covered within the 
energy sector). The EU ETS covers the most energy intensive industrial processes (e.g. 
iron and steel), and also the upstream energy sector - including power stations and oil 
refineries. The sectoral coverage of the EU ETS is still being disputed, and may change 
during the negotiation process. The coverage may also be wider for Phase 2 than for Phase 
1. However, the following discussion will use the proposals made in the published draft 
Directive(CEC, 2001a). 
 
Table 3.2 summarises the sectoral overlaps between IPPC, the CCL, the CCAs and the EU 
ETS. It can be seen that the following combinations appear possible: 
 
• CCL only; 
• CCL and CCA;26 
                                                 
24 Also exempt is fuel used by registered charities for non-business uses. 
25 The LCPD will not be discussed here, as it is primarily focused on the control of SO2 and NOx. It is important 
to note, however, that the LCPD provides incentives to switch from oil and coal to (sulphur free) natural gas, 
which means that the LCPD will have consequences for CO2 emissions. Similarly, the revised LCPD requires 
investors in new and replacement combustion plant to explore opportunities for CHP. The LCPD will have a 
particularly important impact upon coal-fired electricity generation plant, which will be required to either fit 
Flue Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) equipment or reduce the number of operating hours after 2008.  
26 CCA participants still pay 20% of the CCL. 
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• IPPC and EU ETS 
• CCL, CCA and EU ETS; 
• CCL, CCA, IPPC and EU ETS; 
 
In practice, however, the situation is more complicated than this since there are differences in 
regulatory coverage within a single sector. For example, some sites in the non-ferrous sector 
are eligible for CCAs, while others are not. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate this in more detail. 
The text following the diagrams explain the logic. 
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Table 3.1 Definition of IPPC regulated activities, indicating those covered by the EU ETS 
Sector Activities EU ETS 
Energy Combustion plant >50MW, excluding waste incineration * 
 Oil and gas refineries * 
 Coke ovens * 
 Cold gasification and liquifaction plants  
Ferrous 
metals 
Metal ore roasting or sintering * 
 Iron and steel production (including casting) with capacity >2.5tonnes/hr * 
 Ferrous metal processing: a) hot rolling mills with capacity > 20 tonnes steel/hour; b) smitheries with hammers exceeding 50kJ, 
where power used exceeds 20 MW; and c) application of fused metal coats with imported exceeding 2 tonnes steel/hour 
 
 Foundries with production exceeding 20 tonnes steel/day  
Non ferrous 
metals 
Installations for the production of non-ferrous crude metals from ore, concentrates or secondary role materials by metallurgical, 
chemical or electrolytic processes 
 
 Installations for the smelting of non-ferrous metals including recovered products with a melting capacity exceeding 4 tonnes/day 
for lead and cadmium or 20 tonnes/day for all other metals 
 
Minerals Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with capacity >500t/day, or lime in rotary kilns with capacity > 50 
tonnes/day or in other furnaces with a capacity > 50 tonnes/day 
* 
 Installations for the production of asbestos and the manufacture of asbestos based products  
 Installations for the production of glass and glass fibre with melting capacity > 20t/day  * 
 Installations for melting minerals substances including the production of mineral fibres with a melting capacity > 20 tonnes/day  
 Installations for the production of ceramics (including tiles, bricks, stoneware, porcelain) with capacity > 75t/day, and/or kiln 
capacity >4m3 and we had a setting density per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m  
* 
Chemicals Production on the industrial scale of a wide range of chemicals. A large number of categories are listed, none of which are covered 
by the EU ETS 
 
Waste 
management 
Installations for the disposal or recovery of hazardous waste as defined in a) Directive 91/689/EEC; b) Directive 75/442/EEC; and 
c) 75/439/EEC (waste oils) with capacity > 10 tonnes/day 
 
 Installations for the incineration of municipal waste as defined in Directive 89/369/EEC on the prevention of air pollution from 
new waste incineration plants, and in directive 75/439/EEC on the reduction of pollution from existing waste incineration plants 
with a capacity exceeding three tonnes/hour  
 
 Installations for the disposal of non-hazardous waste as defined in Directive 75/414/EEC (headings D8 and D9 in Annex IIA) with 
capacity > 50 tonnes/day 
 
 Landfills receiving more than 10 tonnes/day or whether total capacity exceeding 25,000 tonnes  
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Other Industrial plants for the production of: a) pulp from timber or other materials; and b) paper and board; with capacity > 20 
tonnes/day 
* 
 Plants for the pre-treatment (washing, bleaching etc.) or dyeing of fibres or textiles where capacity > 10 tonnes/day  
 Plants for the tanning of hide and skins where capacity > 12 tonnes/ day of finished products  
 Slaughterhouses with carcass production capacity > 50 tonnes/day  
 Treatment and processing for the production of food products from: a) animal materials which finished product capacity > 75 tonnes/day; b) vegetable raw materials which finished product capacity > 300 tonnes/day 
 
 Treatment and processing of milk, with quantity of milk received > 200 tonnes/day  
 Installations for the disposal or recycling of animal carcasses and animal waste with a capacity > 10 tonnes/day  
 Installations for the intensive rearing of poultry or pigs with more than: a) 40,000 places for poultry; b) 2000 places for pigs; or c) 750 places for sows 
 
 Installations for the service treatment of substances, objects or products using organic solvents (printing, coating, degreasing, waterproofing etc.) with capacity > 150 kg/hour or > 200 tonnes/year 
 
 Installations for the production of carbon or electric graphite by means of incineration  
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Table 3.2 Sectoral overlaps between IPPC, the CCL, the CCA, and the EU ETS 
Sector Contains 
CCL 
paying 
sites 
Contains 
IPPC sites 
Contains 
CCA sites 
Contains 
EU ETS 
eligible 
sites 
No. of 
potentially 
applicable 
regulations 
Energy industry      
Coke     2 
Oil refining     2 
Gas production     2 
Manufacturing industry      
Iron and Steel     4 
Non-ferrous metals     4 
Non metallic metals     4 
Bricks     4 
Cement     4 
Glass     4 
Potteries     4 
Chemicals     4 
Mech. Engineering     4 
Elec. Engineering     4 
Vehicles     4 
Food, Drink and Tobacco     4 
Textiles, leather and 
clothing 
    4 
Paper     4 
Plastics and Rubber     4 
Other Manufacturing     3 
Water      2 
Construction     1 
Mining     1 
Public Sector     1 
Commerce     1 
Agriculture      
Horticulture     2 
Other agriculture     1 
Transport      
Domestic      
Note: While a sector may contain sites eligible for regulation under each instrument, this does not 
mean that all sites in the sector are eligible. In many cases, only a fraction of sites will be eligible.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the target groups for IPPC, the CCL and the 
CCAs. The groups numbered A to E are summarised in Table 3.3. 
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Figure 3.2 Relationship between target groups for IPPC, CCL and CCAs 
Table 3.3 Distinguishing overlapping target groups for IPPC, the CCL and CCAs 
No. Regulations Description 
A CCL only The great majority of sites in the public, commercial, agricultural and 
industrial sectors are eligible for the CCL and not regulated under IPPC. 
Sectors include mining, mechanical engineering and electrical engineering. A 
small number of sites, including registered charities and those below a size 
threshold, are exempt from the CCL. 
B CCL and 
IPPC 
Sites in the manufacturing sector which are regulated under IPPC are eligible 
for inclusion in a CCA. But some sites may have chosen not to join a CCA. 
No data is available on the size of this group, and such a choice would appear 
unlikely given the financial benefits of a CCA. But it nevertheless remains a 
possibility. 
C IPPC only The majority of sites in the upstream energy sector are regulated under IPPC, 
but are not eligible for the CCL since the latter is a downstream tax. This is a 
very important category in terms of overall emissions as it includes power 
stations, oil refineries and coke ovens. 
D IPPC and 
CCA 
Sites in the manufacturing sector which are regulated under IPPC are eligible 
for inclusion in a CCA. Here, IPPC is being taken as a proxy for energy 
intensive industry. The great majority of eligible sites have taken up this 
opportunity and have entered a CCA. This group includes most of the large, 
energy intensive manufacturing sites such as iron and steel, chemicals and 
paper. 
E CCA only While eligibility for a CCA was initially defined as regulation under IPPC, 
this was challenged on competition grounds. The eligibility criteria were 
subsequently widened to include: a) sites in an IPPC sector that fall below the 
IPPC size threshold; and b) sites in a small number of energy intensive sectors 
that fall outside IPPC (e.g. horticulture). This means that a large number of 
sites are signatories to a CCAs, but are not regulated under IPPC. 
Note: CCA companies pay 20% of the CCL. 
IPPC, CCL and CCAs
 CCAs
CCL
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Figure 3.3 illustrates how the target groups for the EU ETS map onto the target groups for 
IPPC, the CCL and CCAs. The regions marked 1 to 10 each contain real sites, with 
corresponding GHG emissions. Some of these regions (e.g. region 9) are likely to account for 
a much larger proportion of emissions than others (e.g. region 2). But each region needs to be 
considered when assessing the implications of implementing the EU ETS. The picture is 
complex and illustrates how boundary issues may severely complicate the implementation of 
the EU ETS. 
Figure 3.3 Relationship between target groups for the EU ETS, IPPC, CCL and CCAs 
 
 
Table 3.4 summarises the coverage of each of the regions in Figure 3.3, and provides an 
example of the type of site represented. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to quantify 
either the number of sites, or volume of emissions accounted for by each region. But the table 
does make a broad assessment of the relative importance of each region, using the categories 
high, medium and low. 
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Table 3.4 Distinguishing overlapping target groups for the EU ETS, IPPC, CCL and CCAs 
No. Regulations Importance Description 
1 CCL only High The great majority of sites in the public and commercial 
sector, and sites in industrial sectors not regulated under 
IPPC (e.g. mining, mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering etc.).  
2 CCL and IPPC Low Sites in the manufacturing sector which are regulated 
under IPPC are eligible for inclusion in a CCA. But 
some sites may have chosen not to join a CCA. No data 
is available on the size of this group, and such a choice 
would appear unlikely given the financial benefits of a 
CCA. But it remains a possibility. Such sites may also 
be in sectors not regulated by the EU ETS. 
3 IPPC only Low Sites in the upstream energy sector are regulated under 
IPPC, but are not eligible for the CCL. The majority of 
these sites are covered by the EU ETS. But there are 
some important exceptions - for example, coal 
gasification plants and waste incineration plants.  
4 CCA and IPPC High Large energy intensive industrial sites in sectors not 
covered by the EU ETS, including chemicals, non 
ferrous, asbestos and large food. 
5 CCA only Medium Sites that lie below the IPPC size threshold in sectors 
that are eligible for (and have joined) a CCA, but are not 
eligible for the EU ETS (e.g. small sites in the chemicals 
and food and drink sectors) 
6 CCA and EU 
ETS 
Low Combustion plant in the size range 20-50MW in a sector 
that is eligible for a CCA 
7 CCL and EU 
ETS 
Low Combustion plant in the size range 20-50 MW in a 
sector that is not eligible for either IPPC or a CCA  
8 CCL, IPPC and 
EU ETS 
Low Sites in manufacturing which are regulated under IPPC 
are eligible for inclusion in a CCA. But some sites may 
have chosen not to join a CCA. Such a choice appears 
unlikely but remains possible. Such sites may also be in 
a sector regulated by the EU ETS. 
9 IPPC and EU 
ETS 
High The great majority of sites in the upstream energy 
industry are included here, including oil refineries, coke 
ovens and power stations. 
10 CCA, IPPC and 
EU ETS 
High The majority of large sites in energy intensive 
manufacturing industry are included here, such as paper, 
minerals and iron and steel. 
Figure 3.3 and Table 3.4 illustrate that determining the regulatory coverage of the EU ETS is 
a difficult task. Moreover, it is even more complicated than this discussion suggests. This is 
because we also need to consider the differences in regulatory coverage of energy use and 
CO2 emissions within a single site. For example, CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion 
may be covered, but CO2 emissions from industrial processes (e.g. cement) may not be. 
These issues are explored further in the following two sections. 
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3.3 Overlaps in site coverage 
To explore in more detail the potential overlaps in instrument coverage, it is helpful to define 
a general site in the industrial, public or commercial sector (Figure 3.4). This includes sites in 
the upstream energy industry, such as oil refineries and power stations. The site can be 
divided into: 
 
• combustion plant: boilers, engines, gas turbines and furnaces producing heat (direct, steam 
or hot water) and possibly electricity; 
• process plant: industrial processes, such as chemical production, using heat and electricity 
(either imported or from the main combustion plant) and including some processes that 
burn fossil fuels such as kilns; and 
• other activities: energy using activities unrelated to the core process, such as warehouses 
and offices.  
 
In addition, it is useful to subdivide combustion plant into: 
 
• main combustion plant: the largest combustion plant, supplying process activities and/or 
generating electricity; and 
• other combustion plant: smaller combustion plant, supplying other, non-process activities. 
Figure 3.4 A general site in the industrial, commercial or public sector 
 
In general terms, sites may contain any combination of combustion plant, process plant and 
other activities. For example: 
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• combustion plant only (e.g. power station); 
• combustion plant and other activities only (e.g. office block); 
• combustion plant, process plant and other activities (e.g. large chemical plant) 
 
In practice, sites may contain more than one type of process plant which may or may not be 
regulated under IPPC. Similarly, the main combustion plant may need to be subdivided into 
individual technological categories for regulatory purposes. These complications will be 
ignored in what follows.  
 
Combustion plant produce heat, in the form of hot water, steam or hot gases (direct heat), 
some of which may also be used to produce electricity. There may be more than one type of 
combustion plant: for example, process plant may be supplied by direct heat from a turbine as 
well as steam from a boiler. As well as supplying process heat and/or electricity, the ‘main’ 
combustion plant may supply heat to the entire site, or there may be separate (smaller) 
combustion plant supplying heat to the other activities.  
 
Combustion plant is regulated under the IPPC Directive, the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive (LCPD) and supporting domestic legislation. The definition of combustion plant 
varies between different regulations in terms of: 
 
• Types of technology covered: Here, combustion plant is defined as boilers, turbines, 
engines and furnaces. It does not include kilns, coke ovens, blast furnaces and similar 
equipment, although these may also involve the combustion of fossil fuels. These 
technologies are included under process plant.  
• Aggregation rules applied to multiple units of plant: Here, the aggregation rules used in 
UK legislation for the definition of Large Combustion Plant (LCP) will be used. LCP 
refers to any combination of boilers, turbines, engines or furnaces that have an aggregate 
net rated thermal input of 50MW or more if they are installed so that waste gases may be 
emitted through a common or multi-flue stack (DoE, 1991).  
• Size of plant: Here, size will be defined by net27 thermal input, using the aggregation rules 
indicated above. Three categories are relevant: 
• Large combustion plant (LCP): This is defined by a net thermal input >50MW and is 
commonly referred to as Part A plant, which refers to the classification used in the 
1990 Environmental Protection Act (EPA). 
• Medium combustion plant: This is defined by a net thermal input >20MW but 
<50MW, using the same technology definitions and aggregration rules.  
• Small combustion plant: This is defined by a net thermal input >20MW. The great 
majority of combustion installations will fall into this category. 
 
                                                 
27 There are two methods of measuring the heat content of fuels, and hence the efficiency of energy conversion 
plant. The first, gross calorific value (GCV), includes the heat that can be obtained from condensing the steam 
produced by heating with the fuel. The second, net calorific value (NCV), excludes the heat from condensing. 
The second is more commonly used when quoting the thermal efficiency of a plant, as the heat from condensing 
cannot normally be used. However, the Digest of UK Energy Statistics uses GCV when measuring fuel use. The 
difference between the two is typically 5% for solid and liquid fuels, and 10% for gases. For combustion plant 
definitions, NCV is used. 
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In UK legislation, individual boilers, turbines, engines or furnaces that have a net thermal 
input >20MW but <50MW are defined as Part B plant, which refers to the classification used 
in the 1990 EPA. These plant are regulated by local authorities under Local Authority Air 
Pollution Control (LAAPC). The Part B definition is based on the thermal input of an 
individual unit, which is in contrast to the Part A definition which uses aggregation rules. 
Combustion installations usually comprise of several units, which means that there will be 
many installations with an aggregate net thermal input >20MW but <50MW which are not 
regulated under LAAPC since no individual plant has an input >20MW. Similarly, many of 
the individual units with thermal input >20MW will form part of a multi-unit LCP 
installation with an aggregate thermal input >50MW, and hence will be regulated under Part 
A. In practice, the number of combustion plant installations covered by LAAPC is relatively 
small. 
 
There is no accurate and up-to-date information on the size distribution of combustion plant 
in UK industry and commerce. However, we do have some data from 1990 on the size 
distribution of the UK boiler stock (i.e. excluding turbines, engines and furnaces). This is 
reproduced in Table 3.5. The data shows the percentage of the total number of sites, boilers, 
capacity and fuel use accounted for by each size category. As indicated above, the proportion 
of medium combustion plant regulated under LAAPC will be less than suggested by the 
table.  
Table 3.5 Estimates of the 1990 UK boiler stock by site thermal input capacity (% of total) 
Site thermal 
input (MWth) 
No. of sites No. of boilers Capacity Fuel use 
< 20 MW 99.81 99.42 77.03 52.95 
20 - 50MW 0.12 0.34 5.67 7.64 
> 50 MW 0.07 0.24 17.29 39.41 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Sorrell (1996) 
The reason for distinguishing between combustion plant (including size of plant), process 
plant and other activities is that this distinction is relevant to defining the scope of the CCL, 
the IPPC Directive, the CCAs and the EU ETS within an individual site. The rules are 
different in each case and are summarised below.  
3.3.1 CCL boundaries 
The upstream energy sector (power stations etc.) is exempt from the CCL, but the great 
majority of sites in the public, commercial and industrial sectors are eligible.  
 
In the majority of eligible sites, all the imported fuel and electricity that is used for energy (as 
opposed to non-energy uses such as feedstocks) is eligible. There are two important cases 
when the source of the energy is exempt: 
 
• oil use (gasoil and HFO), because oil is already subject to excise duties; and 
• electricity use, where the electricity is generated from new renewable energy (as opposed 
to existing renewables, such as large hydro).  
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Hence, sites using either oil or renewable electricity will only have a portion of their energy 
consumption covered by the CCL.  
 
There are also cases when energy use is exempt owing to the purpose for which it is used. In 
these cases, energy used in one part of the site (e.g. process electricity) may be eligible, while 
energy used elsewhere (e.g. gas turbine fuel) may not. The most important exemptions are: 
 
• electricity used in electrolysis processes, for example, the chlor-alkali process, or primary 
aluminium smelting; and 
• fuel used by ‘good quality’ combined heat and power (CHP) schemes.28  
Figure 3.5 Possible regulatory boundaries for a CCL eligible site 
3.3.2 IPPC boundaries 
IPPC controls a wide range of pollutants in all three media. In many IPPC installations 
process emissions (e.g. VOCs) may be significant, even when energy use and combustion 
emissions are small.  
 
IPPC applies to industrial installations. The definition of an installation under the IPPC 
Directive is: 
                                                 
28 The rules for exempting CHP are complex (DETR, 2000e). To qualify for the full exemption, the plant must 
meet a ‘quality index’ of at least 100 and electrical efficiency of at least 20%. Plants of poorer quality (i.e. less 
efficient) are only eligible for a portion of the exemption. Prior to 2002, the exemption only related to heat and 
electricity used on site or sold direct to other users. If the electricity was exported to the grid or through bilateral 
contract, the fuel used to generate this electricity was not exempt. This illogical rule created a barrier to CHP 
and made it necessary to apportion CHP fuel use somewhat artificially between that relating to heat and 
electricity used on-site, and that relating to exported heat and electricity. The anomaly was removed in the 2002 
budget which made all fuel used in good quality CHP plant exempt from the CCL. 
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eligible site
Main
combustion 
plant
Process 
plant
Other 
activities 
Other
combustion 
plant
Fuel & electricity
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‘.. a stationary unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I are carried out, and 
any other directly associated activities which have a technical connection with the 
activities carried out at that site and which could have an effect on emissions or 
pollution.’ 
 
This definition need not include all the activities at a site. The final definition of the 
installation will be in the hands of the Environment Agency inspector when developing the 
IPPC permit and will hinge on the interpretation of ‘directly associated’, ‘technical 
connection’ and ‘capable of having an effect on emissions’. All three criteria must be 
satisfied for an activity to qualify. To give two examples (DETR, 2000b): 
 
• An on-site warehouse used for the storage of steel billets prior to hot rolling. In this case, 
the hot rolling plant is the stationary technical unit. Since the warehouse does not have an 
effect on emissions, it is not part of the installation.  
• Extrusion of aluminium. In this case, the stationary technical unit is a furnace used to 
soften the metal prior to extrusion. The extrusion process itself has no impact on furnace 
emissions, and has no emissions of its own. It is not, therefore, part of the installation. 
 
In most cases, ‘other activities’ such as offices will not be included in the definition of an 
installation. However, it is possible that a combustion plant will be considered to be directly 
associated with a process plant. For example, a furnace in a catalytic cracker is an integral 
part of the process, and therefore forms part of the installation. Furthermore, if the 
combustion plant has an aggregate thermal input >50MW, it will itself be regulated under 
IPPC as an LCP. This means that for IPPC there are four relevant possibilities: 
 
• neither the process plant or the combustion plant is regulated under IPPC; 
• the process plant is regulated, but the combustion plant is not; 
• the combustion plant is regulated, but the process plant is not; and 
• both the combustion and the process plant are regulated. 
 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the corresponding boundaries of the IPPC installation(s). In cases where 
both combustion and process plant are regulated this may be through two separate 
authorisations, or the two may be combined in a single authorisation (as in oil refineries). In 
all cases there may be other activities and perhaps other combustion plant that are on the 
same site but do not form part of the installation. 
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Figure 3.6 Possible regulatory boundaries for an IPPC installation 
 
In practice (and unlike its predecessor, the Air Framework Directive), IPPC includes 
obligations on energy efficiency. This means that if the process plant is regulated, the 
operator will be under some form of obligation to improve the efficiency of heat and 
electricity use within the process. Since heat is derived from the combustion plant, this will 
have an indirect effect on emissions from the combustion plant whether or not the latter is 
directly regulated under IPPC. Similarly, the energy efficiency requirements will have an 
indirect effect on CO2 emissions from electricity generation plant.  
3.3.3 CCA boundaries 
As indicated earlier, sites that pay the CCL and contain IPPC regulated processes are eligible 
for a CCA, together with sites in IPPC sectors that contain processes that fall below the IPPC 
size threshold and sites in a small number of energy intensive sectors that fall outside IPPC 
but which are eligible for a CCA. Most eligible sites have become signatories to a CCA, 
although a few have not. 
 
The regulatory unit in a CCA is termed a facility. A facility comprises one or more IPPC 
installations, and may also include other activities. The boundary of a facility is determined 
by the pattern of energy used at the site. The rules are as follows (DETR, 2000c): 
 
• Where an installation consumes 90% or more of a site’s energy use (expressed in primary 
terms), then all of the site energy use will be eligible to be covered by a CCA. In this case, 
the facility may be defined as the entire site. 
• Where less than 90% of the site energy use is used in the installation, the whole site is not 
eligible to be covered by a CCA. In this case, the facility must be defined such that at least 
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90% of the metered energy is used within the IPPC installation. This energy will need to 
be metered separately from the rest of the site.  
In the general case, the IPPC process is supplied with heat from a combustion plant which 
may or may not be included in the IPPC authorisation. But for the purposes of the CCA, the 
two must be grouped together, since the heat used in the process is derived from the 
combustion plant and it is fuel that is eligible for the tax, not the heat. This means that, for the 
CCA, there are only three relevant possibilities: 
 
• neither the process plant or the combustion plant is eligible for the CCA; 
• both the process plant and the combustion plant are eligible for the CCA, but other 
activities are not; and 
• the entire site is eligible for the CCA 
•  
Note that the CCA targets fuel and electricity use only, not process emissions. 
Figure 3.7 Possible regulatory boundaries for a CCA facility 
3.3.4 EU ETS boundaries 
The scope of the EU ETS is defined through IPPC (Table 3.1), with a subset of IPPC sectors 
being covered. The EU ETS covers only direct emissions from these sites, so an energy user 
only requires allowances for direct emissions, not for electricity consumption. Since the 
scope of the EU ETS includes power stations, the ESI must obtain allowances to cover its 
direct emissions and then pass a portion of the costs on in electricity prices to all electricity 
consumers.  
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The EU ETS scheme only applies to CO2 emissions at present, but these may result from 
either fossil fuel combustion or from certain types of processes such as cement production or 
the consumption of anodes in the primary aluminium industry. In addition, the fossil fuel 
combustion may take place either in the combustion plant (boilers, furnaces, turbines and 
engines) or in the process itself (e.g. kilns or coke ovens). The intention in using IPPC to 
define the scope of the EU ETS is to capture all the CO2 emissions associated with the energy 
intensive industrial processes. This means that if an IPPC process installation is eligible, then 
CO2 emissions from the associated combustion plant will also be included. 
 
The EU ETS also covers combustion plant of >20MW thermal input. The draft Directive 
does not specify the aggregation rules used, but it is assumed here that the aggregation rules 
are the same as in the 1990 EPA. Many combustion plant installations of this size will be on 
industrial sites where there is an associated IPPC process. But others will be on sites where 
there is no IPPC process. Similarly, since the size threshold for combustion plant under the 
EU ETS (20MWth) is lower than that under IPPC (50MWth), the EU ETS will include 
combustion plant that are not regulated under IPPC.  
 
No information is given in the Directive on how installations are defined (e.g. whether other 
activities are included). But we assume here that: a) if a participant qualifies because of 
combustion plant, then only the combustion plant is included; and b) if a participant qualifies 
because of an IPPC process, then both the IPPC installation and the combustion plant are 
included. 
 
There are then three possibilities for coverage under the EU ETS: 
 
• neither the process plant or the combustion plant is regulated; 
• the combustion plant is regulated, but the process plant is not; and 
• both the combustion and the process plant are regulated. 
 
The coverage of the EU ETS can be summarised as follows: 
 
• If the combustion plant is regulated directly under IPPC or has an aggregate thermal input 
>20MW the combustion plant must be included in the EU ETS. The associated process 
plant emissions are not included, unless the process itself is eligible for the EU ETS. 
• If the process plant is regulated directly under IPPC, the process plant may be included in 
the EU ETS (depending upon the sector). If it is included, the combustion plant emissions 
are covered as well.  
 
Note that if this interpretation is correct, the second rule may allow for combustion plant 
smaller than 20MW being included, along with the associated IPPC process.  
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Figure 3.8 Possible regulatory boundaries for EU ETS participant 
3.3.5 Overlaps in regulatory boundaries 
The following table summarises the potential coverage of each of the four regulations. In 
each row, only one of the possible coverages is possible at a single site. Possible exemptions 
to the CCL - such as when the main combustion plant is CHP – are ignored, although in 
practice these may be important. 
Table 3.6 Possible areas of coverage of IPPC, CCL, CCAs and EU ETS within a typical 
industrial site 
 Main 
combustion 
plant only 
Process plant 
only 
Main 
combustion and 
process plant 
Whole site 
IPPC     
CCL     
CCA     
EU ETS     
Note: At a single site, only one of the possibilities ticked in each row is allowed. 
 
In the majority of cases, the bulk of emissions derive from the main combustion plant and the 
process plant. So the distinction between these and the rest of the site is of less importance. 
Table 3.7 summarises the situation for a simplified typical industrial site in which all the 
energy use and emissions is accounted for by the main combustion plant and process plant. 
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Table 3.7 Possible areas of coverage of IPPC, CCL, CCAs and EU ETS within a simplified 
typical industrial site 
 Main combustion 
plant only 
Process plant only Main combustion 
and process plant 
IPPC    
CCL    
CCA    
EU ETS    
Note: At a single site, only one of the possibilities ticked in each row is allowed. 
3.3.6 Combinations of regulatory influences at a single site 
We are interested in defining the overlaps in regulation between the CCL, CCA, IPPC and 
EU ETS. The question to ask is: what are the allowed combinations of regulation by the CCL, 
CCA, IPPC and EU ETS for the simplified typical industrial site described above? This in 
turn will depend upon the type of combustion plant at the site. This question is best broken 
down into three stages: 
 
• What are the allowed combinations of the CCL, CCA and IPPC? 
• What are the allowed combinations of the CCL, CCA, IPPC and size of combustion plant 
installation? 
• What are the allowed combinations of the CCL, CCA, IPPC, size of combustion plant 
installation and the EU ETS? 
 
Tables 3.8 to 3.10 summarises the various possibilities. In these tables, processes may not be 
regulated by IPPC because: a) the process is not in an eligible sector; b) the process falls 
below the size threshold; or c) there is no process at the site. Similarly, combustion plant may 
not be regulated by IPPC because: a) the plant is exempt for some reason; b) the plant falls 
below the relevant size threshold; or c) there is no combustion plant at the site. 
 
The important result is that individual sites may have one of 18 possible combinations of 
the CCL, CCA, IPPC, and EU ETS (Table 3.10). The picture is clearly getting very 
complex! The analysis clearly demonstrates that implementation of the EU ETS is likely to 
open up a host of boundary issues. 
 
The story does not end here however. The instruments also differ in their coverage of: a) 
individual greenhouse gases; b) different types of fossil fuels; and c) electricity use, including 
the treatment of renewable electricity. These issues are discussed in the following sections.  
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Table 3.8 Allowable combinations of IPPC, CCL, and CCA  
No Process 
regulated by 
IPPC? 
Combustion 
plant 
regulated by 
IPPC? 
Site CCL 
eligible? 
Site CCA 
member? 
Example 
1 No No Yes Yes Large energy intensive site in non-IPPC sector that is eligible for a CCA 
2 No No Yes No Small, non-energy intensive industrial site in IPPC or non-IPPC sector 
3 No No No No Small site that is exempt from the CCL (e.g. charity) 
      
4 Yes No Yes Yes Site with IPPC process that is eligible for and has joined a CCA 
5 Yes No Yes No Site with IPPC process that is eligible for a CCA, but has chosen not to join 
6 Yes No No No Site with IPPC process that is CCL exempt (e.g. gas plant) 
      
7 No Yes Yes Yes LCP on site in an energy intensive, non-IPPC sector, that is eligible for a CCA 
8 No Yes Yes No LCP on site in a non-IPPC sector 
9 No Yes No No Site with LCP that is CCL exempt (e.g. power station) 
      
10 Yes Yes Yes Yes Site with IPPC process and LCP that has joined a CCA 
11 Yes Yes Yes No Site with IPPC process and LCP that has chosen not to join a CCA 
12 Yes Yes No No Site with IPPC process and LCP that is CCL exempt (e.g. oil refinery) 
Note: Only sites eligible for the CCL can be signatories to a CCA. 
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Table 3.9 Allowable combinations of IPPC, CCL, CCA, and type of combustion plant 
No Process 
regulated by 
IPPC? 
Large 
combustion 
plant 
(>50MWth) 
(IPPC) 
Medium 
combustion 
plant  
(20-50MWth) 
Small 
combustion 
plant 
(<20MWth) 
(unregulated) 
Site CCL 
eligible 
Site CCA 
member 
1 No No No Yes Yes Yes 
2 No No No Yes Yes No 
3 No No No Yes No No 
       
4 No No Yes No Yes Yes 
5 No No Yes No Yes No 
6 No No Yes No No No 
       
7 No Yes No No Yes Yes 
8 No Yes No No Yes No 
9 No Yes No No No No 
       
10 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
11 Yes No No Yes Yes No 
12 Yes No No Yes No No 
       
13 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
14 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
15 Yes No Yes No No No 
       
16 Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
17 Yes Yes No No Yes No 
18 Yes Yes No No No No 
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Table 3.10 Allowable combinations of IPPC, CCL, CCA, type of combustion plant and EU ETS member 
No Process 
regulated by 
IPPC? 
Large 
combustion 
plant 
(>50MWth) 
(IPPC) 
Medium 
combustion 
plant 
(20-50MWth) 
Small 
combustion 
plant 
(<20MWth) 
(unregulated) 
Site CCL 
eligible 
Site CCA 
member 
EU ETS covers 
process plant 
emissions 
EU ETS covers 
combustion 
plant emissions 
1 No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
2 No No No Yes Yes No No No 
3 No No No Yes No No No No 
         
4 No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
5 No No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
6 No No Yes No No No No Yes 
         
7 No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
8 No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
9 No Yes No No No No No Yes 
         
10 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes F(sector) F(sector) 
11 Yes No No Yes Yes No F(sector) F(sector) 
12 Yes No No Yes No No F(sector) F(sector) 
         
13 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes F(sector) Yes 
14 Yes No Yes No Yes No F(sector) Yes 
15 Yes No Yes No No No F(sector) Yes 
         
16 Yes Yes No No Yes Yes F(sector) Yes 
17 Yes Yes No No Yes No F(sector) Yes 
18 Yes Yes No No No No F(sector) Yes 
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3.4 Overlaps in emissions coverage 
It is useful to distinguish three categories of direct GHG emissions from an industrial site: 
 
• CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, either in the combustion plant (boilers, 
furnaces, engines and turbines) or in the process plant (e.g. kilns); 
• CO2 emissions from non-combustion industrial processes (e.g. cement production); and 
• other GHG emissions (mostly from non-combustion industrial processes).  
Also of interest are the indirect CO2 emissions from electricity consumption. These derive 
from fossil fuel combustion by thermal power stations. Reducing electricity consumption 
from an industrial site will lead to a reduction in these indirect emissions. The treatment of 
electricity is discussed more fully in section 3.5.  
 
The coverage of the three direct sources of emissions differs between our four policy 
instruments (IPPC, CCL, CCA, EU ETS), as does the manner in which each source is 
influenced or controlled. The core obligations and incentives are:  
• CCL: Energy price incentives. 
• CCA: Relative or absolute targets for energy use or carbon emissions, with participation 
and compliance incentivised by exemption from 80% of the CCL. 
• IPPC: Best Available Technology (BAT) requirements for non-CO2 greenhouse gases, and 
more ambiguous energy efficiency requirements for fuel and electricity consumption.  
• EU ETS: Allowance requirements for direct CO2 emissions, with compliance incentivised 
by an excess emissions penalty and the requirement to surrender allowances in subsequent 
periods.  
 
The operation of IPPC is particularly complex as it includes both BAT requirements and 
energy efficiency requirements. The key points are summarised in Box 3.1, while a fuller 
discussion is given in Smith and Sorrell (2001). 
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Box 3.1 IPPC and GHG emission control 
IPPC does not regulate CO2 directly. Instead, energy efficiency forms one of the general obligations 
on operators (Article 3), and represents one of the considerations to be taken into account when 
determining BAT (Annex IV). CO2 is not listed in Annex III as one of the substances for which 
emission limit values are particularly applicable (Article 2(6)). However, the other five GHGs are 
listed in Annex III (assuming that methane can be categorised as a volatile organic compound). 
Hence, while CO2 emissions would be reduced through improved energy efficiency, IPPC does not 
appear to have an obvious mechanism to, for example, require a switch to a fuel with a lower carbon 
content. Nor does it directly allow for the imposition of CO2 emission limits. However, the wording of 
the Directive is such that both measures could potentially be justified. For example, Article 2(6) 
suggests that emission limit values may be assigned for substances not listed in Annex III. Similarly, 
Article 9(4) requires that ‘in all circumstances’ provision should be made for the minimisation of long 
distance or transboundary pollution. So whilst CO2 is not mentioned explicitly in the Directive, the 
ambiguity of language permits a range of interpretations. 
 
A further issue is the ambiguity of Article 3. The first paragraph requires authorities to ‘ensure that 
installations are operated in such a way that.... energy is used efficiently’. But the second paragraph 
weakens this by stating ‘...it shall be sufficient if Member States ensure that the competent authorities 
take account of the general principles set out in this Article....’. A strict interpretation could be that the 
Article requires standards for the amount of energy used, while a loose interpretation could be that it 
merely requires authorities to ensure that pollution abatement does not lead to excessive energy use.  
 
Table 3.11 summarises the impact of the four instruments on each of the three emission 
sources, showing the key obligations and incentives. The issues involved are discussed 
further in section 5. 
Table 3.11 Coverage of direct emissions by IPPC, the CCL, the CCA, and the EU ETS 
Emission source IPPC CCL CCA EU ETS 
CO2 from fossil fuel combustion1 Energy 
efficiency 
requirement 
Price 
incentives on 
gas and coal 
consumption 
Relative or 
absolute 
energy or 
carbon target 
includes fossil 
fuel 
consumption 
Carbon 
allowance 
allocation 
includes fossil 
fuel emissions 
Non-combustion CO2 from 
process sources 
- - - Carbon 
allowance 
allocation 
includes 
process CO2 
emissions 
Other GHGs from process 
sources 
BAT 
requirements 
- - - 
 
While each instrument influences CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, the coverage of 
individual fossil fuels differs. This is summarised in Table 3.12 for all sectors other than 
electricity generation.  
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Table 3.12 Coverage of fossil fuel combustion in all sectors other than electricity generation  
 IPPC CCL CCAs EU ETS 
Coal and lignite     
Coke and petroleum coke     
Natural gas     
LPG     
Heavy fuel oil  -   
Gasoil  -   
Coke oven gas and blast 
furnace gas 
 -   
Refinery gas and other 
refinery fuels 
 - -  
Waste fuels and process 
gases 
 - -  
Petrol and road diesel - - - - 
3.5 Indirectly affected target groups 
The groups indirectly affected by each policy instrument are diverse. For example, both the 
EU ETS and the CCL will increase costs for industrial companies, which in turn will either 
be passed on to customers, passed back to suppliers, or absorbed by lower returns. Similarly, 
both instruments will create opportunities for energy service companies and for companies 
engaged in auditing emission reduction opportunities. But the most important indirect 
impacts are through the electricity industry. These are summarised below for each instrument 
in turn. 
3.5.1 CCL 
The CCL targets consumers of electricity in the public, commercial and industrial sectors and 
provides a price incentive to reduce electricity consumption. Reductions in consumption will 
lead to lower emissions from fossil fuel electricity generating plants. In the case of the CCL, 
therefore, electricity consumers will be directly affected, and electricity generators indirectly 
affected.  
 
The CCL provides consumers with the direct incentive to switch to electricity from ‘new 
renewable’ sources, as this is exempt from the levy. This incentive (0.43p/kWh) helps to 
overcome the current price disadvantage of electricity from new renewable sources. 
Qualifying sources include:  
 
• small hydro (<20MW);  
• onshore wind 
• offshore wind  
• geothermal 
• wave 
• tidal  
• photovoltaics 
• geothermal 
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• energy crops 
• landfill gas 
• coal mine methane 
• agriculture and forestry wastes 
• municipal and industrial wastes (partial exemption only) 
 
In the case of electricity from new renewable sources, the qualifying generator applies for 
Levy Exemption Certificate (LEC) which is sold with the electricity to the electricity 
supplier. The latter uses the certificate to demonstrate to Customs and Excise that the 
electricity is eligible to be sold free of the CCL. Energy from municipal and industrial waste 
receives only a partial exemption, related to the energy content of the waste that is derived 
from fossil fuel. The levy exemptions provide a demand-side boost to renewable electricity, 
to complement the Renewables Obligation on electricity suppliers.  
3.5.2 CCAs 
The CCAs also directly target consumers of electricity in the public, commercial and 
industrial sectors. The CCAs provide incentives to reduce electricity consumption via the 
adopted targets. Again, reductions in consumption will lead to lower emissions from fossil 
fuel electricity generating plants.  
 
Since CCA consumers are still paying 20% of the CCL, the incentive to purchase ‘new 
renewable’ electricity applies to them as well, although at a reduced level. For both the CCL 
and CCAs, the increased demand for renewable electricity will provide an indirect incentive 
to generators to invest in new renewable generation. Generators in this case may be either 
companies with an existing portfolio of fossil fuel generating plants, and hence directly 
covered by the EU ETS, or companies with no fossil fuel generating plants, including new 
entrants to the generation market.  
 
It is important to note, that in the majority of cases, switching to electricity from ‘new 
renewable’ sources will not help a CCA company meet its energy or carbon target. This is 
because the carbon content of imported electricity in a CCA facility is calculated assuming a 
fixed emissions factor, regardless of the generating source. The rationale for this is set out in 
DEFRA (2001a). This notes that electricity from renewable sources will only treated as zero 
carbon if it has not been used by the electricity supplier to count towards the latter’s 
Renewables Obligation (DEFRA, 2001a; Smith, 2002a). Since renewable sources which 
qualify for LECs will not necessarily be the same as sources which qualify for Renewables 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs),29 there is no way of knowing whether electricity which is 
sold free of the CCL is also used by a supplier to meet its relevant obligation. Given the 
anticipated difficulty of meeting the renewables targets, the government has assumed that 
suppliers will wish to claim all qualifying renewable supplies towards their obligation 
(DEFRA, 2001a). Consequently, the assumption is made that any renewable energy supply to 
end users by a licensed supplier will have been used to meet the latter’s renewables 
obligation. As a consequence, it will count towards the energy use or carbon emissions from 
the CCA facility. The purchase of renewable electricity will therefore help reduce electricity 
costs for CCA facilities via exemption from the remaining 20% of the CCL, but will not help 
them meet their energy or carbon targets.  
                                                 
29 In particular, the treatment of energy from waste is different. 
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The logic behind this rule appears confused. Why should renewable electricity which 
qualifies for a ROC be eligible for a CCL exemption, but not for a CCA target? If ROC 
qualifying electricity was treated as zero carbon under the CCAs, the net result could be to 
increase the demand for renewable electricity at CCA facilities and to decrease the incentive 
to improve electrical efficiency. Whether this would be the case in practice, would depend 
upon the relative cost of purchasing renewables versus improving end use efficiency. If the 
primary objective of the CCAs is to improve energy efficiency, then the exclusion of ROC 
electricity appears justifiable. But the exemption of ROC electricity from the CCL implies 
that the same priority to end use efficiency does not apply here. In sum, this is a revealing 
example of the complexities of policy interaction where individual policies have multiple 
objectives. 
3.5.3 EU ETS 
The EU ETS covers fossil fuel electricity generators, who will need to obtain allowances to 
cover their emissions. As a consequence, the cost of electricity supply from fossil fuel plants 
will rise to reflect marginal abatement costs. A portion of these price rises will be passed on 
to consumers in all sectors - including the domestic sector. In the case of the EU ETS, 
electricity generators are directly affected and electricity consumers indirectly affected.  
 
The size of the impact on consumers will depend on marginal abatement costs in the EU ETS 
as a whole, as reflected in the price of allowances (assuming profit maximising behaviour and 
a liquid allowance market), together with demand and supply elasticities in the wholesale 
electricity market. Consumer electricity prices must cover generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply costs, and these will vary with the size of the consumer. Generation 
costs account for a greater percentage of the total bill for larger consumers, so the 
proportionate impact of the EU ETS will be greater for these (Table 3.13).  
Table 3.13 Illustrative breakdown of electricity costs (percentage of total) 
Component <100kW 
~£400/year 
100kW – 1MW 
~£40k/year 
>1MW 
~£0.4m/year 
Generation 60 71 76 
Transmission 6 7 7 
Distribution 28 21 16 
Supply 7 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 
 
An important point is that there is no mechanism at present in the UK for the carbon 
labelling of electricity, or disclosure as it is called in the US. Consumers can purchase 
electricity from ‘new renewable’ sources, since this is exempt from the CCL and is identified 
through the system of Levy Exemption Certificates (LECs). But the carbon content of other 
electricity purchases (including electricity from nuclear and large hydro sources) cannot be 
identified. This has two implications: 
 
• If a system equivalent to the Levy Exemption Certificates continues, the EU ETS may 
incentivise consumers to purchase electricity from new renewable sources. This is because 
the price competitiveness of electricity from new renewable sources will be improved 
compared to that from fossil sources as the former will not require carbon allowances. The 
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size of this price incentive will depend allowance prices in the EU ETS. The incentive is 
unlikely to be sufficient in itself to overcome the price disadvantage of renewable sources, 
but may act in synergy with other measures such as the Renewables Obligation to expand 
renewable generation. 
• Without any system of carbon labelling, the EU ETS will not incentivise consumers to 
switch to other zero carbon electricity sources (such as nuclear and large hydro), or to 
switch consumption towards lower carbon fossil sources (e.g. away from coal fired 
generating sources and towards gas fired CCGTs). It would, however, provide a strong 
incentive for electricity generators to reduce the carbon intensity of their generation mix.  
 
The practicality of introducing carbon labelling is currently being discussed in the context of 
the proposed Directive on the Liberalisation of the European Electricity Market (CEC, 
2001c). Since the proportion of electricity from different generating sources varies with the 
type of load, time of day and time of year, the concept presents a range of practical 
difficulties. However, a review conducted by the UK ETG suggested that carbon labelling 
should be possible in the UK and would be facilitated by the introduction of the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) (UKETG, 2000). The concept makes more sense 
for an emissions trading system with indirect allocation of generator emissions to electricity 
consumers, rather than the direct allocation to electricity generators proposed by the EU ETS. 
This is because with indirect allocation consumers have a carbon target and switching to 
lower carbon electricity will help them meet that target. However, even with direct allocation 
there may be some incentive for consumers to switch, since low carbon electricity should 
have a price advantage. There may also be public relations benefits in switching to ‘greener’ 
low carbon electricity, as well as to ‘green’ zero carbon electricity. This suggests that the 
concept should be explored further. 
3.5.4 Incentives for lower carbon emissions from electricity generation 
We therefore have a situation in which the CCL, CCAs and the EU ETS are all incentivising 
lower carbon emissions from electricity generation, but in rather different ways. These 
incentives operate both directly and indirectly and may be complementary. Table 3.14 
provides a summary. 
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Table 3.14 Incentives for lower carbon emissions from electricity generation 
 Measure IPPC EU ETS CCL CCA 
Switch to generation 
from lower carbon 
fossil fuel 
- Direct via ESI 
emissions cap 
- - 
Improve thermal 
efficiency of 
generation 
Direct via energy 
efficiency provisions 
Direct via ESI 
emissions cap 
- - 
Invest in nuclear or 
large hydro 
- Direct via ESI 
emissions cap 
- - 
Supply side 
incentives 
Invest in new 
renewable generation 
sources 
- Direct via ESI 
emissions cap 
Indirect via increased 
demand from 
consumers who have 
switched to gain CCL 
exemption 
- 
Purchase electricity 
from new renewable 
sources 
- Indirect via price 
advantage of zero 
carbon electricity 
Direct by exemptions 
for new renewable 
electricity 
- 
Purchase electricity 
from nuclear, large 
hydro or lower carbon 
fossil sources 
- - - - 
Improve efficiency of 
electricity 
consumption 
Direct via energy 
efficiency provisions 
Indirect via electricity 
price increases from 
generators 
Direct via CCL on 
electricity purchases 
Direct via 
energy/carbon targets 
Demand side 
incentives 
Invest in CHP Direct via energy 
efficiency provisions 
and encouragement of 
CHP 
Indirect via electricity 
price increases (ESI); 
offset by direct 
requirement for 
additional allowances 
for CHP fuel 
(consumer) 
Direct via exemptions 
for CHP fuel 
Direct via 
energy/carbon targets 
and requirements to 
assess CHP potential 
Note: The table shows the additional incentives created by the CCA targets. CCA sites still pay 20% of the CCL. 
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The treatment of electricity from different generating sources is summarised in Table 3.15. 
This illustrates that: 
 
• IPPC and the CCAs provide incentives to reduce electricity consumption regardless of the 
source. 
• The CCL provides a partial exemption for electricity from municipal and industrial wastes, 
and full exemption from all other sources classified as ‘new renewable’. Note that some of 
these, such as landfill gas, emit CO2. 
• The treatment of several ‘renewable’ sources that emit CO2 by the EU ETS has yet to be 
clarified. These include agricultural and forestry wastes, energy crops, landfill gas and 
coal mine methane. The incineration of municipal and industrial waste is excluded from 
the EU ETS Directive, and it is assumed here that this applies even if the combustion plant 
has a thermal input >20MWth.  
Table 3.15 Coverage of electricity generation technologies by IPPC, the CCL, the CCAs and 
the EU ETS  
Technology IPPC CCL CCAs EU ETS 
Fossil fuel Direct and 
indirect 
Indirect Indirect Direct 
Large hydro (>20MW) Indirect Indirect Indirect - 
Nuclear Indirect Indirect Indirect - 
Zero carbon renewable1 Indirect Exempt Indirect - 
Municipal and industrial 
wastes 
Indirect Partially 
exempt 
Indirect - 
Agriculture and forestry 
wastes 
Indirect Exempt Indirect ? 
Energy crops Indirect Exempt Indirect ? 
Landfill gas Indirect Exempt Indirect ? 
Coal mine methane Indirect Exempt Indirect ? 
Notes: 
1. Includes small hydro (<20MW), onshore wind, onshore wind, geothermal, wave, tidal, 
photovoltaics, geothermal 
3.6 Estimating the size of the target groups 
Accurate data is not available on the emissions coverage of IPPC, the CCL, CCAs and the 
EU ETS. But approximate estimates can be obtained using the information presented in 
Volterra (2000). This assigns the CO2 emissions to electricity generation to the final energy 
user. Table 3.16 shows how the estimated 40MtC of ESI emissions in 1998 was 
approximately split between end users. 
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Table 3.16 Electricity demand by sector 1998 
Sector Consumption 
(TWh) 
Associated CO2 
Emissions (MtCe) 
Energy Industry 7.6 0.9 
Other Industry 107.2 13.2 
Domestic 109.6 13.5 
Services 99.9 12.3 
Total 324.3 40 
Source: Volterra (2000) 
 
The available data can be used to obtain an approximate split between the CCL, CCAs and 
the EU ETS. This is shown in Table 3.17. Grey areas are where data is unavailable. In this 
table, regulations are assumed to ‘cover’ emissions if they either: a) regulate combustion or 
process emissions directly; or b) regulate electricity consumption, and thereby indirectly 
affect fossil fuel combustion in the ESI. In the latter case, the regulatory coverage 
incentivises reduced electricity demand but does not create an incentive for reducing carbon 
intensity. 
 
The split given in Table 3.17 includes all energy consuming sectors, as well as upstream 
energy sectors such as oil refineries, but excludes electricity generators as generator 
emissions are allocated to electricity consumers. To obtain this table, a number of simplifying 
assumptions have been made, including: 
 
• process CO2 emissions are ignored, and all direct CO2 emissions from manufacturing are 
assumed to come from combustion plant; 
• the full CO2 emissions of all industrial sectors other than upstream energy are covered by 
either the CCL or the CCAs (i.e. no allowance is made for exempt processes or fuels);  
• the full CO2 emissions of all public, commercial and agricultural sectors are covered by 
the CCL (i.e. no allowance is made for exempt fuels);  
• all IPPC sites in these sectors are included in the CCAs, and no other sites are included 
(i.e. sites below the IPPC size threshold and sites in non-IPPC sectors are ignored); 
• the EU ETS coverage of manufacturing sector emissions is confined to sites with IPPC 
processes that are eligible for the EU ETS (i.e. sites eligible on the basis of having 
combustion plant >20MWth are ignored); and 
• the EU ETS coverage of service sector emissions is confined to indirect emissions from 
electricity use (i.e. direct emissions from the small number of combustion plant 
>20MWth in these sectors are ignored). 
 
These are major simplifying assumptions. For example, they ignore the ~17% of industrial, 
commercial, public and commercial energy use which is accounted for by oil products and 
the ~13% of industrial energy use which is accounted for by autogeneration, much of which 
is exempt from the CCL (DTI, 2002a). While an allowance could be made for these, it is 
difficult to obtain an accurate breakdown at the sector level. The data should therefore be 
considered an order of magnitude estimate only, and one which highlights the need for a 
more detailed analysis.  
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The data provides a sectoral breakdown of CO2 emissions covered by IPPC. Given the above 
assumptions, this provides a proxy for the CO2 emissions covered by the CCAs (since the 
latter does not cover non-CO2 GHGs). IPPC covers both CO2 and other GHGs, but data is not 
available on either the sectoral breakdown of other GHG emissions, or the IPPC coverage of 
this. As a result, the total coverage of GHG emissions by IPPC cannot be estimated. 
 
Table 3.18 aggregates the results by broad sector category, while Tables 3.19 and 3.20 
summarise the results as a percentage of the total 
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Table 3.17 Estimated emissions coverage of the CCL, CCA and EU ETS compared to total 
UK GHG emissions (MtC equivalent)  
Sector Total1 
CO2 
CO2 
from 
elec. 
Gen.2 
Other 
GHGs 
Total 
GHGs 
Covered 
by full 
CCL 
Covered 
by CCA 
Covered 
by EU 
ETS3 
Iron and Steel 8.6 1.1   1.2 7.4 7.4 
Non-ferrous metals 1.7 0.7   0.6 1.1 0.7 
Non metallic metals 0.7 0.0   0.6 0.1  
Bricks 0.4 0.1   0 0.4 0.4 
Cement 1.6 0.5   0 1.6 1.6 
Glass 0.6 0.2   0 0.6 0.6 
Potteries 0.3 0.1   0.2 0.1 0.1 
Chemicals 5.9 1.8   0.9 5.0 1.8 
Mech. Engineering 1.8 1.0   1.5 0.3 1 
Elec. Engineering 0.9 0.7   0.9 0 0.7 
Vehicles 1.8 0.6   1.5 0.3 0.6 
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco 
3.5 1.4   2.7 0.8 1.4 
Textiles, leather and 
clothing 
1.2 0.4   0.6 0.6 0.4 
Paper 3.8 1.2   1.4 2.4 2.4 
Plastics and Rubber 1.6 0.5   1.5 0.1 0.5 
Other 
Manufacturing 
1.8 1.1   1.8 0 1.1 
Water 0.8 0.5   0.8 0 0.5 
Construction 1.0 0.2   1 0 0.2 
Mining 0.6 0.4   0.6 0 0.4 
Total 
manufacturing 
38.6 12.4 11.4 50 17.8 20.8 21.8 
Coke 0.7 0.2   0 0 0.7 
Oil refining 5.6 0.6   0 0 5.6 
Other 2.8 2.7   0 0 2.8 
Total Energy 9.1 3.5 6.4 15.5 0 0 9.1 
Total Industry 47.7 15.9 17.8 65.5 17.8 20.8 30.9 
Public Sector 8.1 2.6 0.7 8.8 8.1 0 2.6 
Commerce 13.9 7.6 0 13.9 13.9 0 7.6 
Total Services 22 10.2 0.7 22.7 22 0 10.2 
Transport 41.5 1.0 0.4 41.9 0 0 1 
Domestic 43.5 12.6 3.1 46.6 0 0 12.6 
Agriculture 3 0.4 10.1 13.1 3 0 0.4 
Total Other 88 14.0 13.6 101.6 3 0 14 
TOTAL 157.7 40.0 32.1 189.8 42.8 20.8 55.1 
Source: Adapted from Volterra (2000), p25; DTI (2002) 
Notes:  
1. ESI emissions assigned to final user 
2. Estimate based on electricity consumption of each sector  
3. Italics indicate indirect coverage of electricity emissions only for this sector 
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Table 3.18 Estimated emissions coverage of the CCL, CCA and EU ETS compared to total 
UK GHG emissions (MtC equivalent)  
Sector Total1 
CO2 
CO2 
from 
elec. 
Gen.2 
Other 
GHGs 
Total 
GHGs 
Covered 
by full 
CCL 
Covered 
by CCA 
Covered 
by EU 
ETS3 
Manufacturing 38.6 12.4 11.4 50 17.8 20.8 21.8 
Energy 9.1 3.5 6.4 15.5 0 0 9.1 
Total Industry 47.7 15.9 17.8 65.5 17.8 20.8 30.9 
Public Sector 8.1 2.6 0.7 8.8 8.1 0 2.6 
Commerce 13.9 7.6 0 13.9 13.9 0 7.6 
Total Services 22 10.2 0.7 22.7 22 0 10.2 
Transport 41.5 1.0 0.4 41.9 0 0 1 
Domestic 43.5 12.6 3.1 46.6 0 0 12.6 
Agriculture 3 0.4 10.1 13.1 3 0 0.4 
Total Other 88 14.0 13.6 101.6 3 0 14 
TOTAL 157.7 40.0 32.1 189.8 42.8 20.8 55.1 
Source: Adapted from Volterra (2000), p25; DTI (2002) 
Notes:  
1. ESI emissions assigned to final user 
2. Estimate based on electricity consumption of each sector  
3. Italics indicate indirect coverage of electricity emissions only for this sector 
Table 3.19 Estimated emissions coverage of the CCL, CCA and EU ETS compared to total 
UK GHG emissions (% of total in each column)  
Sector Total1 
CO2 
CO2 
from 
elec. 
Gen.2 
Other 
GHGs 
Total 
GHGs 
Covered 
by full 
CCL 
Covered 
by CCA 
Covered 
by EU 
ETS3 
Manufacturing 24.5 31.0 35.5 26.3 41.6 100.0 39.6 
Energy 5.8 8.8 19.9 8.2 0.0 0.0 16.5 
Total Industry 30.2 39.8 55.5 34.5 41.6 100.0 56.1 
Public Sector 5.1 6.5 2.2 4.6 18.9 0.0 4.7 
Commerce 8.8 19.0 0.0 7.3 32.5 0.0 13.8 
Total Services 14.0 25.5 2.2 12.0 51.4 0.0 18.5 
Transport 26.3 2.5 1.2 22.1 0.0 0.0 1.8 
Domestic 27.6 31.5 9.7 24.6 0.0 0.0 22.9 
Agriculture 1.9 1.0 31.5 6.9 7.0 0.0 0.7 
Total Other 55.8 35.0 42.4 53.5 7.0 0.0 25.4 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Adapted from Volterra (2000), p25; DTI (2002) 
Notes:  
4. ESI emissions assigned to final user 
5. Estimate based on electricity consumption of each sector  
6. Italics indicate indirect coverage of electricity emissions only for this sector 
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Table 3.20 Summary of emissions coverage of the CCL, CCA and EU ETS (MtC equivalent)  
 Total emissions (MtC) Percentage of UK CO2 
emissions 
Percentage of UK GHG 
emissions 
 CCL CCA EU 
ETS 
CCL CCA EU 
ETS 
CCL CCA EU 
ETS 
Manufacturing 17.8 20.8 21.8 11.3 13.2 13.8 9.4 11.0 11.5 
Energy 0.0 0 9.1 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 4.8 
Total Industry 17.8 20.8 30.9 11.3 13.2 19.6 9.4 11.0 16.3 
Public Sector 8.1 0 2.6 5.1 0.0 1.6 4.3 0.0 1.4 
Commerce 13.9 0 7.6 8.8 0.0 4.8 7.3 0.0 4.0 
Total Services 22.0 0 10.2 14.0 0.0 6.5 11.6 0.0 5.4 
Transport 0.0 0 1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Domestic 0.0 0 12.6 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 
Agriculture 3.0 0 0.4 1.9 0.0 0.3 1.6 0.0 0.2 
Total Other 3 3 14 1.9 1.9 8.9 1.6 1.6 7.4 
TOTAL 42.8 20.8 55.1 27.1 13.2 34.9 22.6 11.0 29.0 
 
Some notable points from these tables are as follows: 
 
• Total UK GHG emissions in 2000 were 189.7MtC, of which 65.5MtC (34.5%) was from 
industry, 13.9MtC (7.3%) from commerce and a 8.8MtC (4.6%) from the public sector. 
Excluding the energy industries, total (manufacturing) industry emissions were 50MtC, or 
26.3% of the UK total. 
• Total UK CO2 emissions in 2000 were 157.7MtC. This corresponds to 83% of total UK 
GHG emissions. The CO2 emissions were split as follows: industry 30%; public and 
commercial 13.9%; transport 26.3%; domestic 27.6% and other 2.2%. 
• CO2 dominates GHG emissions in all sectors apart from certain sectors of industry and 
agriculture. Of the 50 MtC of manufacturing industry emissions, a total of 11.4 MtC 
(22.8%) derive from GHG gases other than CO2. 
• Direct emissions from the ESI account for 40MtC. This corresponds to 25% of UK CO2 
emissions and 21% of total UK GHG emissions. 
• Grouping together both direct and indirect coverage of CO2 emissions, the CCL covers 
27.1% of UK CO2 emissions, the CCAs 13.2%, the CCL/CCA package 40.3% and the EU 
ETS 34.9%. Taking GHG emissions as a whole, the CCL covers 22.6% of UK GHG 
emissions, the CCAs 11.0%, the CCL/CCA package 33.6% and the EU ETS 29%. 
• Grouping together both direct and indirect coverage of CO2 emissions, the CCL covers 
46.1% of manufacturing sector emissions (ignoring exemptions), the CCAs 53.9%, the 
CCL/CCA package 100% and the EU ETS 56.5%. The corresponding figures for total 
GHG emissions are 35.6%, 41.6%, 77.2% and 43.6%. 
• Ignoring exemptions, the CCL covers 100% of service sector CO2 emissions. The EU ETS 
only covers the indirect emissions from electricity generation, which amounts to 46.4% of 
the CO2 total for the service sector. The CCAs do not extend into the service sector. 
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• The EU ETS covers 27% of the emissions from the domestic sector, through its coverage 
of indirect emissions from the ESI. In contrast, the CCL/CCAs exempt the domestic sector 
altogether. 
3.7 Summary 
This section has explored the overlaps in scope of the CCL, CCAs and EU ETS. Since the 
coverage of the CCAs is related to coverage of the IPPC Directive, the scope of the latter has 
also being examined. Most of the discussion has focused on overlaps in the direct target 
groups, but attention has also been paid to the indirect impacts of the instruments on the 
electricity market.  
 
The results are formidably complex. They suggest that implementing the EU ETS will create 
substantial difficulties in terms of differential treatment, double regulation and equivalence of 
effort. The overlaps were investigated in four stages: 
 
• Sectoral coverage: Differences in sectoral coverage of the four instruments suggest that 
individual sites in the public, commercial, manufacturing and energy sectors may face one 
of ten combinations of the four instruments (Table 3.4).  
• Site coverage: Differences in the coverage of individual technologies within an individual 
site expands the number of possible combinations of instrument coverage from ten to 
eighteen. For example, comparable sites in the same sector could have different regulatory 
coverage depending upon the size of their main combustion plant (Table 3.10). 
• Emissions coverage: Further complications are introduced by the differences in coverage 
of: a) CO2 versus other GHGs; b) combustion versus non-combustion CO2 emissions; and 
c) combustion emissions from different fossil fuels.  
• Electricity coverage: A final layer of complexity is provided by the differing incentives 
each instrument creates for abating emissions from electricity generation. Each instrument 
gives a different mix of direct and indirect incentives to both the supply and demand side 
of the electricity market, with the result that each instrument incentivises a different mix of 
abatement options (Table 3.14). Particular complications are introduced by the 
inconsistent treatment of electricity from various renewable sources (Table 3.15). 
 
The aggregate coverage of CO2 emissions from each instrument is also different. The CCL 
covers approximately 27% of UK CO2 emissions, the CCAs 13.2%, the CCL/CCA package 
40% and the EU ETS 35%. As indicated above, the particular mix of emission sources is 
different in each case. 
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Confusion over instrument objectives  
This section first explores the quantitative and qualitative objectives of the CCL, CCAs and 
EU ETS. It then compares these objectives to assess their compatibility and to identify any 
potential conflicts. The discussion is preceded by a short note on energy prices.  
4.1 A note on energy prices  
In this section and elsewhere, comments are made on the potential impact of each instrument 
on energy costs and energy prices. But any such impacts must be set in the context of 
underlying trends in energy prices. Table 4.1 provides energy price indices for the industrial 
sector over the period 1990-2001, adjusted by the GDP deflator. These show that: 
 
• In 2001, UK gas prices were 6.8% higher in real terms than in 1990, coal prices were 
16.5% lower and electricity prices were 10% lower. 
• Gas prices increased by 18% in real terms between 1995 and 2001, while coal prices fell 
by 3.8% and electricity prices fell by 23%; 
• Gas prices increased by 34.6% in real terms between 2000 and 2001, while electricity 
prices fell by 8.5%. 
Table 4.1 Energy price indices for the UK industrial sector 
Year Coal HFO Gas Electricity 
1990 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1991 98.50 87.84 100.96 103.31 
1992 99.75 84.48 104.46 109.04 
1993 93.64 90.05 102.69 114.24 
1994 92.52 97.44 103.63 110.10 
1995 86.79 113.78 90.36 109.07 
1996 82.55 125.65 66.13 105.30 
1997 80.62 120.21 69.74 99.30 
1998 82.49 100.20 73.59 98.37 
1999 81.25 114.69 72.94 98.95 
2000 81.37 166.04 79.33 91.74 
2001 83.49 165.81 106.79 83.95 
% change 1990-2001 -16.5 65.8 6.8 -16.1 
% change 1995-2001 -3.8 45.7 18.2 -23.0 
% change 2000-2001 2.6 -0.1 34.6 -8.5 
Average prices 2001 
(p/kWh) 
0.482 1.055 0.816 3.135 
Notes:  
• Figures for 2001 exclude the impact of CCL, which came into force in April 2001. 
• Deflated using the GDP implied deflator at market prices with base year of 1995 but rescaled to 
1990=100. 
Source: DTI (2002) 
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The decline in industrial electricity prices is continuing. Average industrial electricity prices 
excluding the CCL decreased in real terms by 6% in the year to the second quarter of 2002, 
giving an average price of 2.87p/kWh. Over the same period, industrial gas prices excluding 
the CCL decreased by 12% in real terms, while the price of coal and HFO decreased by 4% 
and 1% respectively. 
 
The fall in industrial electricity prices is primarily the result of large falls in wholesale 
electricity prices following the introduction of NETA in March 2001. A combination of 
overcapacity in electricity generation and (arguably) the absence of incentives within NETA 
to reward unused capacity has driven wholesale prices as low as 1.4p/kWh. This in turn has 
halted new investment and precipitated a crisis in electricity generation (ENDS, 2002b). The 
resulting fall in electricity industrial prices has acted to offset the price increase from the 
CCL. For example, the difference in average electricity prices (excluding the CCL) between 
the second quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2002 was 0.53p/kWh, which is greater 
than 0.43p/kWh increase provided by the CCL. In contrast, gas price trends between 2000 
and 2002 have added to the price increases from the CCL. 
4.2 CCL objectives 
4.2.1 Quantitative objectives 
The CCL increases coal and gas prices by 0 15p/kWh and delivered electricity prices by 
0.43p/kWh. The tax rates can be converted into an equivalent carbon tax for gas and coal by 
using assumptions about average carbon content. Similarly, the tax rates for electricity can be 
converted into an equivalent carbon tax for the primary fuel input to electricity generation by 
using assumptions about fuel mix, carbon intensity, thermal efficiency and losses in 
transmission and distribution.  
 
The results are shown in Table 4.2. This illustrates that the CCL corresponds approximately 
to a £8.15/tCO2 tax for natural gas, a £4.55/tCO2 tax for coal and a £9.35/tCO2 tax for the 
primary fuel input to electricity generation. Together with the exclusion of oil, these figures 
illustrate the variance of the CCL from a straightforward carbon tax and the disincentive it 
creates for switching to fuels with a low carbon content. The size of the levy represents a 
compromise between climate policy and competition objectives, reached in the context of 
heavy industrial lobbying. 
 
The reason for excluding oil products is that these are already eligible for excise duties. 
Current duty rates30 correspond to an equivalent carbon tax of £8.9/tCO2 for HFO and 
£11.6/tCO2 for gasoil. Excise duties are a legacy of policies imposed in the 1970s to reduce 
dependence upon imported oil, and have been retained despite the UK being a net exporter of 
oil for nearly two decades. The CCL improves the competitiveness of oil compared to gas 
and coal. But oil is still taxed at a higher rate on a carbon equivalent basis.  
                                                 
30 Current excise duties are £27.62/tonne for HFO and £36.53/tonne for gasoil. The combustion of one tonne of 
HFO leads to emissions of 3.11tCO2, while the corresponding figure for gasoil is 3.136tCO2. 
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Table 4.2 CCL rates and equivalent carbon tax rates 
Fuel Rate 
p/kWh 
Equivalent in 
£/tCO2 
Equivalent in 
£/tC 
Gas 0.15 8.15 29.8 
Coal 0.15 4.55 16.7 
Delivered electricity 0.43 9.35 34.28 
Notes: Assumed emission factors: Gas = 51.3kgCO2/GJ;  Coal = 91.5kgCO2/GJ. Assumed delivered to 
primary conversion factor = 2.60. Assumed carbon emissions factor for primary electricity = 0.17 kg 
CO2/kWh. These assumptions correspond to those used for the CCAs. 
 
The contribution of the CCL to reduced carbon emissions depends upon assumptions about 
energy price elasticities in different sectors. Based on DTI econometric modelling, the 
government estimates the CCL will contribute a reduction of 2MtC/year between 2000 and 
2010, ‘including the exemption for CHP and renewables’ (DETR, 2000c). In addition, CCL 
revenues fund financial support for R&D and capital allowances for energy efficiency 
investment, which are expected to contribute an additional 0.5MtC.  
 
The total figure of 2.5MtC/year corresponds to 5.8% of emissions from the fuel and 
electricity use that is subject to the full CCL, or 3.9% of emissions from the fuel and 
electricity use that is subject to the CCL/CCA package (CCA facilities still pay 20% of the 
CCL) (Table 3.17). The uncertainty of this estimate is illustrated by the fact that it is 33% 
greater than an earlier estimate provided by the DETR, which was for a 30% higher CCL 
rate.  
4.2.2 Qualitative objectives 
The CCL has its origins in the recommendations of the Marshall report (Marshall, 1998). 
This concluded that there was a role for a business energy/carbon tax in UK climate policy, in 
part because a downstream trading scheme could not reach smaller firms. The suggested 
requirements for such a tax included: 
 
• full revenue recycling, with a portion of the revenues used to promote energy efficiency; 
• some form of exemption/rebate for energy intensive industry, while retaining incentives 
for reduced energy use; and 
• incentives for CHP and renewables. 
 
All three of these objectives have been reflected in the design of the CCL. Overall revenue 
neutrality is achieved through a 0.3% reduction in employers national insurance 
contributions. Investment in energy efficiency is promoted through a £50m annual R&D fund 
managed by the newly formed Carbon Trust, together with £100m for a system of first year 
capital allowances for energy efficiency investments. This represents approximately 15% of 
the expected £1 billion to be raised from the CCL, with the remainder going to fund the cuts 
in national insurance contributions. Finally, good quality CHP and renewables are exempt 
from the levy. 
 
Several other objectives are less explicit but very important, and explain the choice of a 
downstream energy tax rather than an upstream carbon tax. The first is the social policy 
objective of protecting the domestic consumer from energy price rises. The UK is almost 
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unique in Europe in having up to five million households living in ‘fuel poverty’, defined as 
spending more than 10% of household income on energy. This results from a combination of 
income inequality and an inefficient housing stock. Fuel poverty is a sensitive political issue 
that has prevented previous governments from imposing VAT on domestic energy supplies.31 
The same considerations led to the choice of a downstream tax for electricity, rather than 
imposing the tax on the fuel consumed by generators. The rationale was that an upstream 
energy or carbon tax would lead to electricity price rises for all consumers, including 
households. 
 
The second is the energy policy objective of protecting the remains of the UK coal industry. 
The UK coal market shrunk by 49% between 1990 and 1999, largely as a consequence of the 
‘dash to gas’ following electricity market privatisation. This decline was (and is) leading to 
concern about fuel diversity and supply security (PIU, 2002).32 In 1998, there was concern 
that the structure and operation of the electricity market was denying a fair opportunity for 
coal fired generation. This led to a review of energy sources for electricity generation (DTI, 
1998), a temporary restriction on consent for new gas fired stations, and ultimately the 
introduction of NETA. Imposing an upstream carbon tax would have completely undermined 
these attempts to protect coal.  
 
A second energy policy consideration was the desire to prevent the nuclear industry, and to a 
lesser extent large hydro, from receiving a large windfall. This would have been the case if 
the fuel input to generation had been subject to a carbon tax since, prior to 2001, the 
operation of the UK wholesale electricity market (the Pool) would allow all generators to 
receive a higher electricity price.33 In contrast to the Pool, NETA is based upon bilateral 
contracts between generators and suppliers, which makes the impact of an upstream carbon 
tax more difficult to assess. 
 
The nuclear industry continues to lobby for exemption from the CCL, of the grounds that it 
emits no CO2. But the government has refused this by arguing that, despite its name, the CCL 
is designed to encourage energy efficiency, rather than simply reduce CO2 emissions (ENDS, 
2002b).34 A rationale for this stance could be that nuclear power has uninternalised 
environmental costs of its own, which the CCL goes some way to cover. Energy efficiency 
also has broader benefits in terms of improving supply security and facilitating the long term 
transition to a low carbon economy and these broader energy policy objectives may also have 
been a consideration in the design of the CCL. 
 
                                                 
31 In contrast, most energy efficiency investments, such as cavity wall insulation, are subject to the full rate of 
VAT. 
32 The concern is that: first, the UK is becoming increasingly reliant upon gas in all sectors other than transport; 
second, North Sea gas supplies are declining and by around 2020 as much as 90% of gas may need to be 
imported; and third, fuel diversity in electricity generation will be reduced further by the closure of nuclear 
power stations. At present, the UK has 12.5GW of nuclear capacity, representing 15% of installed capacity and 
around 25% of supply. By 2020, only around 2GW (Sizewell B) is anticipated to remain in operation.  
33 This assumes that generators receive the system marginal price (SMP), which would normally be set by coal 
fired generation plant and would be increased through the imposition of a carbon tax.  
34 In October 2002, Trade and Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt stated that the government had no plans to 
exempt nuclear from the CCL (ENDS, 2002b). The levy had been designed as an energy tax rather than a carbon 
tax to: ‘…encourage all sectors of business and the public sector to improve energy efficiency. Excluding 
electricity generated from nuclear would take a fifth of the UK's electricity out of the levy, reducing the 
incentive upon business to use electricity efficiently and reducing the levy’s beneficial effect on carbon 
emissions.’ 
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The net result is that the UK CCL does not have the sole objective of reducing carbon 
emissions - something which would have best been achieved through an upstream carbon tax. 
Instead, its complex design reflects a range of other objectives, including the desire to protect 
domestic consumers, energy intensive industry, and UK coal producers, together with 
avoiding a windfall to nuclear generators and encouraging energy efficiency. Instead of 
meeting these objectives explicitly through subsidiary policies and measures – for example, 
tax exemptions for low income households – the government chose to achieve these multiple 
objectives through the CCL itself. The result is that the transparency of policy objectives has 
been clouded and the cost effectiveness of the tax (in terms of £/tCO2 abated) has been 
reduced. 
4.3 CCA objectives 
The primary objective of the CCAs is to cushion energy intensive industries from the full 
impact of the CCL, while at the same time securing quantified improvements in energy 
efficiency and thereby contributing to the UK carbon targets. Each CCA has a specific, 
precise and quantified target for reducing energy intensity, carbon intensity or energy use (no 
sectors have chosen absolute targets for carbon emissions). The agreements are complex and 
vary from sector to sector in a number of respects, including: 
 
• baseline year: this can be any year from 1990 to 200035; 
• absolute or relative targets: nearly all sectors have opted for relative targets (e.g. % 
reduction in energy use per unit of output), with only the steel and aerospace sectors 
agreeing to targets for absolute energy consumption. 
• value of the targets: the percentage improvement over the baseline year varies widely 
between sectors; 
• risk management procedures: some sectors are allowed to adjust their targets if there are 
changes in product mix or output level, while others have adopted a ‘tolerance band’. 
 
The negotiation of the targets was based on a bottom up database of industrial energy 
efficiency opportunities held by ETSU (ETSU, 2001). This distinguishes between 
‘technically possible’ opportunities and ‘cost effective’ opportunities, where the latter include 
assumptions about investment criteria in different sectors. A selection of these assumptions 
are summarised in Table 4.3 
                                                 
35 The baseline is normally a single year, rather than the average of several years.  
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Table 4.3 ETSU assumptions on typical payback criteria by sector 
 Sector  Retrofit measures  New plant 
 Iron and Steel  2 4 
 Non Ferrous Metals 2 2 
 Non Metallic Minerals 2 4 
 Bricks 2 4 (15*) 
 Cement 2 4 (15*) 
 Glass 2 2 (10*) 
 Pottery 2 4 (10*) 
 Chemicals 2 2 (5-10*) 
 Mechanical Engineering 1-2 2 
 Electrical Engineering 2 5 
 Vehicles 2 5 
 Food and Drink 2 2-4 
 Textiles 1-2 1 (2*) 
 Other Industries 1-2 2 
 Paper 2 2 
 Plastics and Rubber 2 2 
Source: ETSU (1999) 
 
The starting point for negotiations was the adoption of ‘all cost effective’ (ACE) 
opportunities identified by the database by 2010. But the final agreements generally require 
less than ACE. Overall, the CCAs will lead to around 60% of ACE measures being taken, 
although there is wide variation between sectors. Factors influencing the targets for each 
sector include: the negotiating skills of the trade association; availability of capital; growth 
rates; market structure and international competitiveness; historic progress on energy 
efficiency; differing baseline years; varying potential for CHP; regulatory constraints; and the 
cost of management time (ETSU, 2001).  
 
The stringency of the targets may be questioned (Sorrell and Smith, 1999). First, the ETSU 
database is limited in its level of sectoral and technology disaggregation and hence only 
identifies a subset of the available energy efficiency opportunities. Second, improvements in 
energy efficiency may result from either specific energy efficiency investments, or as a by-
product of technological investments undertaken for other reasons. This second type of 
improvement may not have an easily identifiable payback rate, but historically has been very 
important in improving industrial energy efficiency (Bell, 1990). Again, the ETSU database 
may only include a subset of such opportunities. Third, the ETSU database is confined to 
currently available technologies, but over the ten year period of the agreements technical 
innovation could substantially change both the availability and cost of efficiency 
opportunities (although this risk is partly mitigated by the review of the CCA targets which 
are scheduled for 2004 and 2008). Finally, the investment criteria illustrated in Table 4.3 can 
be challenged in terms of the rationale for the variation between sectors, the choice of simple 
paybacks rather than discounted cash flow,36 the very short paybacks used, and the neglect of 
                                                 
36 This reflects normal industry practice, but simple paybacks neglect cost savings beyond the end of the 
payback period. 
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wider social costs. In practice, if the investment are cost effective then industry should be 
making them anyway, without the incentive of the agreement.37 
 
Based on ETSU’s analysis, the government estimates that the CCAs will deliver 2.5MtC 
annual reductions by 2010 compared to a business as usual scenario. This compares to 4MtC 
if ‘all cost effective measures’ were adopted. Interestingly, ETSU also estimate that the price 
effect of the levy on its own in the sectors (i.e. with no agreements and no associated 
discounts) would give a saving of only 0.25MtC per annum (ETSU 2001). A 2.5MtC 
reduction corresponds to 12% of the baseline emission coverage of the CCAs, while 4MtC 
corresponds to 19.2%. 
 
Although this figure is based upon quantified and legally binding targets, there is some 
uncertainty over whether it will be achieved in practice. First, most of the agreements are on a 
relative basis. If industrial output increases faster than was anticipated during the negotiations 
then there will be a concomitant increase in carbon emissions. Second, most of the 
agreements are on an energy basis. If the balance between different types of fuel, or between 
fuel and electricity, departs from that assumed there will be a corresponding change in carbon 
emissions. Third, the risk management procedures have complicated the agreements, and may 
lead to changes in the targets if there are changes in the product mix. Fourth, the targets are 
not fixed for the ten year period but are open to renegotiation in 2004 and 2008, at which 
point they may either be relaxed or tightened. Finally, and most importantly, the estimates of 
carbon emissions from electricity consumption are based upon a fixed conversion factor for 
the period 2000-2010, which in turn is based upon assumptions about the average fuel mix 
for electricity supply over this period (Table 4.4). In practice, actual carbon emissions are 
likely to depart from estimated carbon emissions due to changes in generation efficiency and 
fuel switching by generators. The most likely scenario is for carbon intensity to fall, leading 
to the emission factor overestimating actual carbon reductions. To take an extreme case, if 
nuclear generation remained unchanged in 2010 and all coal plants were replaced with gas 
fired CCGTs, the carbon intensity of electricity production would fall by some 28%. The 
carbon savings from improved electricity efficiency at CCAs facilities would then be 
overestimated by some 28%. Total energy consumption would still be reduced, but the 
calculated reduction in carbon emissions would be incorrect. This discrepancy is of particular 
importance when considering the potential interface between the CCAs and the EU ETS. 
                                                 
37 The issue here is the definition of ‘cost effective’. Hidden costs, notably management time, may make many 
apparently cost effective investments uneconomic. This is a complex question, with a voluminous literature 
(Sorrell et al, 2000). 
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Table 4.4 Conversion factors for grid purchased electricity used in the CCAs 
Year Delivered to 
primary 
conversion 
factor 
Carbon 
emission factor 
kgCO2/GJ 
(primary) 
Carbon 
emission factor 
kgCO2/kWh 
(primary) 
Carbon 
emission factor 
kgCO2/kWh 
(delivered) 
 1990 3.20 69.65 0.25 0.80 
 1991 3.20 66.72 0.24 0.77 
 1992 3.10 61.96 0.22 0.69 
 1993 3.00 57.19 0.21 0.62 
 1994 2.95 54.99 0.20 0.58 
 1995 2.90 55.36 0.20 0.58 
 1996 2.88 55.36 0.20 0.57 
 1997 2.84 49.49 0.18 0.51 
 1998 2.76 46.19 0.17 0.46 
 1999 2.68 46.19 0.17 0.45 
 2000 2.60 46.19 0.17 0.43 
 2005 2.60 46.19 0.17 0.43 
 2010 2.60 46.19 0.17 0.43 
Source: DETR, 1999a  
Notes:  
• Delivered to primary conversion factor allows for efficiency losses in generation, transmission 
and distribution, while carbon emission factor allows for carbon intensity of fuel mix. 
• 1GJ = 277.8kWh; 1tC = 3.66tCO2; 
4.4 EU ETS objectives 
4.4.1 Quantitative objectives 
The Directive does not include any quantitative targets for GHG emissions reduction. 
Decisions on the total quantity of allowances to be issued are left to individual Member 
States, but must be ‘consistent with’: 
 
• Member State obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and the EU burden sharing agreement, 
taking into account the proportion of national emissions represented by covered sources; 
• the technological potential of installations to reduce emissions; 
• assessments of actual and projected progress towards fulfilling Community commitments; 
and 
• other EU legislative and policy instruments (CEC, 2001a). 
 
The last includes a requirement that no allowances should be allocated to cover emissions 
which would be reduced or eliminated as a consequence of EU legislation on renewables. 
Account should also be taken of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new 
legislative requirements. 
 
The total quantity of allowances should ensure that the overall emissions of all the 
participating installations collectively would be no higher than if the emissions were to be 
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regulated under IPPC (Article 13). In practice, this is likely to be very difficult to 
demonstrate. CO2 emissions are not regulated by BAT under the IPPC Directive, but by more 
ambiguous energy efficiency requirements (Smith and Sorrell, 2001). This means that it is 
first necessary to decide how these will be interpreted, and then to demonstrate that the 
requirements have been adhered to in practice. Other GHGs are currently subject to strict 
BAT requirements under IPPC, which are incompatible with emissions trading (Smith and 
Sorrell, 2001). The Directive therefore proposes that the IPPC Directive be amended to 
accommodate the subsequent inclusion of such gases in the scheme (CEC, 2001a). 
 
In Phase 1 of the scheme (2005-2008), allowances will be allocated free. The criteria for 
distributing allowances between installations include (CEC, 2001a): 
 
• compliance with State Aid provisions (each situation examined on its merits);  
• consistency with the technological potential of installations to reduce emissions; 
• taking account of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new legislative 
requirements; 
• not discriminating between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain 
undertakings or activities; 
• not allocating an installation more allowances than it is likely to need; 
 
Taken together, the suggested allocation criteria are at best ambiguous and at worst 
contradictory. On the one hand, the reference to the EU burden sharing agreement implies a 
top-down form of allocation, while on the other hand the references to technological 
potential, equivalence to IPPC, and ‘need’ for allowances imply a bottom-up form of 
allocation. It is not clear which should take priority or how a compromise between these 
could be achieved. 
 
From the perspective of UK industry, an approach to allocation which is strongly shaped by 
the burden sharing targets would be preferred. This is because the UK is well on course to 
meet its burden sharing target. Following this logic, UK installations could obtain relatively 
soft targets under the EU scheme. Conversely, installations in Member States (such as Spain) 
which look likely to exceed their burden sharing target would receive more stringent targets. 
But this raises equity issues. A Member State (e.g. the UK) may be on course to meet its 
burden sharing target for reasons that are entirely independent of the performance of many of 
the installations regulated under the EU scheme.38 This may mean that the EU ETS 
installations get off lightly, giving them a competitive advantage over installations in other 
countries. Alternatively, individual companies may feel penalised for the failure of their 
Member State (e.g. Spain) to meet its burden sharing target. Hence, differentiating 
installation targets on the basis of national progress towards the burden sharing targets is 
bound to raise competitiveness concerns. Conversely, allocating targets on the basis of 
bottom-up considerations is administratively burdensome. Trying to do both is arguably 
worse still, although this is what is implied by the text of the Directive. 
 
                                                 
38 In the aggregate, this is unlikely. The EU ETS covers approximately 46% of EU CO2 emissions and includes 
electricity generation which has been the primary source of reduced emissions in the last decade. But the 
contribution of individual installations to a Member State’s progress towards its burden sharing target may vary 
widely.  
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A similarly contentious issue is giving ‘credit for early action’ within the allocation. This will 
be strongly argued for by many participants (including those with CCAs), but may violate the 
recommendation that installations should receive no more allowances than they ‘need’. 
Negotiating acceptable allocations within and between Member States is likely to be time 
consuming and difficult. 
4.4.2 Qualitative objectives 
The Directive also mentions a variety of qualitative objectives, including: 
 
• cost-effective reduction of GHG emissions to help meet Kyoto obligations; 
• striking a balance between simplicity, effectiveness, subsidiarity and transparency;  
• compatibility with liberalised energy markets ; 
• synergy with existing legislation, notably IPPC; 
• transparency and public access to information;  
• preserving integrity of the single market and avoiding distortion of competition; 
Within this, the desire for compatibility with liberalised energy markets is particularly 
important as this led to electricity generators being given direct responsibility for emissions 
to facilitate cross-border trade in electricity (section 2.3). Similarly, the requirements on 
competitiveness and the single market are central issues in determining allowance allocation 
and equivalence of effort. 
 
The implicit social and energy policy objectives that shaped the design of the CCL - 
protecting domestic consumers and the coal industry, encouraging energy efficiency and 
avoiding windfalls to nuclear - are entirely absent from the proposal. 
4.5 Stringency of objectives 
The core objective of each of the three instruments is the same: the reduction of carbon 
emissions from the target groups. But two aspects of the objectives warrant closer 
examination: first, the relative stringency of each instrument (in terms of marginal abatement 
cost); and second, the potential conflicts between subsidiary objectives - in particular those 
associated with the CCL. These are discussed in the following two sections. 
4.5.1 Stringency of the EU ETS 
Assuming free allocation of allowances, there are three elements to the stringency of the EU 
ETS. First, the stringency of the overall cap as reflected in the allowance price; second, the 
stringency of individual targets as reflected in the individual allowance allocations; and third, 
the extent to which allowance prices and abatement costs are modified by the interface 
between the EU ETS, other trading schemes and the international carbon market. 
 
Overall stringency is determined by the size of the cap (i.e. the total number of allowances), 
relative to the abatement cost curve of the total population of participating installations. In a 
well functioning allowance market, the allowance price will equal the marginal abatement 
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costs for the source population while total costs will equal the integral over the marginal cost 
curve between initial emissions and target emissions. As indicated above, the total number of 
allowances is intended to be determined through a mix of top-down and bottom-up criteria. 
 
The stringency of individual targets will be determined by the size of the individual 
allowance allocation, relative to both the abatement cost curve of the individual installation 
and the market price for allowances. Individual installations may find themselves to be either 
buyers or sellers of allowances. While an individual installation will always minimise costs 
by setting marginal abatement cost equal to the allowance price, the total costs incurred will 
depend upon the size of its initial allowance allocation. 
 
The above assumes that the EU ETS is a closed system. But Article 24 of the draft Directive 
states that the Community may conclude agreements with other Annex B Parties to provide 
for the mutual recognition of allowances, and Article 26 creates the possibility of future links 
to JI projects and the CDM (CEC, 2001a). This means that after 2008, both allowances and 
project credits from outside the EU could enter the EU ETS.  
 
This provision is very important, as it means that after 2008 the allowance price in the EU 
ETS could converge with the international price for carbon. Given: a) the availability of 
cheap hot air from Russia and the EITs; b) the large reduction in demand created by the 
withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol; and c) the generous sink provisions 
negotiated at Marrakech; it is highly likely that the international price will be very low. For 
example, den Elzen and Moor (2002) estimated an allowance price during the commitment 
period of $2.4/tCO2 (~£1.6/tCO2), while other commentators have put allowance prices at or 
close to zero (Blanchard et al, 2002). Whether this occurs in practice will depend upon 
developments in the international carbon market, including the extent to which Russia and the 
Ukraine raise prices by operating as a cartel.39 If this proved to be the case and if the EU ETS 
was fully open, the stringency of the scheme could fall significantly after 2008. Conversely, 
the Community may seek to restrict the import of allowances in order to maintain the EU 
ETS allowance price and thereby maintain the incentive to reduce EU emissions. A wide 
range of scenarios is possible, but the general point is that after 2008 the stringency of the EU 
ETS will depend in part upon the extent to which it is opened up to other trading schemes. 
4.5.2 Consistency with technological potential and IPPC 
The text of the draft EU ETS Directive requires that both total allowance allocation and 
individual allowance allocation be ‘consistent with’ the technological potential to reduce 
emissions. The criteria make no reference to the economic potential to reduce emissions. This 
is in contrast to the targets in the CCAs, which are based upon an (arguably weak) 
interpretation of cost effective potential, which is distinct from (and less than) technological 
potential. One interpretation of ‘consistent with technological potential’ is strict BAT, as in 
IPPC. But this interpretation of the EU ETS guidelines seems unlikely as BAT does not apply 
to CO2, and even BAT (as defined in IPPC) requires consideration of sectoral affordability 
(Sorrell, 2002).  
 
The requirement that allowance allocation be consistent with a counterfactual implementation 
of IPPC also create difficulties. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that not all participants 
are regulated under IPPC, there are important differences between how EU ETS targets and 
                                                 
39 Also, individual countries are unlikely to minimise abatement costs in the manner assumed in economic 
models, with the result that such models are likely to underestimate both abatement costs and allowance prices. 
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IPPC targets would be negotiated. The former would be done at an aggregate level, in a 
similar manner to the CCAs, while the latter would be negotiated individually for each 
installation. In each case, the motivation of the regulator is to determine abatement costs and 
to set a target according to some agreed criteria of costs and benefits, while the motivation of 
the regulated party is to reduce the stringency of the agreed target by exaggerating estimates 
of abatement costs. Industry has private information on abatement costs which are difficult 
for the regulator to gain access to.  
 
The relevant issue here is the difference in the level of information asymmetry between:  
 
1. government negotiating an aggregate target for industry overall, or for individual sectors 
(EU ETS); and 
2. the environmental regulator negotiating installation-specific targets with individual firms 
(IPPC). 
 
The former suffers from problems of aggregation. Estimates of what is cost effective for a 
sector may differ significantly from what is cost effective for individual sites. Some sites may 
have greater opportunities, while others may have fewer. The aggregate target for a sector 
should ideally be based on the sum of cost effective opportunities for individual sites, but 
without individual site audits the regulator has only limited information on what these are. 
The advantage of negotiating with individual firms under IPPC is that this aggregation 
problem is significantly reduced. In principle, the regulator can employ detailed knowledge 
of the circumstances of the individual site; can require a site energy audit to identify 
opportunities; and can, in principle, reflect the full range of energy efficiency opportunities 
within the permit requirements. Set against this, however, the regulator may lack resources 
and relevant expertise in energy efficiency, and may also lack the political authority to 
require challenging targets. 
 
The relative stringency of the EU ETS is therefore an empirical question and will depend 
upon implementation by individual Member States. Information asymmetry is unavoidable 
and there is always the risk that the agreed targets will be significantly less than is achievable. 
The importance of this will depend very much upon the time frame for the targets. The CCAs 
pose particular risks in that the targets are fixed, in principle, for ten years (2001-2010) 
although there are provisions for revisions. This should be less of a problem for Phase 1 of 
the EU ETS, as this is only intended to run for three years (2005-2007). 
4.5.3 Differential treatment and equivalence of effort 
The comparative stringency of the different instruments is relevant for two reasons. First, 
there may be questions of differential treatment and equivalence of effort if one sector/site is 
targeted by one instrument, and a second by another. This is relevant both within a sector, 
and between sectors in different countries. Differential treatment dominated the politics of the 
CCAs (with sectors clamouring to be included so as to avoid the full rate of the CCL), and 
may similarly be a dominant issue for the EU ETS. Section 3 illustrated the complexity of the 
overlaps and boundaries in the coverage of the different instruments, suggesting that 
differential treatment could be a significant issue if the two instruments were implemented 
side by side.  
 
Differential treatment could also be relevant if opt-in/out clauses were included in the EU 
ETS, allowing sectors/companies/installations to opt-in to or out of the scheme provided they 
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were covered by an equivalent ‘regulation’ such as a CCA. This would require demonstration 
of equivalence of effort between the included and excluded groups - both within Member 
States and between Member States. Equivalence of effort will be very difficult to demonstrate 
for CCA facilities, not only because they have relative rather than absolute targets (section 
2.4), but also because of the associated risk management provisions (Sorrell, 2001a). 
Differences in stringency would incentivise companies to move in or out of the EU ETS – 
representing one form of carbon leakage. Movements out of the cap (by high cost 
participants) should lower allowance demand, lower allowance prices and bring marginal 
abatement costs down. Movements in to the cap (to avoid more stringent regulations outside) 
should raise allowance demand, increase allowance prices and raise marginal abatement 
costs. Both sets of movements should bring marginal abatement costs within the cap closer to 
those outside. But the incentives to move are complex. They depend upon the relative scope, 
form and stringency of targets inside and outside the cap (e.g. absolute versus relative); the 
prevailing allowance price; the perceived benefits of allowance trading; and the associated 
administrative costs of moving, including monitoring, verification and enforcement costs and 
the transaction costs of using the allowance market. This complexity makes the benefits of 
opt-in/opt-out provisions difficult to assess. 
 
The stringency of the CCAs would also become relevant if they were used as the basis for 
calculating allowance allocation for CCA companies, thereby facilitating their entry into the 
EU ETS. This form of sequencing from existing negotiated agreements to the EU ETS is 
specifically endorsed in the Directive, which recommends using output forecasts to convert 
existing relative targets into an allowance cap. The issue would then be whether the (arguably 
weak) CCA targets meet the criteria for allowance allocation in the EU ETS.  
4.6 Conflicts between objectives 
As indicated above, the CCL was designed to protect domestic consumers and the coal 
industry and to avoid a windfall to nuclear power. The EU ETS does not have these 
objectives, and there is a risk that the operation of the EU ETS will undermine these 
objectives. The scale of the conflict may be illustrated by some simple calculations. 
4.6.1 Coal 
Take the impact on the coal industry first. The EU ETS will increase generation costs for 
carbon intensive generation plant. The size of the increase will depend on a variety of factors, 
including abatement cost curves, the stringency of the cap, the liquidity of the allowance 
market and the method of allowance allocation. Abatement costs will in turn depend upon 
fuel prices and the plant mix.  
 
An order of magnitude estimate of the short term price increases from the EU ETS can be 
made assuming: a) the trading scheme is introduced overnight without companies having the 
opportunity to change their behaviour (i.e. invest in energy efficiency or fuel switch); b) the 
full costs of meeting the emission target are passed on to consumers through electricity price 
rises, with none being be passed on to suppliers or absorbed through lower returns; and c) the 
recycling of revenue from any allowance auctioning can be ignored. 
 
The impact on generation costs will depend very much upon whether the allowances are 
freely allocated or auctioned. But in theory the impact on electricity prices should be 
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independent of the method of allowance allocation (section 2.1.3). As an illustration, it is 
assumed here that 100% of the allowances are auctioned and that the clearing price in the 
auction is £10/tCO2 (£36.6/tC). This is above the current CCL rate for coal (£4.55/tCO2) and 
gas (£8.15/tCO2) but close to the equivalent upstream carbon tax that would be required to 
produce the current CCL rate for electricity (£9.35/tCO2).40 It is higher than the market price 
for allowances in the early stages of UK and international trading (£3-5/tCO2) and 
significantly higher than estimates of carbon prices during the commitment period, which 
assume maximum use of hot air trading and sink flexibilities (£1.6t/CO2) (Natsource, 2002; 
den Elzen and Moor, 2002).41  
 
For simplicity we calculate the average short term increase in generation costs and wholesale 
electricity prices created by the EU ETS. This may be estimated by calculating the revenue 
raised from an allowance auction with a clearing price of £10/tCO2, divided by unchanged 
electricity output. The impact on generation costs is summarised in Table 4.5. This static 
analysis gives a very broad brush illustration of the short term economic impact of a scheme 
with 100% allowance auctioning on electricity generators and consumers.  
Table 4.5 Illustrative impact of full allowance auctioning to the UK generators, with a 
£10/tonneCO2 clearing price and no revenue recycling  
 Electricity 
Generation 
(TWh) 
Emission 
factor 
MtCO2/TWh 
Carbon 
emissions 
MtCO2 
Revenue from 
allowance 
auction with 
£10/tCO2 
clearing price 
(£m/yr) 
Increase in 
generation 
costs 
(p/kWh) 
Renewables 10.2 0.00 0.0 0 0.00 
Nuclear 96.3 0.00 0.0 0 0.00 
Gas 141.4 0.40 57.1 571 0.40 
Coal 106.1 0.99 105.0 1050 0.99 
Oil 5.6 0.78 4.4 44 0.79 
Total/av 359.5 0.46 166.5 1665 0.46 
Source: Based on DTI (2002).  
 
Using current average generation efficiencies, such a scheme would increase generation costs 
for coal-fired plant by ~1.0p/kWh, and those for a gas-fired CCGT by ~0.4p/kWh (Table 
4.5). The generation cost for a new CCGT was estimated by the DTI in 1999 to be around 
2.0p/kWh, and that for an existing coal-fired plant 1.6p/kWh (2.0p/kWh if FGD is fitted) 
(DTI, 2000). Future generation costs depend upon gas and coal price trends. If fuel prices 
remained at 1999 levels,42 a trading scheme with 100% auctioning with a clearing price of 
£10/tCO2 would increase generation costs from existing coal-fired plant by 63% to 2.6p/kWh, 
or to 3.0p/kWh if FGD is required, while costs for new CCGTs would increase by only 20% 
to 2.4p/Wh (Table 4.5). This would mean that new CCGT investment would be 8% cheaper 
than existing coal-fired generation, and 20% cheaper than existing coal-fired generation if 
                                                 
40 For comparison, the 1992 EU proposals for a carbon tax was set at $10/bbl which, if updated, would equate to 
around £16.3/tCO2 (£60/tC). 
41 den Elzen and Moor’s (2002) projection of carbon prices prior to the withdrawal of the US and the additional 
sink provisions was around $7.0/tCO2. 
42 DTI (2000) uses 1999 fuel prices to calculate generation costs. But gas prices have since increased and coal 
prices reduced (Table 4.1). 
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FGD were required. In practice, coal plant without FGD is likely to be restricted in the 
number of operating hours after 2008 in order to meet the requirements of the revised LCPD 
(DEFRA, 2002a).43  
 
In the 2000 DTI energy projections using ‘central’ economic growth and ‘low’ fuel price 
assumptions (CL scenario), coal-fired generation declines by 63% between 1999 and 2010, 
with capacity falling from 26GW to 9GW (all with FGD) (DTI, 2000). An EU ETS with 
100% allows auctioning would disadvantage coal still further and would be likely to 
accelerate its replacement with gas unless compensating measures were taken. In turn, 
explicit (as opposed to implicit) compensating measures may fall foul of EU state aid rules.  
 
Figure 4.1 uses the above data and assumptions to show the price advantage of new CCGT 
investment against existing coal fired stations for a range of allowance prices. This suggests 
that, with 100% allowance auctioning, an allowance price of around £7/tCO2 should make 
new CCGT competitive against existing coal. Again, this ignores revenue recycling and the 
scope for efficiency improvements. In practice, a host of market and regulatory factors 
complicate these simple calculations and until the recent falls in electricity prices, new CCGT 
investment was going ahead with no price on CO2. 
Figure 4.1 Generation price advantage of new CCGT over existing coal fired station for 
different levels of prices in allowance auction 
 
With free allocation of allowances and/or a lower allowance price, the price changes and the 
corresponding threat to the coal industry would be much less than indicated above. This is all 
the more the case if new plant has to purchase allowances while existing plant receives a free 
allocation. However, these illustrative figures do help explain the choice of energy tax over a 
                                                 
43 The choice for coal plant is either to fit FGD, or to generate for no more than 20,000 hours/year after 2008 
and to close in 2016. 
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carbon tax for the CCL as well as the threat posed to the remaining coal industry by the 
inclusion of UK electricity generators in a European trading scheme. While the UK coal 
industry is in steep decline, with little prospect of new coal fired generation capacity, the 
government has expressed its concern about the threat to supply security from the increasing 
reliance on gas throughout the economy. This is one of a number of issues explored in the 
recent Cabinet Office Energy Review (PIU, 2002), which is due to be followed by a White 
Paper on energy policy in early 2003 (DTI, 2002b). The EU ETS therefore has some 
important implications for UK energy policy. 
4.6.2 Nuclear 
Very similar comments apply to the position of nuclear power. Again, using the above 
assumptions a trading scheme would lead to an increase in average electricity prices of 
0.46p/kWh. But generation costs for nuclear power would remained unchanged. Since 
nuclear power runs on baseload, its share of total generation is likely to remain unchanged in 
the short term (although the retiral of nuclear plants will reduce its share in the longer term). 
If nuclear generation continued at its 1999 level of 96TWh, and if nuclear benefits fully from 
the net increase in average electricity prices resulting from the EU ETS, this implies a 
‘windfall’ to the nuclear industry of £442 million/year. 
 
The Cabinet Office Energy Review has recommended that nuclear power should benefit from 
any methods that will be used to value carbon and internalise the externalities of fossil fuel 
use (PIU, 2002, p125), although this is not yet official government policy. During 1992, the 
UK nuclear generator, British Energy, faced increasing difficulties as a consequence of 
falling wholesale electricity prices - which were in turn due to a combination of the new 
electricity trading arrangements (NETA) and overcapacity in electricity generation. The 
company’s financial situation became so bad that in September 2002 the government agreed 
to a loan of £410m (later increase to £650m) to cover its working capital requirements and 
save it from insolvency. Further support may be necessary in the future unless overcapacity is 
reduced and electricity prices increase. Hence, the economic and political context has 
changed and a ‘windfall’ to nuclear may now be consistent with government objectives. The 
EU ETS may provide an alternative mechanism for supporting nuclear power in the longer 
term without requiring government expenditure or an explicit subsidy. But the issues of waste 
and decommissioning have yet to be resolved and nuclear power remains highly controversial 
(Evans, 2002).  
4.6.3 Domestic consumers 
The third area of concern is the position of domestic consumers. Again, using the above 
illustrative figures, an trading scheme with a allowance price of £10/tCO2 would lead to a 
price increase to domestic consumers of around 0.46p/kWh. Using the average annual 
electricity consumption of 3300kWh/year, this corresponds to an increase of £15.34, or 6% of 
the average ‘standard credit’ domestic electricity bill for England and Wales in 1999 
(£261/year). The percentage increase for overall energy bills (fuel plus electricity) would be 
smaller still.44 This relatively small increase reflects the fact that a large component of 
domestic electricity prices are made up of transmission, distribution and supply costs (Table 
3.13). In comparison, average annual domestic electricity prices in 2001 (including VAT) 
were 25.9% lower in real terms than in 1995, and 24.2% lower than in 1990.  
                                                 
44 . It is overall energy bills, rather than fuel used for heating, that is used in the UK definition of fuel poverty 
(DETR, 2000d). 
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It would be useful to conduct a more detailed analysis of impact of such price increases on 
households in fuel poverty. Since these are likely to both spend a greater proportion of their 
total energy bill on space heating and to use inefficient electric storage heating, the 
proportional impact is likely to be greater. Furthermore, any increase in domestic energy 
prices is likely to increase the number of households in fuel poverty. Government data 
suggests that falling energy prices between 1996 and 1999 reduced the number of fuel poor 
households from 5.5 to 4.5 million (DETR, 2000d), a trend which politicians would be 
unwilling to reverse.  
 
Three factors may make the estimate of a 0.46p/kWh increase in consumer prices (for a 
£10t/CO2 allowance price) rather pessimistic:  
 
• The estimate is for short-term price impacts, which do not allow for behavioural change, 
including efficiency improvements by generators and consumers and changes in the 
carbon intensity of generation. 
• The estimate assumes 100% pass through of costs to electricity consumers. In practice, 
some of the costs will be absorbed by shareholders or fuel suppliers. 
• The estimate assumes that the impact of electricity prices will be the same, regardless of 
the method of allowance allocation. This is the theoretical prediction, but it is questionable 
whether this will hold in practice (section 2.1.3). 
 
In addition, allowance prices greater or less than £10/tCO2, will lead to corresponding 
changes in the price impact on the domestic consumer. Smaller price impacts will reduce the 
political difficulties of introducing the EU ETS, as will the expected progress in eliminating 
fuel poverty by 2010 (DETR, 2000d). But the calculations do illustrate that the EU ETS has 
some important implications for UK social policy. 
4.5 Summary 
The core objective of the three instruments is the same: the reduction of carbon emissions 
from the target groups. Whether the instruments can be considered complementary or 
redundant can only be decided through a more detailed examination of their mode of 
operation, and the incentives they create for individual target groups (section 5). But two 
points can be made: 
 
• The stringency of the EU ETS is at present unclear and the proposed allocation criteria are 
contradictory. But there is a strong possibility that targets required under the EU ETS will 
be more stringent (in terms of marginal abatement costs) than those currently applicable 
under the CCAs - quite apart from the fact that these will be absolute, rather than relative 
targets. This has important implications for either the use of CCAs targets as a basis for 
allocation in the EU ETS, or the use of opt-in or opt-out options within the EU ETS at the 
national, sector, company or installation level. An important complication, however, is the 
possibility of importing allowances from other trading schemes into the EU ETS after 
2008. This would reduce EU ETS allowance prices and consequently make it much easier 
for participants to comply with their obligations. 
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• The design of the CCL reflects multiple objectives, including the desire to protect 
domestic consumers, energy intensive industry, and UK coal producers, together with the 
desire to promote energy efficiency and avoid a ‘windfall’ to nuclear generators. Such 
objectives would be threatened by the introduction of the EU ETS, although in each case 
the political importance of these objectives has changed since 1999 and is likely to have 
changed further by 2005 or 2008. In particular, a nuclear ‘windfall’ may now be positively 
helpful to government objectives. Nevertheless, it is clear that the proposed Directive 
raises major issues of UK energy policy (particularly supply security) and social policy 
(fuel poverty). 
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5. Confusion over instrument operation  
This section explores the interaction between the operation of the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA 
package, assuming that the EUETS is implemented while the CCL/CCA package remains 
unchanged. In practice, it is very unlikely that the EU ETS could coexist alongside an 
unchanged CCL/CCA package, but by examining interaction under the assumption that they 
do coexist we can highlight some relevant issues and conflicts. This in turn can guide the 
subsequent development of policy options.  
 
Each instrument can be understood as imposing obligations on its target groups, although 
these obligations may leave considerable scope for discretion. Similarly, each instrument 
provides incentives for the target group to act in accordance with these obligations and in 
support of policy objectives. If a single target group is directly affected by more than one 
policy, it must respond to the obligations and incentives of both. The compatibility of these 
obligations and incentives may be considered as lying somewhere on a spectrum from 
mutually reinforcing to direct conflict (Sorrell, 2001b).  
 
The obligations and incentives change the behaviour of the target group, which in turn may 
have consequences for other (indirectly affected) target groups. In particular, there may be 
changes in the costs faced by these target groups. These indirect effects will also be examined 
here, focusing primarily on the consequences for the electricity market. 
 
Section 3 explored the complex overlaps in direct and indirect target groups for the EU ETS 
and CCL/CCA package. Figure 5.1, which is a simplified version of Figure 3.3 with IPPC 
removed, shows the overlaps in direct target groups between the CCL, CCA and EU ETS. A 
useful way of exploring the interaction of obligations and incentives is to examine the groups 
marked 1,2,3 and 4 in turn. 
Figure 5.1 Overlapping direct target groups for the EU ETS and CCL/CCA package 
Overlapping direct target groups
 CCA
EU ETS
CCL1. CCL only
2. CCL & EU ETS
4. CCA & EU ETS
3. CCA only
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5.1 Group 1: CCL only 
This group includes sites in the manufacturing, commercial and public sectors that are 
eligible for the CCL but are not participants in either the CCAs or the EU ETS. This group 
includes the bulk of sites in these sectors. 
 
While not directly affected by the EU ETS, this group is indirectly affected by the increase in 
electricity prices that result from the generators taking on an emissions cap. As indicated in 
section 2.1, the size of this price increase will depend upon a range of factors including 
allowance prices and the relative elasticity of electricity supply and demand. In turn, 
allowance prices will be a function of the stringency of the overall cap. 
 
Sites in this group will effectively have double regulation of electricity. They will be paying 
the CCL at 0.43p/kWh and they will be paying whatever electricity price increase results 
from the cap on the generators. Whether this is considered acceptable or not will depend upon 
political priorities and the likely scale of the electricity price increase from the EU ETS 
relative to current and anticipated wholesale electricity prices. These are all uncertain, but 
some general comments can be made. These are grouped here under five headings: double 
regulation; multiple objectives; market distortions; backup regulation; and implications for 
revenue raising. 
5.1.1 Double Regulation 
Under some circumstances, the scale of the price increase could be substantial. The 
illustrative calculations in section 4 assumed: 
 
• the market price for an allowance in the EU ETS is £10/tCO2; 
• the full costs of meeting the emission target are passed on to consumers through electricity 
price rises, with none being passed on to suppliers or absorbed through lower returns;  
• there is no recycling of the revenues raised from any allowance auctioning; and 
• the impact on electricity prices is the same, whether allowances are freely allocated or 
auctioned. 
 
These assumptions lead to an electricity price increase of around 0.46p/kWh, which is 
essentially the same as the current CCL rate for electricity (0.43p/kWh). This means that 
consumers would face an additional increase in electricity prices comparable to that imposed 
by the CCL. This would almost certainly lead to complaints about ‘double regulation’. 
 
The main difference between carbon/energy taxation and emissions trading concerns 
price/quantity adjustment. With a tax, it is the tax level that is fixed and the quantity of CO2 
that adjusts. With emissions trading, it is a quantity of CO2 emissions that is fixed, and the 
price of the allowances that adjusts.45 In the absence of an agreed allocation, it is not possible 
to estimate the allowance prices under the EU ETS, or the consequent impact on electricity 
                                                 
45 In theory, the choice between taxation and trading should be based upon the relative slopes of the marginal 
damage and marginal cost curves (Weitzman, 1974). 
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prices. Even with an agreed allocation, ex ante estimates of allowance prices are likely to 
vary widely. So the EU ETS creates the risk of high allowance prices and the consequent risk 
of electricity price increases that would hit groups currently regulated by the CCL. This may 
create pressure for modifying or removing the CCL prior to introducing the EU ETS. 
 
A related issue is the probable lack of compensation for these price increases. With the CCL, 
electricity price increases were balanced by reductions in employers’ national insurance to 
give overall revenue neutrality. This created winners and losers, but overall the affected 
groups were paying no more tax than before. With the EU ETS, the allowances are most 
likely to be freely allocated to participants, including the electricity industry. If the theoretical 
predictions of section 2.1.3 prove correct, the impact on electricity prices will be the same as 
if the allowances were auctioned. But in the absence of auction revenues, there will be no 
mechanism for compensating electricity consumers for the resulting price increases. Hence, 
using the above assumptions on allowance prices, the EU ETS could lead to a similar level of 
electricity price increase as the CCL, but without any compensation. If the EU ETS replaced 
the current CCL on electricity, Group 1 would be worse off. If the EU ETS coexisted with the 
CCL on electricity, Group 1 would be substantially worse off. Even if the allowances were 
auctioned, the most likely recipients of recycled revenues would be the participants of the 
scheme (including electricity generators), rather than those indirectly affected by electricity 
price increases. So sites paying the CCL would still suffer uncompensated price increases.  
 
This line of reasoning suggests that Group 1 should lobby for auctioning within the EU ETS, 
with a portion of the revenues being used to compensate them for electricity price increases. 
But in practice, both the use of auctioning and the use of revenues in this way look an 
unlikely outcome, even for Phase 2. As an alternative, Group 1 could monitor and lobby 
against ‘unwarranted’ electricity price increases by the generators. As argued in section 2.1.3, 
increases in electricity prices that result from an EU ETS with free allocation may be 
considered unwarranted as they represent a form of ‘double charging’. Consumers pay once 
as taxpayers, in creating an effective subsidy with the free allowances, and a second time as 
consumers in purchasing the sector’s products. But the ‘inequity’ of this arrangement is less 
obvious than with an explicit subsidy since there is no direct use of taxpayers money. Also, in 
the context of asymmetric information the extent to which a price increase is ‘warranted’ 
could be very difficult to detect, and the institutional mechanisms for challenging such 
behaviour may be ineffective. This suggests that the most obvious strategy for Group 1 would 
be to lobby for modification to the CCL. 
 
The above discussion needs to be set in the context of the relatively small contribution of 
energy to total costs for Group 1 sites. By definition, the great majority of Group 1 sites are 
not energy intensive, otherwise they would be eligible for a CCA. For example, in 
mechanical engineering sector, energy accounts for around 1.5% of total production costs, 
and the figure is lower still in the commercial sector. This is even more the case when we 
consider recent trends in wholesale electricity prices (section 4.1). Hence, the potential 
impact of double regulation on Group 1 sites should not be overstated. 
5.1.2 Multiple objectives 
The coexistence of the CCL and EU ETS would improve incentives for the efficient use of 
electricity, since the price signal for this would be greater than either instrument acting alone. 
Whether this is considered desirable will depend upon the weight given to energy efficiency 
as a policy objective, as opposed to the least cost abatement of carbon emissions.  
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It may well be the case that fuel switching in electricity generation offers lower cost 
abatement than improving end-use efficiency.46 But the choice of a downstream rather than 
upstream tax in UK climate policy suggests that the objective of least cost abatement is 
balanced by other objectives and concerns. Section 4.2 argued that the primary objective in 
the design of the CCL was the protection of the domestic consumer, but security of supply 
considerations also played a role. Unrestricted fuel switching in electricity generation may 
pose a risk to supply security by increasing dependence upon imported gas. In contrast, 
improving end-use efficiency can only be beneficial for energy security. Indeed, a recent 
assessment of UK climate policy by the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) found 
that energy efficiency scored higher than any other abatement option against a set of 
sustainable development criteria that included energy security (SDC, 2001).47 Hence, from a 
multi-criteria perspective, the promotion of end-use efficiency may be a highly valued policy 
goal.  
 
But establishing that energy efficiency is a highly valued objective is not the same as 
establishing that higher energy prices are the most desirable way to achieve that objective. 
Higher prices remove one impediment to optimal investment in energy efficiency, that of the 
divergence between the private and social cost of energy consumption, and increase the 
profitability of individual energy efficiency investments. However, they may do little to 
remove the range of other barriers to energy efficiency (Box 3.1) and may have undesirable 
consequences for equity or competitiveness unless compensating measures are introduced. 
These wider barriers may be best addressed through a policy mix, in which higher energy 
prices form a necessary but not sufficient element. 
                                                 
46 Historical experience would appear to bear this out, although the opportunities are diminishing as gas takes a 
large proportion of the generation fuel mix. However, this is an empirical question and close attention would 
need to be paid to the distortions and market failures in both the generation market and in the market for end-use 
efficiency. 
47 The criteria were: a) integrating the economic, social and environmental dimensions of quality of life; b) 
respecting biophysical limits; c) making the polluter pay; d) protecting and enhancing UK competitiveness; e) 
promoting social justice and inclusion; and f) achieving energy security (SDC, 2001). 
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Box 5.1 Barriers to energy efficiency 
• Market failures: Several features of the energy service market can be understood as neo-classical 
market failures. In particular, the market produces insufficient information about the energy 
performance of different technologies. When the costs of acquiring information on energy 
efficiency greatly exceed those for energy supply, consumers will under-invest in energy 
efficiency. The split incentives between landlord and tenant also represent a form of market 
failure. 
• Organisational failures: Organisations commonly use high discount rates to evaluate efficiency 
investments, neglect life cycle costs and provide inadequate incentives for staff to use energy 
efficiently. While these are normal features of organisational behaviour, there may be instances 
where governments can intervene to the mutual benefit of both the organisation and society. 
• Transaction costs: Energy supply and energy efficiency provide alternative means of supplying 
energy services, but their market characteristics are very different. Energy efficiency is not a stand-
alone product but a subsidiary feature of a wide range of products and services. This means that 
the transaction costs of purchasing energy efficiency greatly exceed those for energy supply, 
creating a systematic bias against the former. 
• Limitations on decision-making: Individuals do not make decisions in the manner assumed by 
economic models, but are instead subject to severe constraints on attention, resources and their 
ability to process information. Energy is easily overlooked when its contribution to total costs is 
small. Such limitations can create an additional barrier to energy efficiency, reinforce the operation 
of other barriers, or set a limit to what can be achieved by policy initiatives such as information 
programmes. 
Source: Sorrell et al (2000) 
5.1.3 Market distortions 
If we assume that the primary purpose of climate policy is to internalise the external costs of 
CO2 emissions, then the economic incentives for substituting between fuel and electricity (or 
vice versa) will be distorted by double regulation. Electricity prices will internalise CO2 costs 
in addition to the CCL, while fuel prices will not. The notion of ‘internalising’ CO2 costs 
assumes that the CO2 prices in the EU ETS provide an accurate reflection of the external 
costs of climate change. In practice this is unlikely, and the CO2 price will almost certainly be 
too low.48 The key point, however, is that the relative costs of fuel and electricity use will be 
distorted. 
 
In practice, the technical opportunities for substituting between fuel and electricity may be 
limited. Furthermore, the CCL itself distorts economic incentives by using different implicit 
CO2 costs for coal, gas and electricity while exempting oil products. From the perspective of 
industrial consumers, the CCL provides an implicit carbon tax on the fuel for electricity 
generation of £9.35/tCO2,49 compared to £8.15/tCO2 for downstream gas consumption and 
£4.15/tCO2 for coal (Table 4.2). Hence for Group 1 sites, the increase in electricity prices 
from the EU ETS merely compounds the existing distortion between fuel and electricity 
prices that is provided by the CCL.  
 
                                                 
48 Climate change is a clear case of environmental problem where notions of monetising environmental impacts 
appear untenable. It is far preferable to work with physically based sustainability targets, such as those 
recommended by the IPCC. But the current Kyoto targets represent only the first step towards this goal. 
49 Using the assumptions on generation fuel mix etc. adopted for the CCAs. 
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The double regulation of electricity may be expected to improve the economics of 
cogeneration by increasing electricity import prices relative to on-site fuel use (although here 
there is already a strong incentive through the CCL exemptions on CHP fuel). But if energy 
prices are distorted, the environmental benefits of encouraging cogeneration are undermined. 
A counter argument could be that the price differential between electricity and fuel helps to 
overcome the range of barriers that CHP currently faces. This may be one rationale behind 
the existing CCL exemptions for CHP. But as with energy efficiency, a more effective 
approach could be to address these barriers directly, rather than indirectly through changes in 
relative energy prices.50 
5.1.4 ‘Backup’ regulation 
There is one scenario in which the coexistence of the EU ETS and CCL could be positively 
beneficial for UK policy objectives. This is where the anticipated allowance price in the EU 
ETS is very low. There are two circumstances in which this could occur: 
 
• Before or after 2008, if the aggregate targets under the EU ETS are very weak. In theory, 
this scenario should be unlikely as it appears inconsistent with the allocation criteria listed 
in the draft Directive, including the requirements that allowance allocation should be 
consistent with technological potential to reduce emissions, and that no site should be 
allocated more allowances than it ‘needs’ (CEC, 2001a). But in practice, these allocation 
criteria may be difficult to apply. 
• After 2008 if cheap allowances are imported into the EU ETS, either through bilateral 
interfaces with other trading schemes or through interfaces with the international carbon 
market (AAUs, ERUs or CERs). As discussed in section 4.5.1, the combination of surplus 
hot air, generous sink flexibilities and the US withdrawal make it very likely that the 
international carbon price will be low during the commitment period. This means that 
external interfaces could drive down allowance prices in the EU ETS. As a result, both 
developments in the international carbon market and the interface rules for the EU ETS 
are of critical importance to the future development of UK climate policy. 
 
If the allowance price is low, the impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices will be limited. 
The double regulation described above would have relatively little economic impact on 
Group 1 sites and political opposition to the retention of the CCL would be reduced. 
Conversely, if the EU ETS replaced the CCL on electricity, the net result would be a 
reduction in electricity prices and a consequent loss of the downstream incentive to improve 
electricity efficiency. Hence, if a scenario of low allowance prices is considered likely and if 
electricity efficiency is a valued policy objective, there may be an argument for retaining the 
CCL in its current form in order to retain this downstream price incentive. Here, the CCL 
could be seen as a ‘backup’ to the EU ETS to ensure that Group 1 sites took some action to 
improve electricity efficiency. 
 
European governments have long been concerned about hot air trading and during the 
Protocol negotiations they attempted to impose ‘supplementary’ conditions that would ensure 
that a portion of abatement was achieved through domestic action. This attempt failed, but the 
                                                 
50 The trend of rising industrial gas prices and falling electricity prices has damaged the economic potential of 
CHP. But an equally important factor has been the operation of the balancing mechanism in NETA, since this 
penalises intermittent and unpredictable generators (Bathurst and Strbac, 2001). Other barriers include the high 
charges that are imposed for connection to distribution networks. 
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concern remains. It stems from a tension between cost minimisation in the first commitment 
period and the creation of incentives for deep cuts in carbon emissions over the longer term 
(Grubb et al, 1999, p193).  
 
The EU ETS allowance price could be maintained by preventing or restricting the import of 
trading commodities from outside the EU ETS. At present, the Commission has indicated its 
intention to allow the import of ERUs and CERs into the EU ETS in the longer term 
(provided that they do not derive from nuclear or sink projects) and to enter into bilateral 
agreements with third party trading schemes for the transfer of allowances. But the 
Commission is opposed to EU ETS participants using AAUs to fulfil their commitments. 
While this stance may reduce the risk of a low allowance price post 2008, it neglects the fact 
that the trading commodities are partly fungible. For example, a low price for AAUs is likely 
to be reflected in a low price for ERUs and CERs. Similarly, if AAUs are imported into a 
third party trading scheme which is interfaced to the EU ETS they will affect the EU ETS 
allowance price. In this context, retention of the CCL as a backup regulation for Group 1 sites 
could be seen as imposing ‘supplementarity by the back door’. 
5.1.5 Implications for revenue raising 
Some 85% of the £1 billion/year by the CCL is returned to industry in the form of reductions 
in employers national insurance contributions. The remaining £150 million is allocated as 
follows (Carbon Trust, 2002): 
 
• £100 million to support a programme of Enhanced Capital Allowances (ECAs) for 
investment in energy efficiency equipment; 
• £13 million to the DTI for R&D into renewable electricity;  
• £4 million to DEFRA for an energy crops programme; 
• £1.4 million for renewables programmes in Scotland and Northern Ireland; and 
• £30.9 million to fund the newly formed Carbon Trust, which is administering a revised 
Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program (EEBPP)51 and funding a Low Carbon 
Innovation Programme.  
 
These are central elements of the UKCP. For example, the financial support for R&D and the 
ECA programme are together expected to contribute emission reductions of 0.5MtC by 2010. 
Effectively, all the above programmes return revenue to industry but in a less direct manner 
than reductions in employers national insurance, and with a beneficial impact on carbon 
emissions. 
 
The point here is that both the overall revenue neutrality of the CCL proposal and these 
individual climate policy initiatives would be threatened by any scenario which involved 
either replacing the CCL with the EU ETS, or modifying the level of the CCL. Any reduction 
in the level of the CCL would lead to a reduction in overall government revenue, with a 
corresponding requirement to either raise the revenue by other means or to reduce 
government spending – possibly by removing the above schemes. Compensating revenues 
could be obtained through auctioning allowances in the EU ETS, but this looks unlikely. 
Hence, revenue issues are a central concern for the future implementation of the EU ETS. 
                                                 
51 Now termed ‘Action Energy’. 
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5.1.5 Summary 
In summary, the coexistence of the EU ETS and CCL leads to double regulation of electricity 
for all CCL sites, with associated distortions of the energy market. Group 1 is unlikely to be 
compensated for these costs, even with the recycling of auction revenues. The increased costs 
may be justified by the objective of promoting electricity efficiency, but this argument seems 
weak and is likely to attract opposition.  
 
Double regulation may, however, be justified if allowance prices in the EU ETS were 
expected to be low during the commitment period. In this case, the retention of the CCL 
would ensure that a downstream price signal for electricity efficiency was retained (the 
‘backup’ option). It would also ensure that the policy initiatives and institutions currently 
funded by the CCL, including the Carbon Trust, could continue unchanged. The difficulty is 
that allowance prices during the commitment period are uncertain and dependent upon 
decisions by the European Commission and developments in international carbon markets. 
5.2 Group 2: EU ETS and CCL 
This group should be relatively small. The most obvious candidates are sites with combustion 
plant with an aggregate thermal input >20MW but <50MW in sectors which are not eligible 
for a CCA (section 3.3). For these sites, eligibility for the EU ETS is given by the size of 
combustion plant, rather than the sector in which the plant is located, so this group could 
include sites in the public and commercial sectors and in the non-CCA sectors of 
manufacturing industry.52 Despite its small size, this group does illustrate some relevant 
issues. 
5.2.1 Double regulation 
Sites in this group would require allowances for CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion 
in the main combustion plant (section 3.3).53 At the same time, the site would pay the CCL on 
coal and gas (but not oil) consumption by the main combustion plant. Process CO2 emissions, 
whether from combustion or non combustion processes, would not be covered by the EU 
ETS (since only the combustion plant is eligible to join), but oil and gas combustion in the 
process plant would incur the CCL. In addition, the site would pay the CCL on electricity 
consumption, and would incur the additional costs for electricity resulting from the 
participation of the generators in the EU ETS, described above. 
 
For sites in this group, there is double regulation of both fuel and electricity. With 
combustion plant fuel, the site is directly affected by the CCL and the EU ETS. For 
electricity, the site is directly affected by the CCL and indirectly affected by the EU ETS. The 
relative impacts on fuel and electricity consumption may differ. The biggest impacts on fuel 
will occur if allowances are auctioned, while the impacts on electricity prices should be 
independent of the method of allowance allocation. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the 
possible short term impact on energy costs for a site in this group, assuming:  
 
                                                 
52 Or sites in sectors eligible for CCAs, but which have chosen not to join. 
53 It is possible that allowances would also be required for CO2 emissions from non-commercial fuels such as 
biomass. 
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• 100% of allowances are auctioned with a clearing price of £10/tCO2;  
• the trading scheme is introduced overnight without companies having the opportunity to 
change their behaviour;  
• the full costs of meeting the emission target are passed on to consumers through electricity 
price rises; and  
• the recycling of revenue from any allowance auctioning can be ignored. 
Table 5.1 Illustrative impacts on unit energy costs under a combination of the CCL and EU 
ETS with 100% auctioning (p/kWh)  
 Coal HFO Gasoil Gas Electricity
Average industrial energy price 2000 0.47 1.07 1.59 0.61 3.47 
Increase from CCL  0.15 - - 0.15 0.43 
Increase from EU ETS @ allowance price of 
£10/tCO2 with 100% auctioning 
0.33 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.46 
Cost including CCL only 0.62 1.07 1.59 0.76 3.90 
Cost including EU ETS only 0.80 1.32 1.84 0.79 3.93 
Cost with CCL and EU ETS combined. 0.95 1.32 1.84 0.94 4.36 
% cost increase from the CCL 31.9 0.0 0.0 24.8 12.4 
% cost increase from the EU ETS 70.2 23.4 15.7 29.7 13.3 
% cost increase from the CCL and EU 
ETS combined 
102.1 23.4 15.7 54.5 25.7 
Notes:  
• Using average industrial energy prices for 2000 (pre CCL) 
• Fuel costs (p/kWh) = fuel price + CCL + allowance costs (assuming unchanged consumption)  
• Electricity costs (p/kWh) = electricity price + CCL + portion of generator’s marginal abatement 
costs passed on in electricity prices (assumed equal to allowance price) 
• Conversion factors include: Coal=28.0GJ/tonne; HFO=43.2GJ/tonne; Gasoil=45.5GJ/tonne; 
1kWh=3.6*10-3GJ; coal=2.41 tCO2/tonne; HFO=3.11tCO2/tonne; gasoil=3.14tCO2/tonne; natural 
gas=0.187kgCO2/kWh. Assumed delivered to primary conversion factor = 2.60. Assumed carbon 
emissions factor for primary electricity = 0.17 kg CO2/kWh.  
Source: Derived from (DTI, 2002) and Goodwin et al (1999). 
 
The impact of the EU ETS is in direct proportion to the carbon content of each fuel and to the 
carbon intensity of imported electricity. In contrast, the equivalent carbon tax corresponding 
to the CCL varies between fuels, with HFO and gasoil being exempt altogether. This means 
that the EU ETS has a proportionally greater impact on carbon intensive fuels and also 
impacts on oil. An EU ETS allowance price of £10/tCO2 is approximately equivalent to the 
upstream carbon tax that would be required to give the current CCL rates for electricity. If the 
same rate applied for downstream fuel use, coal prices would increase by 70% rather than by 
32% under the current CCL.  
 
Using these assumptions, the combined impact of the CCL and the EU ETS would be 
substantial. The cost of using coal would double compared to 2000 (pre CCL) and the cost of 
using gas would increase by 55%. This compares to an increase of 32% and 25% respectively 
for the CCL alone. In contrast, the cost of using electricity would increase by only 26% 
(compared to 12% for the CCL alone). These cost impacts may be ameliorated by the 
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recycling of auction revenues to EU ETS participants. The net impact would then depend 
upon the rules for revenue distribution.54 
 
The combination of the CCL with 100% allowance auctioning under the EU ETS may be 
opposed as double regulation, as fuel users will effectively be paying twice for fuel 
emissions. But full auctioning is still a distant prospect. With the free allocation proposed for 
Phase 1, participants would only incur abatement costs for fuel combustion, rather than 
having to purchase allowances for all direct emissions. The cost burden (for fuel) should 
correspondingly be much less than indicated above. 
 
Note that when making decisions on the marginal cost of fuel use, the Group 2 site will still 
value the marginal cost of each tonne of associated emissions at the full allowance price. In 
theory, the firm will take the same decisions on output and abatement regardless of whether 
the allowances are auctioned or freely allocated (section 2.1.3). The difference lies in the 
overall cost burden from the firm and hence its capital value (i.e. the difference lies in the 
wealth effects, not the effect on product prices). With auctions, the firm pays for all 
emissions, while with free allocation the firm only incurs abatement costs - including the net 
cost of any allowance acquisition.  
5.2.2 Double regulation as a substitute for allowance auctioning 
As discussed in section 2.1.2, there are strong economic arguments for allowance auctioning. 
Free allocation allows participants to capture all of the scarcity rent and is equivalent to a 
lump sum subsidy for participating firms. With free allocation, polluters do not pay for the 
damage caused by residual emissions and the government denies itself the opportunity to 
raise revenue. In contrast, the CCL raises revenue and requires polluters to pay for residual 
emissions - albeit not at equivalent £/tCO2 rates for all fuels. This means that there could be 
an argument for combining the CCL with the EU ETS if the latter uses free allocation, since 
the CCL can provide some of the benefits of auctioned allowances. This is a second-best 
alternative to 100% auctioning, but may be politically more feasible since the CCL is already 
in place and no agreement would be required at the EU level. There are, however, three 
objections to this approach. 
 
First, this form of double regulation would undermine the efficiency advantages of the 
trading scheme. Marginal abatement costs at the affected sources (Group 2) would be 
distorted by the CCL, leading to higher costs than those faced by other EU ETS participants 
which are not eligible for the CCL. This would raise overall abatement costs under the EU 
ETS.55  
 
Second, the rationale given above for allowing double regulation only applies to fuel use. 
Here, allowances will have been freely allocated to Group 2 participants. But for electricity, 
the allowances will have been freely allocated to the generators. Group 2 participants will not 
capture the economic rent from the these allowances but, if the theoretical predictions of 
section 2.1.3 prove correct, they will still face electricity price increases equivalent to those 
                                                 
54 For example, a flat rate reduction in employment taxes (as with the CCL) would reward the less energy 
intensive companies; distributing revenues on the basis of historic emissions would compensate the most 
heavily affected sites; and basing compensation on sector benchmarks for energy intensity would reward the 
best performing sites. 
55 This problem is not unique to the UK. Pre-existing taxes exist in all Member States and vary from one fuel to 
another. As in the UK, carbon intensive fuels are commonly taxed at a lower rate or even subsidised. 
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under 100% auctioning. In these circumstances, a better approach may be to exempt EU ETS 
participants from the CCL on electricity. 
 
Third, there is a risk that the competitiveness of Group 2 firms will be undermined since 
competing firms in the same sector will not face the same type of double regulation. In the 
UK, some may be subject to the CCL alone; some may be subject to a CCA; and some may 
be subject to joint regulation under the EU ETS and the CCAs. In other Member States, an 
entirely different mix of regulations may apply. 
 
This differential treatment is particularly problematic if competitors are also participants in 
the EU ETS. Group 2 participants face higher fuel prices and are therefore likely to reduce 
emissions further than they would under the EU ETS alone. This means that they are likely to 
either sell more allowances, or purchase fewer allowances. If Group 2 is sufficiently large 
(i.e. possess some degree of market power) there will be a consequent reduction in allowance 
prices. Lower allowance prices will make it easier for their competitors to comply with their 
obligations. In effect, the sites subject to double regulation will be subsidising those which 
are not. Against this, the small number of Group 2 firms are likely to form only a small 
proportion of the total number of firms regulated under the EU ETS and hence are likely to 
be price takers in the allowance market. Their costs will be increased, with consequent 
impacts on shareholders, suppliers or (possibly) consumers, but there will be no direct 
subsidy of other firms.56 Since many direct competitors of Group 2 firms will not be subject 
to the double regulation of the CCL and EU ETS, it is unlikely that Group 2 firms will be 
able to pass on these additional costs in product prices. Instead, it is their shareholders that 
are likely to bear the burden. 
 
Group 2 participants may contest these competitive distortions - notably between companies 
in a sector which are subject to the EU ETS (e.g. with combustion plant >20MW) and those 
in the same sector which are not (e.g. with combustion plant <20MW). Such competitive 
distortions are inherent in any regulatory system in which some sites in a sector are targeted 
by a policy and others are not. The most obvious route by which this occurs is through the 
use of size thresholds for eligibility, such as in IPPC. While the competitive distortions 
created by IPPC have not been a major political issue, the competitive distortions potentially 
created by the CCAs have been, despite the fact that the CCAs use the same size thresholds 
as IPPC. This may be because the perceived cost impacts of the CCL were greater than those 
for IPPC. In the case of the CCAs, the government removed the size thresholds as eligibility 
criteria, allowing even very small sites to join.  
 
In the present case, Group 2 EU ETS participants may object to the double regulation of fuel, 
but the strength of this objection will depend upon whether the allowances are auctioned or 
freely allocated. If auctioned, the strength of this objection will also depend upon the process 
by which revenues are distributed. Group 2 sites also have double regulation of electricity, 
but in this case they face the same costs as Group 1 sites that are not eligible for the EU ETS. 
The extent of competitive distortions will therefore depend upon the allowance allocation 
rules and the relative fuel and electrical intensity of Group 2 sites. For most sites, electricity 
                                                 
56 Cross subsidy would also be avoided if all the sites subject to the trading scheme were subject to the full 
CCL. In practice this is not the case in the UK, and it clearly does not apply to sites in other Member States. 
However, several Member States have their own energy or carbon taxes. 
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costs make up the bulk of total energy costs, which should reduce the competitiveness 
impacts of the double regulation of fuel.57 
5.2.3 Summary 
In summary, the coexistence of the EU ETS and the CCL leads to double regulation of fuel 
and electricity for all Group 2 sites. The implications for electricity costs are identical to 
those for Group 1 sites, while the implications for fuel costs depend very much upon the 
method of allowance allocation. Cost impacts would be very much greater with 100% 
auctioning than with free allocation, although this could be ameliorated by revenue recycling. 
 
In practice, free allocation is planned for Phase 1 of the EU ETS and it is likely that only a 
small fraction of allowances will be auctioned in Phase 2. While the coexistence of the CCL 
could be seen as a second-best alternative to 100% auctioning (as it raises revenue), it would 
undermine some of the efficiency benefits of the EU ETS. Also, the differential treatment of 
Group 2 firms compare to competitors may be challenged as distortion to competition. 
5.3 Group 3: CCA only 
This group is far more important than Group 2. It includes sites in the non ferrous, chemicals 
and food and drink sectors, together with sites in other energy intensive sectors which are 
eligible for a CCA but not eligible for the EU ETS. These account for a large proportion of 
total industrial energy use.  
 
Group 3 sites have CCA targets covering fuel and electricity consumption in both the main 
combustion plant and the process plant - termed the ‘facility’ under the CCA (section 3.3). 
This energy consumption is still subject to the residual 20% of the CCL, while the remainder 
of site energy consumption (outside the facility) is eligible for the full rate of the CCL. If the 
CCA facility accounts for >90% of total site energy consumption, then the total energy 
consumption at the site will be subject to the CCA target. These sites are not directly affected 
by the EU ETS since they are not eligible for participation. However, they are indirectly 
affected through the participation of the electricity generators in the EU ETS.  
 
The CCA targets may take one of four forms: 
 
• absolute CO2 emissions (E) (tCO2); 
• absolute energy consumption (EN) (GJ); 
• energy use per unit of output (EN/Q) (GJ/unit); 
• CO2 emissions per unit of output (E/Q) (tCO2/unit). 
 
We have: 
F = ∑Fi 
 
EN = F + EL 
                                                 
57 For example, for a heat to power ratio of 3:1 and average industrial energy prices, electricity costs would be 
2.2 times fuel (gas) costs.  
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Efuel =∑(Fi*Ci) 
 
Eelec = Celec*EL 
 
E =Efuel + Eelec 
 
Where: 
Fi = Fuel use of fuel type i (GJ) 
F = total fuel use (GJ) 
EN = total energy use (GJ) 
EL = electricity use (GJ) 
Efuel = direct carbon emissions from fuel use (tCO2) 
Eelec = indirect carbon emissions from electricity use (tCO2) 
E = total carbon emissions from energy use (tCO2) 
Ci = carbon intensity of fuel type i (tCO2/GJ) 
Celec = assumed average carbon intensity of imported electricity (tCO2/GJ) 
 
Of the four denominations of CCA target, it is energy use per unit of output which is most 
commonly used. No sector has chosen a target denominated in absolute CO2 emissions and 
only a couple (e.g. steel) have chosen a target denominated in absolute energy consumption. 
 
CO2 emissions at the site may be decomposed as follows: 
 
Efuel = Q * (F/Q) * (Efuel/F) 
 
Eelec = Q * (EL/Q) * (Eelec/EL) 
 
Where: 
 
Q = production output (units) 
F/Q = fuel intensity (GJ/unit) 
Efuel/F = average carbon intensity of fuel use (tCO2/GJ) 
EL/Q = electrical intensity (GJ/unit) 
Eelec/EL = average carbon intensity of electricity use (tCO2/GJ) – this is fixed for the CCAs.  
 
The following table shows how changes in the production output, fuel intensity and carbon 
intensity affect the attainment of different types of CCA target. 
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Table 5.2 How changes in output, energy intensity and carbon intensity affect the attainment 
of different types of CCA target 
 Denomination of CCA target 
Variable CO2  
emissions  
(E) 
Energy 
consumption 
(EN) 
Energy 
intensity 
(EN/Q) 
Carbon 
intensity  
(E/Q) 
Output (Q)   - - 
Fuel intensity (F/Q)     
Average carbon intensity 
of fuel (Efuel/F) 
 - -  
Electrical intensity 
(EL/Q) 
    
Carbon intensity of 
electricity (Eelec/EL) 
 - -  
Notes: The average carbon intensity of fuel will be changed by switching between fossil fuels. 
However, for the purpose of the CCAs the carbon intensity of electricity is assumed to be fixed 
regardless of the source of the electricity. Electricity from renewable sources is treated the same as 
electricity from fossil sources (section 3.5). 
 
The relevant interactions for Group 3 sites relate to the treatment of electricity, and this is the 
focus of the following discussion. But it is important to note that these electricity related 
interactions are identical for all CCA sites. This includes Group 4 sites which are also 
participating in the EU ETS. There are additional issues for Group 4 sites related to the 
treatment of fuel emissions, and these are discussed in detail in section 5.4.  
 
To analyse these electricity-related interactions, it is useful to distinguish a situation in which 
the CCAs take their basic form without the associated baseline and credit trading 
arrangements, from one in which the existing trading arrangements are allowed to continue 
alongside the EU ETS. This gives two cases to consider. 
 
• implications for electricity, no CCA trading; 
• implications for electricity, with CCA trading. 
 
These are discussed in turn.  
5.3.1 Implications for electricity, no CCA trading 
With the CCAs and EU ETS coexisting, electricity use at Group 3 sites is: 
 
• subject to the relevant CCA target; 
• eligible for the residual 20% of the CCL; and  
• subject to electricity price increases resulting from the participation of the electricity 
generators in the EU ETS. 
 
This creates a double regulation problem. 
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Magnitude of cost impacts 
Previous sections explored a scenario in which a £10/tCO2 allowance price was passed on in 
full in electricity prices. This translates to an increase electricity prices which is 
approximately equivalent to the current level of the CCL (0.43p/kWh).  
 
The purpose of the CCAs is to shield energy intensive companies from the increase in energy 
costs created by the CCL. If the EU ETS leads to an electricity price increase of the same 
magnitude as the CCL, the rationale for negotiating the agreements is partially undermined. 
Group 3 firms would have a target for their electricity consumption at the same time as they 
faced an increase in electricity prices. Considering electricity alone, firms would be worse off 
than under the full rate of the CCL. Not only would they face the double regulation of CCA 
targets and EU ETS electricity price increases, they would also receive no compensation for 
those price increases. Unlike with the CCL, there would be no revenue to distribute if the 
allowances were freely allocated, and if the allowances were auctioned the electricity 
generators themselves would be the more likely recipients.  
 
As with Group 2, the importance of this double regulation will depend on the relative price of 
electricity and fuel and the electricity intensity of Group 3 sites. An order of magnitude 
illustration is given by Table 5.3. This estimates the relative contribution of fuel and 
electricity to total CCL costs for the two main Group 3 sectors (chemicals and food and 
drink), using 1999 energy prices and assuming that each pays the full rate of the CCL.58  
                                                 
58 Non-ferrous metals is a highly electricity intensive sector that also falls within group 3. But data on fuel use 
for the sector is not reported separately in DTI (2002a). 
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Table 5.3 Estimated contribution of imported electricity to total CCL costs for the chemical 
and food and drink sectors  
 Chemicals Food and Drink 
Energy consumption (GWh)   
Coal  6455 2093 
Petroleum  4489 4129 
Gas  51184 29005 
Imported electricity 13712 9804 
Total 75839 45031 
CHP fuel use (GWh)   
Coal  4826 1844 
Petroleum  4021 611 
Gas  22181 7973 
Total 31028 10428 
Pre CCL energy costs (£m)   
Coal  30.3 9.8 
Petroleum  33.2 30.6 
Gas  279.5 158.4 
Imported electricity 496.8 355.2 
Total 839.7 553.9 
Estimated CCL levy costs (£m)   
Coal  2.4 0.4 
Petroleum  0.0 0.0 
Gas  43.5 31.5 
Imported electricity 59.0 42.2 
Total 104.9 74.1 
Total costs (£m) 944.6 628.0 
CCL as % of total 12.5 13.4 
Contribution of individual fuels 
to CCL costs (%) 
  
Coal  2.3 0.5 
Petroleum  0.0 0.0 
Gas  41.5 42.6 
Imported electricity 56.2 56.9 
Notes: 
• Consumption and price data from 1999. Energy costs calculated using average industrial prices: 
coal=0.47p/kWh; petroleum=0.74p/kWh (assuming HFO); gas=0.55p/kWh; 
electricity=3.62p/kWh. As large consumers, the unit price for CCA companies could be lower. 
• Assumes each sector pays the full rate of the CCL.  
• Uses aggregate energy consumption data for each sector. In practice, only a portion of sites may 
be covered by the CCAs and only a portion of energy consumption at these sites may be eligible. 
Furthermore, the energy intensity and heat to power ratio of eligible sites may differ from the 
sector average. 
• Estimates electricity imports from the difference between total electricity consumption and self 
generated electricity. The latter includes both CHP and non-CHP plants. Coal fired stream 
turbines dominate in the chemicals sector.  
• Assumes all CHP fuel use is exempt from the CCL. 
Source: DTI (2002) 
 
These calculations estimate that electricity accounts for ~56% of total CCL costs for the 
chemicals sector and 57% for the food and drink sector (although see the notes to Table 5.3). 
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An increase in electricity prices equivalent to that provided by the CCL would increase total 
energy costs by 6.5% for chemicals and 6.7% for food and drink. If imported electricity 
accounts for a lower proportion of energy costs in CCA firms compared to the sector as a 
whole (possible if the contribution of self generation is higher), these figures would be 
reduced. 
 
Compared to Group 1 sites, the site are relatively energy intensive. But despite this, these 
estimates suggest that the impact of the EU ETS on overall energy costs for Group 3 sites 
could be relatively small. This is all the more case when the estimates are set in the context of 
long-term changes in industrial electricity prices. As indicated in section 4.1, between 1996 
and 2001, average industrial electricity prices fell by 20% (30% in real terms), while there 
was a fall of 10% (13% in real terms) in 2001 alone (DTI, 2002). Hence, under the above 
assumptions, the cost impacts of the EU ETS on these sectors would be insufficient to reverse 
the reduction in electricity costs that was experienced in 2001 alone. 
 
As before, the calculations assume that the full cost increase to electricity generators is 
passed on to electricity consumers, rather than borne by suppliers or shareholders, and that 
the size of the cost increase is independent of the method of allowance allocation. In practice, 
the first assumption is almost certainly incorrect and the second is questionable (see section 
2.1.3). Hence, the actual rise in electricity prices assuming an allowance price of £10/tCO2 
could be less than indicated here. 
‘Backup’ regulation 
The calculations are also based on an assumed allowance price of £10/tCO2. As indicated in 
section 4.5, this could be an overestimate for the post-2008 period if: a) excessive hot air 
pushes the international carbon price to a low level; and b) linkages between the EU ETS and 
JI, CDM, IET or other trading schemes means that the EU ETS allowance price follows the 
international price.  
 
This situation is similar to that described in section 5.1.4. If the allowance price is low, the 
impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices will be very small. The double regulation 
described above would then have relatively little economic impact on Group 2 sites and 
political opposition to the retention of the CCAs would be reduced. Conversely, if the EU 
ETS replaced the CCAs on electricity, the net result would be a reduction in electricity 
prices, a loss of the CCA electricity targets and a consequent loss of the downstream 
incentive to improve electricity efficiency. Hence, if a scenario of low allowance prices is 
considered likely and if electricity efficiency is a valued policy objective, there may be an 
argument for retaining the CCAs in their current form in order to retain this downstream 
incentive. Here, the CCAs could be seen as a ‘backup’ to the EU ETS to ensure that Group 1 
sites took some action to improve electricity efficiency. An analogous approach has been 
adopted by the UK Environment Agency in their interpretation of the energy efficiency 
provisions under IPPC (Smith, 2002a). 
 
A central issue here is the relative effectiveness of energy price increases versus downstream 
targets in encouraging energy efficiency. The UK government's view is that price signals 
alone are relatively ineffective, given the range of other barriers that inhibit energy efficiency 
(Box 3.1).59 This is considered to be even more the case when the price signal is indirect, as 
with the EU ETS, rather than explicitly labelled and publicised, as with the CCL. This leads 
                                                 
59 Interview with DEFRA official, June 2002. 
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to a preference for negotiated downstream targets for energy intensive uses - a view which 
accords with the preferences of energy intensive industry since it allows them to avoid paying 
for residual emissions. In support of this, the bottom-up modelling conducted by ETSU 
suggested that the CCAs would deliver 9.2MtCO2 annual reductions by 2010, compared to a 
saving of only 10% of this (0.92MtCO2) if companies paid the full rate of the CCL (i.e. with 
no CCA targets) (ETSU, 2001). A 9.2MtCO2 reduction corresponds to 12% of the baseline 
emission coverage of the CCAs and 14% of the total quantified emission reductions in the 
UKCP – as compared to only 1.4% with the CCL alone. As with any modelling work, there 
are caveats regarding the methodology and the tenfold difference seems very surprising. But 
if it is correct, it illustrates the centrality of the CCA targets to the overall UKCP and the risks 
to the program if the CCA targets were removed. 
5.3.2 Implications for electricity, with CCA trading 
The existing CCAs also have arrangements for emissions trading as part of the UK ETS. 
These are of the baseline and credit form and are described fully in Sorrell (2001a). The 
correct term for the trading commodity used by the CCAs should be ‘credit’, but since these 
are fungible with the allowances used in the cap and trade portion of the UK ETS, the 
commodity is known by the general term ‘UK ETS allowances’ and is denominated in tonnes 
of CO2 (Sorrell, 2001a). Three points to note are: 
 
• There has to be conversion between the currency of the allowances and the currency of the 
CCA targets. This conversion uses the output of the previous year and the average values 
of energy intensity (EN/Q) and carbon intensity of fuel (Efuel/F) over the previous year. 
• CCA companies can purchase allowances at any time from anywhere in the UK ETS. But 
CCA companies can only sell surplus allowances at two-year intervals, after their 
performance has been verified against their targets. 
• There are no restrictions on the purchase of allowances by CCA companies or on the sale 
of allowances to other CCA companies. But the sale of allowances to direct participants in 
the UK ETS is subject to the provisions of the Gateway (Sorrell, 2001a). 
 
Since the CCA targets cover electricity use, this implies that the carbon emissions associated 
with that electricity use can be traded in the UK ETS. At the same time, the carbon emissions 
from electricity generation can be traded by the electricity generators in the EU ETS. While 
the UK ETS allowances indirectly cover the emissions from the associated electricity 
generation, the EU ETS allowances directly cover emissions from electricity generation. This 
means that both the electricity generator and the CCA participant have ownership of a 
property right (an EU ETS or UK ETS allowance) which: a) corresponds to the same physical 
emissions; b) relates to the use of the atmospheric commons; and c) can be traded. As 
discussed in section 2.3.2, the nature and extent of control that each party has over these 
emissions is quite different. 
 
In practice, there may be fungibility between the EU ETS and the UK ETS trading 
commodities. But since this raises a range of practical issues, full fungibility cannot be 
guaranteed. Another possibility is that there will be no fungibility of trading commodities. In 
this case, the trading arrangements for the UK ETS and EU ETS will remain entirely 
separate. 
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Double coverage and double crediting 
The different treatment of electricity in the EU ETS and CCAs creates a double coverage 
problem. The electricity generator requires EU ETS allowances to cover all the emissions 
associated with generating electricity for CCA sites. Meanwhile, the CCA firm will require 
UK ETS allowances to cover exceedances of its CCA target. Some or all of this exceedance 
may result from excess electricity consumption, and this will be converted into equivalent 
emissions (and corresponding allowance requirements) by means of the relevant conversion 
factors. In principle, this means that when CCA companies exceed their targets, two 
allowances may be required to cover each tonne of additional emissions that result – i.e. one 
UK ETS allowance required by the CCA firm, and one EU ETS allowance required by the 
electricity generator.  
 
This situation also creates a double crediting problem. Reducing electricity consumption 
below the CCA target could ‘free up’ or ‘create’ allowances in both the UK ETS and EU 
ETS. In the EU ETS, the corresponding reduction in electricity generation will mean that 
allowances held by electricity generators will no longer be required to cover emissions. 
Hence they are ‘freed up’ and available for sale to other EU ETS participants. In the UK 
ETS, reducing electricity consumption below the CCA target will ‘create’ UK ETS 
allowances which had no existence prior to the abatement action. These are then available for 
sale to other UK ETS participants.  
 
To clarify the implications of this double coverage/crediting it is useful to revise the 
distinction between allowance and credit based emissions trading schemes, as summarised in 
Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Allowances versus credits  
Emission Reduction Credit Emission Allowance 
Scheme: ‘Baseline and credit’ Scheme: ‘Cap and Trade’ 
Applies to emission reductions below defined 
baseline 
Applies to all emissions. 
Only emission reductions can be traded All emissions can be traded 
Credits are generated when a source reduces 
its emissions below an agreed baseline 
Allowances are allocated by the regulatory 
authority 
May develop incrementally as a means of 
introducing flexibility into existing 
regulatory structure 
Trading must be built into the regulatory 
structure from the beginning 
Participation in the credit market is voluntary 
- sources can just meet existing standards 
Participation in the program is mandatory - 
the overall emission cap still applies even if 
sources do not trade 
Source: Sorrell and Skea (1999) 
 
The distinction between allowance and credit based schemes is separate from the distinction 
between absolute and relative targets. Absolute targets place an absolute limit on the quantity 
of emissions from a trading participant, while relative targets restrict the quantity of 
emissions per unit of output. The EU ETS is an allowance based scheme (cap and trade) with 
absolute targets and allowance based schemes can only be used with absolute targets. But the 
trading arrangements for the CCAs are a credit based scheme (baseline and credit) with both 
absolute and relative targets. The choice between absolute and relative targets varies between 
CCA sectors - although most have chosen relative targets denominated in energy use per unit 
of output. 
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Figure 5.2 is a stylised representation of situation. The left-hand side shows allowance 
holdings in the EU ETS. Here, allowances are required to cover all emissions and the sum of 
allowances equals the emissions cap. The right hand side shows the equivalent emissions in 
the CCAs (the other participants in the UK ETS are ignored here). Here, emissions are 
calculated using the relevant conversion factors and include both the direct emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion and the indirect emissions from electricity consumption. Group 3 firms 
form a subset of CCA participants and electricity generators form a subset of EU ETS 
participants.  
 
In practice, all CCA firms have a portion of their emissions resulting from electricity 
consumption. But to simplify this exposition, let us assume that the indirect emissions from 
non-Group 3 CCA firms are zero (i.e. assume their electricity consumption is zero and that all 
their emissions result from direct fossil fuel combustion). This confines attention to the 
indirect emissions from Group 3. For these, assume that, initially, 50% of emissions result 
from direct fossil fuel combustion and 50% from electricity consumption. A portion of 
electricity generator emissions results from generating electricity for these Group 3 firms, and 
these emissions are represented on both sides of the diagram. To simplify things further, 
assume that: 
 
• all CCA participants have targets denominated in absolute emissions;60  
• all UK ETS and EU ETS allowances are used to cover emissions;  
• emissions from CCA participants are equal to their individual targets.  
 
Panel 1 of Figure 5.2 shows this initial situation, in which: 
 
• the emissions from Group 3 firms are 2 tonnes, of which 1 tonne (50%) results from 
electricity consumption; 
• the emissions from electricity generators are 8 tonnes of which 1 tonne results from 
electricity generated for Group 3 firms; 
• the emissions from non-Group 3 CCAs are 4 tonnes; 
• the emissions from participants other than electricity generators in the EU ETS are 8 
tonnes;  
• the emissions covered by the EU ETS are 16 tonnes;  
• the emissions covered by the CCAs are 6 tonnes.  
 
The total emissions covered by the EU ETS and CCAs combined is not equal to 16+ 6 = 22 
tonnes. This is because the 1 tonne of Group 3 emissions that result from electricity 
consumption is counted twice – once on each side of the diagram (i.e. there is ‘double 
coverage’ of these emissions). Hence, the 22 tonnes of emissions that is covered by the 
combination of the EU ETS cap and the CCA targets corresponds to only 21 tonnes of real, 
physical emissions. 
 
                                                 
60 In practice, no CCA firms have targets in this form, but adopting this as an initial assumption simplifies the 
explanation. 
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Figure 5.2 Double counting of electricity emissions with coexistence of EU ETS and CCAs, 
when the CCAs have absolute targets 
 
 
Now, consider a situation where electricity-related emissions from the Group 3 firms increase 
by 1 tonne as a consequence of increasing electricity consumption. Group 3 emissions now 
exceed the aggregate Group 3 CCA target. To cover these emissions, Group 3 firms must 
purchase 1 tonne of UK ETS allowances from other participants in the CCAs. At the same 
time, emissions from the electricity generators will have increased by 1 tonne as a 
consequence of the increased electricity generation required to meet the Group 3 demand. To 
cover these emissions, electricity generators must purchase 1 tonne of EU ETS allowances 
from other participants in the EU ETS. Assuming all allowances are used to cover emissions, 
the situation is then as shown in Panel 2 of Figure 5.2. The sum of the regulatory targets in 
the two sectors is the same as before: 16+ 6 = 22 tonnes. But the real physical emissions 
covered by the two regulations has reduced by 1 tonne to 20 tonnes (16 + 3 + 1). The 
increase in emissions by the Group 3 firms has been offset by a reduction in emissions of 
twice the size - one tonne from EU ETS participants, and one tonne from the CCA 
participants. In other words, the emission increase from the Group 3 firms has been ‘double 
covered’. 
 
For comparison, consider a situation where electricity-related emissions from the Group 3 
firms reduce by 1 tonne to zero tonnes. Group 3 emissions are now below the aggregate 
Group 3 CCA target. This will give Group 3 firms a surplus of 1 tonne of UK ETS 
allowances which may be sold to other CCA participants. At the same time, it will give 
electricity generators a surplus of 1 tonne of EU ETS allowances which may be sold to other 
EU ETS participants. Assuming all allowances are used to cover emissions, the situation is 
then as shown in Panel 3 of Figure 5.2. The sum of the regulatory targets in the two sectors is 
unchanged at 22 tonnes. But the real physical emissions have increased by 1 tonne to 22 
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tonnes (16 + 5 + 1). The reduction in emissions by the Group 3 firms has been offset by an 
increase in emissions of twice the size - one tonne from EU ETS participants, and one tonne 
from the CCA participants. In other words, the emission increase from the Group 3 firms has 
been ‘double credited’. 
 
In summary, an increase/decrease in emissions from Group 3 firms lead to an equal and 
opposite decrease/increase in emissions from participants in each of the two trading schemes. 
The net result is that an emissions increase/decrease from Group 3 firms leads to a 
decrease/increase of twice the size in the total emissions covered by the CCAs and EU ETS. 
The final total of emissions covered by the CCAs and EU ETS may be greater or less than the 
initial total of emissions (21 tonnes in Figure 5.2). However, this final total will always be 
less than or equal to the sum of the allowance cap in the EU ETS and the target emissions for 
the CCAs. This sum provides an overall cap on the total emissions from the combined 
schemes. The situation is complicated by the fact that the CCA targets reduce every two years 
while the EU ETS cap is fixed for the duration of each phase, but this will be ignored here. 
 
Since the CCAs use credit based trading, the double coverage problems described above only 
apply to emission increases above the relevant CCA target. If the Group 3 emissions are 
initially below the aggregate Group 3 CCA target, and if they remain below the target after an 
emissions increase, there will be no double coverage since they will be no requirement for 
UK ETS allowances. Similarly, the double crediting problems only apply to emission 
reductions below the relevant CCA target. If the Group 3 emissions are initially above the 
aggregate Group 3 CCA target, and if they remain above the target after an emissions 
reduction, there will be no double crediting since they will be no generation of UK ETS 
allowances. In contrast, if the CCAs used allowance based (rather than credit based) trading, 
the double coverage/crediting would apply to all emissions increases/decreases. 
 
In practice, Group 3 firms have relative rather than absolute targets. In this case, the manner 
by which emissions increase becomes important. If the CCA target is denominated in 
emissions intensity (E/Q), increasing equivalent emissions through increasing output (Q) 
while holding emissions intensity constant will not create a requirement for UK ETS 
allowances. Conversely, increasing emissions through increasing E/Q while holding Q 
constant will create a requirement for UK ETS allowances. As before, double coverage will 
only take place for emissions that exceed the aggregate Group 3 CCA target, but in this case 
the target is relative, rather than absolute. Similarly, double coverage will only take place for 
increases in the emissions intensity of electricity use (Eelec/Q) – not for fuel use (Efuel/Q). 
Since the carbon intensity of imported electricity (Celec) is assumed to be constant, the only 
way in which a requirement for allowances is generated is through an increase in electricity 
intensity (EL/Q). Similar comments apply to double crediting. 
Implications for environmental integrity 
The cap in the EU ETS will not breached by this double crediting - total emissions from 
participating firms in the EU ETS will remain equal to or below the cap and the total number 
of EU ETS allowances will remain unchanged. Similarly, the operation of the CCAs will not 
be affected by the double crediting. If all the CCAs had absolute targets, total emissions from 
the CCA sector would remain below the target emissions. Since, in practice, most CCAs have 
relative targets, aggregate emissions in the CCA sector (and hence the UK ETS overall) could 
increase. But this is an inherent feature of a scheme with relative targets and is not due to the 
double crediting. 
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The reason aggregate emissions in the CCA sector may increase is that increases in output 
can lead to increases in emissions. To see how this may apply, refer to Figure 5.3.61 This 
shows the carbon intensity limit for a facility in the CCA relative sector which has purchased 
a total Cp of UK ETS allowances from a Group 3 firm. This has the effect of shifting the 
emission constraint for the purchasing firm (a sloping line) to the right. Before the trade, 
allowable emissions for this firm at output O1 are equal to C1, while allowable emissions at 
output O2 are equal to C2. After the trade, allowable emissions for output O1 are equal to C’1, 
and allowable emissions for output O2 are equal to C’2. For an increase in output from O1 to 
O2, total allowable emissions have increased by (C’2 – C1) = (Cp + Ce). At the same time, 
total allowable emissions from the Group 3 firm will have decreased by only Cp. This means 
that the total allowable emissions from overall CCA sector (for output level O2 from the 
purchasing firm) will have increased by Ce, while emissions from the Group 3 firm will only 
have reduced by Cp. This is not, however a consequence of the double crediting, but is an 
inherent feature of a scheme with relative targets. The same situation would result if Cp of 
allowances were purchased from a non-Group 3 CCA firm.  
Figure 5.3 How trading with relative targets can lead to an increase in total emissions 
 
Given the above, we can ask whether the potential double coverage/crediting is a problem. At 
first sight, environmental integrity appears to be breached: in some circumstances two 
allowances are created from a one tonne reduction in emissions at a Group 3 site and these 
allowances are used to cover two tonnes of emissions increase at other sites. However, the 
double crediting is balanced by the double coverage. One tonne of emissions increase from 
the Group 3 sites is covered by two allowances, which must be obtained from two tonnes of 
emission reduction at other sites. In all cases, this only applies to emissions increases above 
or reductions below the Group 3 CCA targets.  
 
                                                 
61 This discussion is based on Salmons (2000). 
Cp CeO1
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C’2 Carbon emissions
Output
C2 C’1C1
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The net result does not present a threat to environmental integrity. In the case of absolute 
CCA targets, the combined emissions from the EU ETS and CCAs will be less than the sum 
of the emissions cap for the EU ETS and the target emissions for the CCAs (i.e. there will be 
an assurance of an overall cap). In the case of relative CCA targets, there is no assurance of 
an overall cap and emissions from the CCA sector may increase if output (Q) increases. But 
this is an inherent feature of relative targets and is not a consequence of the double 
coverage/crediting. 
 
But while environmental integrity may be protected, the double coverage/crediting does 
inject a considerable amount of confusion into the regulatory situation. In particular, the 
ownership of emissions from Group 3 sites becomes disputed. This would apply if both 
trading schemes were allowance based, but is all the more the case when the CCAs use credit 
based trading since this means that some emissions increases/decreases from Group 3 sites 
will be double covered/credited and some will not.  
 
The double coverage/crediting also creates problems for carbon accounting within the UKCP. 
Total emissions from the EU ETS and CCA sectors are not equal to the sum of emissions 
from the EU ETS participants and the CCA participants, since the electricity-related Group 3 
emissions are double counted. Instead, the electricity-related emissions from Group 3 
participants must only be counted once. However, if the CCAs have absolute targets, the 
emissions ceiling for the EU ETS and CCA sectors is equal to the sum of the EU ETS and 
CCA targets. This ceiling would only be reached if the electricity-related Group 3 emissions 
were zero. With relative targets, there is no emissions ceiling. 
 
Overall, the double coverage/crediting of electricity-related emissions for Group 3 sites 
appears complex, confusing and unwieldy, both for the participants themselves and for the 
UKCP overall. 
Fungibility between the EU ETS and the UK ETS  
One final issue is the potential fungibility between UK ETS and EU ETS allowances. 
Unrestricted fungibility means that an EU ETS participant could purchase UK ETS 
allowances and use them for compliance with its obligations, and similarly a UK ETS 
participant could purchase EU ETS allowances and use them for compliance with its 
obligations. 
 
If all CCAs had absolute targets, the overall environmental integrity of the EU ETS would 
not be threatened. However, if (as is the case) the CCAs had relative targets, the 
environmental integrity of the EU ETS could be threatened. This is because output growth in 
the CCA sector could increase the total number of allowances in the two schemes, thereby 
inflating the size of the EU ETS cap. In practice, since the CCAs use credit based rather than 
allowance trading, this need not automatically be the case since UK ETS allowances (credits) 
are only created when emissions are reduced below a CCA target. Nevertheless, it remains a 
possibility. 
 
Whether this is a problem is a matter of political judgement. Since the inflation threatens the 
entire EU ETS, the judgement needs to be made by the Commission. The concern here is 
analogous to that which led to the inclusion of the Gateway in the design of the UK ETS. The 
Gateway prevents a net flow of allowances from the CCA sector to the direct participant 
sector, thereby preventing inflation of the direct participant cap (Sorrell, 2001a). To prevent 
inflation in the EU ETS, a similar arrangement would be required to govern trade 
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(fungibility) between those CCAs that had relative targets and the EU ETS. The Gateway 
would not be needed to govern trade between those CCAs that had absolute targets and the 
EU ETS. The required arrangement is illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4 Interfacing the EU ETS and the CCAs 
5.3.3 Summary 
In summary, the coexistence of the EU ETS and CCAs leads to double regulation of 
electricity for all Group 3 sites. The electricity generators incur abatement costs to meet their 
EU ETS targets and a portion of these costs are passed on in electricity prices to Group 3 
firms. This cost increase is identical to that faced by Group 1 and Group 2 firms. For the 
latter, the cost increase is in addition to the CCL on electricity, while for Group 3 sites, the 
cost increase is in addition to the existing CCA target (which includes electricity 
consumption). This means that Group 3 sites face an electricity price increase at the same 
time as being required to meet a CCA target. Under certain assumptions, an EU ETS 
allowance prices of around £10/tCO2 could lead to an electricity price increases of a similar 
magnitude to the full rate of the CCL. 
 
The impact on overall energy costs at Group 3 sites will depend upon the market price for 
allowances and the electricity intensity of Group 3 sites. Simple calculations suggest that with 
allowance prices of around £10/tCO2, the overall increase in energy costs will be less than 
10% for a typical Group 3 site. This appears relatively small compared to the reductions in 
industrial electricity prices over the last five years. Furthermore, these calculations assume 
that the full cost increase to electricity generators is passed on to electricity consumers and 
that the size of the cost increase is independent of the method of allowance allocation. In 
practice these assumptions may well be incorrect, and the actual electricity price increase 
with free allocation of allowances could be less than indicated here. 
 
Interfacing the EU ETS and the
CCAs
CCLA unit 
sector
CCLA absolute 
sector
EU ETSGateway
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The calculations also assume an allowance price of £10/tCO2. This could be an overestimate 
for the post 2008 period if excessive hot air on the international carbon market leads to a 
corresponding reduction in EU ETS allowance prices. In these circumstances, there may be 
an argument for retaining the CCA electricity targets as ‘backup’ regulation, to ensure some 
improvement in downstream electricity efficiency. This points to a broader debate regarding 
the relative effectiveness of energy price increases versus downstream targets in encouraging 
energy efficiency. 
 
In practice, the CCAs have credit based trading arrangements as part of the UK ETS. 
Coexistence of these arrangements with generator participation in the EU ETS leads to: a) 
double coverage, where two allowances may be required to cover each tonne of additional 
emissions; and b) double crediting, where two allowances are ‘freed up’ or ‘generated’ from 
a each tonne of emission reductions. Since the CCAs use credit based trading, these problems 
only result from increases above or reductions below the CCA target . Similarly, since most 
of the CCAs use relative targets, these problems only result from changes in the emissions 
intensity of electricity use - not from changes in output. In practice, this means that some 
emissions increases/reductions are double covered/credited and some are not. Overall, this 
double coverage/crediting does not threaten the environmental integrity of either the EU ETS 
or the CCAs. It does, however introduce complexity and confusion into the regulatory 
situation, resulting from a conflict over the ownership of emissions from electricity 
generation. 
 
Finally, the use of relative targets in the CCAs means that output growth in the sector could 
increase the total number of allowances in circulation. If there were full fungibility between 
UK ETS and EU ETS allowances, this would create a danger of inflation in the number of 
EU ETS allowances with a corresponding risk of violating the EU ETS emissions cap. 
Whether or not this is a problem is a matter for political judgement. The most likely result in 
practice is for the Commission to require the use of a Gateway arrangement, similar to that 
used in the UK ETS, to interface the CCAs to the EU scheme. 
5.4 Group 4: EU ETS and CCA 
In terms of overall energy use and emissions, this group is more important than Group 3. It 
includes energy intensive sites in the paper, glass, steel, minerals and other energy intensive 
sectors which account for a very large proportion of total industrial energy use.62 Again, it is 
very unlikely that the EU ETS and CCAs could coexist at these sites, but it is useful to work 
through the implications if they did. 
 
These sites would require EU ETS allowances to cover CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion in both the main combustion plant and process plant, together with CO2 
emissions from non-combustion processes. At the same time, their CCA target would cover 
fuel and electricity consumption in both the main combustion plant and process plant. If the 
latter accounted for more than 90% of the energy consumption at the site, then the total site 
energy use would be included in the CCA. Electricity prices would also be indirectly affected 
by the participation of electricity generators in the EU ETS. Table 5.5 summarises this 
overlapping coverage. 
                                                 
62 Iron and steel, paper and minerals together account for around 28% of manufacturing energy consumption. 
The bulk of this is concentrated in the larger sites, which are eligible for the EU ETS.  
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Table 5.5 Coverage of EU ETS and CCA at a single site 
Emission source CCA EU ETS 
Fuel use in main combustion plant   
Fuel use in process plant   
Fuel use elsewhere on the site f(90% rule) - 
Electricity use in main combustion plant   
Electricity use in process plant  (indirect) 
Electricity use elsewhere on the site f(90% rule) (indirect) 
Non combustion processes -  
Notes: The average carbon intensity of fuel will be changed by switching between fossil fuels. 
However, for the purpose of the CCAs the carbon intensity of electricity is assumed to be fixed 
regardless of the source of the electricity. Electricity from renewable sources is treated the same as 
electricity from fossil sources (section 3.5). 
 
The consequences for electricity consumption of this interaction are identical to those for 
Group 3 sites in the previous section. Hence, this section will confine attention to the direct 
emissions from fuel use. 
 
As in section 5.3, it is useful to distinguish a situation in which the CCAs take their basic 
form without the associated baseline and credit trading arrangements, from one in which the 
existing trading arrangements are allowed to continue alongside the EU ETS. This gives two 
cases to consider. 
 
• implications for fuel, no CCA trading; 
• implications for fuel, with CCA trading; 
 
These are discussed in turn. 
5.4.1 Implications for fuel, no CCA trading 
CO2 emissions from fuel combustion are constrained by the allowance allocation under the 
EU ETS, but with the flexibility to trade. This is an absolute target. At the same time, fuel use 
is constrained by the parallel CCA target, but without the flexibility to trade. In most cases, 
the CCA will have a relative target. 
 
When a CCA is combined with the EU ETS, there are two targets for the site to meet. For the 
EU ETS target, denominated in CO2 emissions, changes in Q, F/Q and Efuel/F will all affect 
attainment of the target. In contrast, only a subset of these variables will affect attainment of 
the CCA target (Table 5.2). On the one hand there are more degrees of freedom to meet the 
EU ETS target (including allowance purchases), but on the other hand the EU ETS exposes 
the operator to greater risk, since increases in output may threaten attainment of the EU ETS 
target. 
Implications for marginal abatement costs 
The effect of having two targets will depend upon whether the constraint imposed by the 
CCA target is binding. If so, the net effect will be to increase marginal abatement costs for 
the site in question. This may be demonstrated algebraically. Assume that the firm is a price 
taker in both the product market and the allowance market. Its problem is then to choose 
output (q) and abated emissions A such that profits (revenues minus costs) are maximised.  
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First consider the situation with the EU ETS target alone. Assuming free allocation of EU 
ETS allowances, the site must maximise the following objective function: 
 
Profit = P*q - TC(q,A) - PP[(E(q) – A) - GF] 
 
Where:  
q = production output (units),  
P = exogeneous product price (assume the firm is a price taker in the product market)  
A = abated emissions 
TC(q,a) = total costs (production + abatement) for output q and abated emissions A 
E(q) = unconstrained emissions for output q   
PP = exogenous allowance price (assume the firm is a price taker in the allowance market) 
GF = allowance allocation (assuming free allocation) 
 
Assume that total costs are increasing in output (dTC(q,A)/dq>0) and in abated emissions 
(dTC(q,A)/dA >0) and that emissions are increasing in output (dE(q)/dq>0). Also assume that 
marginal production costs are increasing in output (d(dTC(q,A)/dq)dq>0) and marginal 
abatement costs are increasing in abated emissions (d(dTC(q,A)/dA)da >0). 63  
 
The first order condition for minimising abatement costs is then given by: 
 
dTC(q,A)/dA = PP 
 
This is the standard cost efficiency result: total abatement costs are minimised when marginal 
abatement costs are set equal to the allowance price. 
 
Now consider the situation with a parallel CCA target. As indicated above, this target is most 
likely to be denominated in energy intensity. This, together with the differing coverage of the 
EU ETS and CCAs complicates the derivation of simple equations for profit maximisation. 
But the general principle may be illustrated by assuming that the CCA target is denominated 
in emissions intensity (E/Q) and that the scope of the CCA is identical to that of the EU ETS. 
Using these simplifying assumptions, the site must then also meet the following constraint: 
 
(E(q) – A)/q <= N 
 
Or: 
 
(E(q) – A) <=q*N 
 
where: N = emissions intensity target (tCO2/unit) 
 
Forming the Lagrangian: 
 
Z = P*q - TC(q,A) - PP[(E(q) – A) - GF] + λ[q*N – (E(q) – A)] 
                                                 
63 The first derivative measures whether the value of the function is increasing (+ve), decreasing (-ve) or 
stationary (=0). The second derivative measures whether the slope of the function is increasing (+ve), 
decreasing (-ve) or stationary (=0). For a maximum, the first derivative = 0 and the second derivative < 0. For a 
minimum, the first derivative = 0 and the second derivative > 0. Here, the function = profits; and the slope of the 
function means the change in profits for changes in either q or A. 
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The full solution requires the Kuhn Tucker conditions. But if we assume q>0 and A>0, then 
the first order condition for minimum cost abatement is given by dZ/dA=0, or: 
 
-dTC(q,A)/dA + PP + λ = 0 
or: 
dTC(q,A)/dA = PP + λ (1) 
 
The Lagrange multiplier λ indicates the change in the objective function (profits) for a 
marginal change in the CCA-constraint. If the CCA-constraint is binding, λ is positive. If the 
CCA-constraint is not binding, λ is zero. In the latter case, profits are not affected by the 
additional CCA-constraint.  
 
If the CCA-constraint is binding, equation (1) shows that the firm chooses abatement such 
that the marginal abatement costs are equal to the allowance price plus λ. This means that the 
firm faces higher marginal abatement costs and higher total abatement costs from the 
additional CCA-constraint. The net effect of the CCA target is to increase the marginal 
abatement costs of the Group 4 firm relative to those firms which are participating in the EU 
ETS without such a constraint. The double regulation of Group 4 firms distorts the operation 
of the EU ETS in that it can no longer achieve a minimum cost distribution of CO2 
abatement. In this, the effect of the CCA target is similar to that of the CCL for Group 2 firms 
(section 5.1.3). The additional costs faced by Group 4 firms will be passed on to shareholders 
or to suppliers. It will only be possible to pass costs on to consumers if the Group 4 firms in a 
particular sector have market power in the relevant product market. 
 
If the CCA-constraint is binding, the firm will abate more than it would with the EU ETS 
alone. This situation is similar to that described in section 5.1 for double regulation with the 
CCL. If, in the absence of the CCA target, the firm was likely to be a net buyer of 
allowances, the number of allowances bought is likely to be reduced by the coexistence of the 
CCA. In some circumstances, the firm could even become a net seller of allowances. 
Similarly, if in the absence of CCA target the firm was likely to be a net seller of allowances, 
the number of allowances sold is likely to be increased. Thus, compared to the case with the 
EU ETS alone, the coexistence of the CCA will lead to more allowances on the market and, 
potentially, a reduction in the allowance price.64 In this case, the double regulation of Group 4 
firms would not only increase the costs of these firms, but also subsidise abatement at other, 
non-Group 4 firms since the latter will be able to purchase cheaper allowances. These may be 
UK or foreign competitors of the Group 4 firms. Whether this is actually the case will depend 
upon the collective market power of Group 4 firms (i.e. their ability to affect the allowance 
price). Since the EU ETS market is EU-wide, this could be limited. 
 
The first order condition for optimum output (q) is given by dZ/dq = 0, or: 
 
P - dTC(q,A)/dq – PP*dE(q)/dq + λ(N - dE(q)/dq) = 0 
 
Then: 
P = dTC(q,A)/dq + PP*dE(q)/dq + λ(dE(q)/dq- N) 
 
Or: 
                                                 
64 Assuming the CCA target is binding for at least some firms. 
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dTC(q,A)/dq = P - PP*dE(q)/dq - λ(dE(q)/dq- N)  (2) 
 
 
Equation (2) shows that Group 4 firms should chose output (q) such that the marginal 
production costs are equal to product price minus both:  
 
• the marginal costs for covering emissions associated with the additional output (which 
equals the EU ETS allowance price); and  
• a term that reflects the impact of an increase in output on the CCA-constraint.  
 
If the additional emissions from a one unit output increase exceed that allowed by the CCA 
(N), this additional term is negative and output will be lower compared to a regime with the 
EU ETS alone. By contrast, if the additional emissions from a one unit output increase are 
lower than the CCA target, the CCA-constraint becomes less binding, and output will be 
higher compared to a regime with the EU ETS alone. 
Magnitude of cost impacts 
The relative importance of the CCA target to the firm will depend upon the magnitude of λ 
relative to the allowance price PP. Here: 
 
λ =  f (the individual CCA target (N) and the cost characteristics of the individual firm)  
PP =  f (the aggregate emission target in the EU ETS and the cost characteristics of the 
population of participating firms).  
 
One possibility is that PP>>λ (this include situations where the constraint is non-binding and 
hence λ=0). In this case, the CCA target for the firm will have relatively little effect 
compared to the EU ETS (zero effect if λ=0). In this scenario, the CCA becomes largely 
redundant and the EU ETS dominates overall abatement costs. Another possibility is that 
PP<<λ. Here, it is the CCA target which dominates and the scope for compliance with the 
EU ETS is severely constrained. A third possibility is that λ≅PP. In this case, the marginal 
abatement costs for Group 4 will be doubled compared to a scenario with the EU ETS alone. 
The effect upon total abatement costs and average abatement costs will depend upon the 
shape of the marginal cost curve. But in all cases, total abatement costs will be increased. 
 
The stringency of the CCA-constraint λ relative to PP will vary from firm to firm and the 
constraint may only be binding for a subset of firms. But in principle, the λ’s for each firm 
should be based upon broadly similar criteria. It is reasonable, therefore, to discuss the 
average value of the constraint for Group 4 firms - λav - and compare this with PP. The above 
scenarios then become λav<<PP, λav>>PP and λ av≅PP. 
 
If λav>>PP there is a possible rationale for retaining the CCA targets. This is identical to the 
rationale given in section 5.1.4 for retaining the CCL, and in section 5.3.1 for retaining the 
electricity targets in the CCAs. This stems from the fact that cost minimisation is not the only 
objective of UK climate policy. The promotion of energy efficiency is also a highly valued 
policy goal and this requires the retention of downstream incentives. If there were serious 
concerns that allowance prices in the EU ETS would be low post 2008, this could motivate 
the retention of CCA targets for fuel consumption at Group 4 sites as a ‘backup’. The CCAs 
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would ensure that individual firms took some action to improve the efficiency of fuel use (in 
most cases through improving F/Q), rather than relying solely on the purchase of cheap 
allowances. Note that this argument holds regardless of the stringency of the EU ETS targets 
for the Group 4 firms – what matters is the market price for EU ETS allowances.  
 
If PP>>λav, the justification for retaining the CCAs is less obvious. Here it is the EU ETS 
which dominates, and the CCAs have relatively little impact on overall abatement costs or 
regulatory flexibility. In practice, however, the relative stringency of the CCA targets and the 
EU ETS will not be known prior to the introduction of the latter and may differ between 
Phase 1 and Phase 2.  
Practical considerations 
Double regulation by the EU ETS and CCAs does not merely increase abatement costs, but 
also administrative costs. These derive from having two sets of reporting requirements (every 
two years under the CCAs and annually under the EU ETS), two sets of verification 
requirements, two sets of compliance provisions and so on. There may be some scope for 
rationalisation, but the sum of administrative costs will inevitably be greater than under either 
instrument acting alone. Given that the administrative requirements of the CCAs are already 
considered onerous (ENDS, 2002c), such a level of administrative complexity would be 
strongly opposed by Group 4 firms. 
 
In practice, the biggest obstacle to this type of double regulation would be political. The EU 
ETS would remove the flexibilities that the CCAs give - relative targets would be replaced by 
absolute targets and the broader provisions for risk management would be lost. Objections 
may be anticipated from Group 4 sites. This is an inevitable consequence of joining the EU 
ETS, but the difficulties and costs this creates for CCA sites would be compounded if the 
existing CCAs were retained alongside the new EU ETS. The double regulation would be 
viewed as unnecessary, costly and redundant and is unlikely to be seriously contemplated. 
5.4.2 Implications for fuel, with CCA trading 
As described in section 5.3, the existing CCAs also have arrangements for credit-based 
emissions trading. Hence, if Group 4 CCA firms join the EU ETS, they will become 
participants in two trading schemes simultaneously: the UK ETS and EU ETS. In practice, 
there may be fungibility between the two trading schemes, but we first consider a situation 
where there is no fungibility of trading commodities – i.e. the trading arrangements for the 
UK ETS and EU ETS are entirely separate. 
Implications for marginal abatement costs 
As before the implications for marginal abatement costs of this form of double regulation can 
be determined algebraically. In this case, using the same terminology as above and assuming 
an emissions intensity target for the CCA, the problem for the Group 4 firms is to choose 
abatement and output levels which maximise the following function: 
 
Profit = P*q - TC(q,A) - PPEU[(E(q) - A) - GF] - PPUK[(E(q) -A) – N*q] 
 
Where: 
PPEU = allowance price in the EU ETS  
PPUK = allowance price in the UK ETS 
and other symbols as above 
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We again assume that the firm is a price taker in the product market and both allowance 
markets. The first order condition for minimising abatement costs is then: 
 
-dTC(q,a)/dA + PPEU + PPUK = 0 
 
Or: 
 
dTC(q,a)/dA = PPEU + PPUK (3) 
 
Equation (3) states that firms choose abatement such that marginal abatement costs for that 
firms are equal to the sum of allowance prices in the two separate markets. Note that equation 
(1) would be the same as equation (3), if λ was replaced by PPUK. Allowing firms to trade 
allowances to meet the CCA targets improves efficiency, since all firms face the same 
marginal abatement costs in that market (PPUK). For any individual firm, PPUK may be greater 
or less than the λ parameter derived in the previous section, which means that marginal 
abatement costs may be higher or lower than without CCA trading. But total abatement costs 
for the firm will always be equal to or less than in the non-CCA trading scenario. If λ>PPUK, 
the firm will comply by purchasing UK ETS allowances at a lower cost than reducing direct 
emissions, while if λ<PPUK, the firm will reduce emissions by more than in the previous case 
and sell the surplus UK ETS allowances for a profit. In both cases, the firm benefits. The 
same result applies to Group 4 firms as a whole: the sum of abatement costs across all firms 
will be lower in a regime with CCA trading than in a comparable regime without trading.  
 
If the overall target implied by the CCA is binding, PPUK will be positive. If not, PPUK will be 
zero. For positive PPUK, all firms will reduce more emissions than under an EU ETS alone. 
This compares to only some firms in the case with no CCA trading. In the latter case, only 
those firms where the CCA constraint was binding (λ>0) would abate more than with the EU 
ETS alone. Whether individual firms under a CCA-trading regime abate more or less than 
without trading depends on whether PPUK is greater or less than their individual λ.  
 
The first order condition for optimising production output (q), is: 
 
P - dTC(q,A)/dq - PPEU * dE(q)/dq - PPUK *(dE(q)/dq - N) = 0 
 
Then: 
 
P = dTC(q,A)/dq + dE(q)/dq*( PPEU + PPUK) + PPUK *N  
 
Or: 
dTC(q,A)/dq = P - (PPEU)*dE(q)/dq - PPUK *( dE(q)/dq- N)  (4) 
 
Equation 4 states that firms chose output such that the marginal production costs are equal to 
product price minus: 
 
• the marginal costs for covering emissions associated with the additional output under the 
EU ETS; and  
• a term that reflects the impact of an increase in output on the CCA-constraint.  
 
 118
If dE(q)/dq < N an increase in output enables the firm to sell additional allowances under the 
CCA trading scheme at a price of PPUK per unit. Thus, output will be higher compared to the 
EU ETS alone. By contrast, if dE(q)/dq > N the increase in output forces the firm to buy 
additional allowances under the CCA trading scheme at a price of PPUK per unit and output 
will be lower compared to the EU ETS alone.  
 
Although individual firms should be better off with CCA trading than without, participation 
in two separate allowance markets may create severe practical difficulties. In particular, it is 
possible that a firm could be a seller in one market and a buyer in the second at the same 
time. This confusing situation implies additional administrative costs which could undermine 
the cost savings from trading. Once again, there seems little prospect of this scenario being 
acceptable in practice. 
Double coverage and double crediting 
Simultaneous participation in two trading schemes also creates a double coverage problem. 
The firm requires EU ETS allowances to cover all the direct emissions from fuel combustion. 
It also requires UK ETS allowances to cover emissions in excess of its CCA target. In 
principle, this means that two allowances are required for each tonne of direct fossil fuel 
emissions in excess of the CCA target. While the ownership of the emissions clearly resides 
with the Group 4 firm, it needs to acquire two separate property rights to cover these 
emissions: one from the UK ETS and one from the EU ETS. 
 
Similarly, the simultaneous participation in two trading schemes also creates a double 
crediting problem. This primarily relates to the situation where a firm is a seller in both 
markets. Here, a single abatement action that reduces CO2 emissions could ‘free up’ 
allowances in the EU ETS or ‘create’ UK ETS allowances.  
 
The difference between this and the double coverage/crediting of electricity emissions needs 
to be emphasised. For the indirect emissions from electricity generation, Group 4 sites are 
participating in only one trading scheme (the UK ETS). However, at the same time the 
electricity generators are participating in the EU ETS. Allowances in the UK ETS indirectly 
cover the emissions from electricity generation, while allowances in the EU ETS directly 
cover emissions from electricity generation. For the direct emissions from fuel combustion, 
Group 4 sites are simultaneously participating in two trading schemes. Allowances in both 
the UK ETS and the EU ETS are being used to cover direct emissions from the Group 4 site. 
For both fuel and electricity consumption at the Group 4 site, there is double coverage of the 
associated (direct and indirect) emissions.  
 
The implications of this double coverage/crediting can be analysed in a similar manner as for 
the Group 3 sites in section 5.3.2. Figure 5.5 is a stylised representation of the Group 4 firms 
participating in both trading schemes. As before, assume that all CCA participants have 
targets denominated in absolute emissions and that all UK ETS and EU ETS allowances are 
used to cover emissions. Similarly, assume that, initially, emissions from CCA participants 
are equal to their individual targets. Panel 1 of Figure 5.5 shows this initial situation, Panel 2 
shows the consequences of increasing emissions at the Group 4 sites, and Panel 3 shows the 
consequences of reducing emissions. 
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Figure 5.5 Double counting with simultaneous participation in an allowance based and 
credit based trading scheme, when both schemes have absolute targets 
 
The net result is very similar to the double counting of electricity emissions described in 
section 5.3.2. An increase/decrease in emissions from Group 4 firms leads to an equal and 
opposite decrease/increase in emissions from participants in each of the two trading schemes. 
Hence, an emissions increase/decrease from Group 4 firms leads to an equal and opposite 
decrease/increase in the total emissions covered by the CCAs and EU ETS. The final total of 
emissions covered by the CCAs and EU ETS may be greater or less than the initial total of 
emissions (14 tonnes in Figure 5.5). But this final total will always be less than or equal to the 
sum of the allowance cap in the EU ETS and the target emissions for the CCAs. This sum 
provides an overall cap on the total emissions from the combined schemes.  
 
Since the CCAs use credit based trading the double coverage problems only apply to 
emission increases above the relevant CCA target and the double crediting problems only 
apply to emission reductions below the relevant CCA target. Similarly, since in practice 
Group 4 firms have relative rather than absolute targets, the manner by which emissions 
increase/decrease is relevant (i.e. changing output, or changing energy/carbon intensity). 
 
As before, the cap in the EU ETS will not breached by the double crediting and the operation 
of the UK ETS will not be affected by the double crediting. If all the CCAs had absolute 
targets, total emissions from the CCA sector would remain below the target emissions. Since, 
in practice, most CCAs have relative targets, aggregate emissions in the CCA sector (and 
hence the UK ETS overall) could increase, but this is an inherent feature of a scheme with 
relative targets and is not due to the double crediting.  
 
As before, while environmental integrity may be protected the double coverage/crediting 
injects a considerable amount of confusion. In this case, the ownership of fuel emissions from 
Group 4 sites becomes unclear. This is all the more the case when the CCAs use credit based 
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trading since this means that some emissions increases/decreases from Group 4 sites will be 
double covered/credited and some will not.  
 
Double coverage/crediting also creates problems for carbon accounting within the UKCP 
since total emissions from the EU ETS and CCA sectors are not equal to the sum of 
emissions from the EU ETS participants and the CCA participants. 
 
As with the double coverage of electricity emissions, the simultaneous participation of Group 
4 sites in two trading schemes appears complex, confusing and unwieldy, both for the 
participants themselves and for the UKCP overall. 
Fungibility between the EU ETS and the UK ETS 
The situation becomes even more confusing when we consider the potential fungibility 
between UK ETS and EU ETS allowances. Consider the implications of unrestricted 
fungibility for the situation shown in Panel 2 of the Figure 5.5, where the Group 4 firm has 
increased emissions by one tonne in excess of its CCA target. In this case, the Group 4 firm 
could cover its EU ETS obligations by buying allowances from either trading scheme. 
Similarly, the firm could cover its CCA obligations by buying allowances from either 
scheme. The final result in terms of emissions would be the same as shown in Panel 2. But 
the firm would be in the odd position of using two allowances of the same type to cover the 
same tonne of emissions.  
 
If all CCAs had absolute targets, overall environmental integrity would not be threatened. 
The situation would merely be complicated and confused. However, if (as is the case) the 
CCAs had relative targets, the environmental integrity of the EU ETS could be threatened. 
This is because output growth in the CCA sector could increase the total number of 
allowances in the two schemes, thereby inflating the size of the EU ETS cap. 
 
Section 5.3.2 discussed the use of a Gateway to govern trade between the CCAs and the EU 
ETS. This would prevent a net flow of allowances from the CCA sector to the EU ETS. But 
the dual participation of Group 4 firms in both trading schemes means that any Gateway 
arrangement could easily be circumvented. This means that the dual participation of Group 4 
firms in both trading schemes is likely to prevent the fungibility of UK ETS and EU ETS 
allowances. 
Sector versus firm incentives 
A final issue to consider is the conflict between sector-level and firm-level incentives. The 
analysis has so far assumed that each Group 4 firm was acting to minimise its own abatement 
costs. But the structure of the CCAs complicates this assumption. 
 
The great majority of the CCAs consist of a two tier agreement: an umbrella agreement 
between the government and the trade association combined with underlying agreements 
between government and individual firms (Sorrell, 2001a). The umbrella agreement contains 
an overall target for the sector, while the underlying agreements contain targets for the 
individual firms which are based on the overall sector target but take into account factors 
such as product mix. If the sector as a whole meets the target in the umbrella agreement, all 
firms within the underlying agreement receive the CCL discount. If the sector target is not 
met, individual firms are assessed against their individual targets in the underlying agreement 
and are eligible for the discount if they have complied. With this structure, the incentive to 
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free ride is mitigated by the risk of losing the discount if the sector as a whole fails to meet its 
target. 
 
The CCA trading rules create problems for this arrangement. In principle, an individual firm 
could sell its surplus emissions outside the sector, rather than having them count towards 
meeting the sector’s target. The latter course of action would amount to a subsidy of 
competitor firms which were failing to meet their targets. To address this, the trade 
associations for the CCA sectors have developed three models for regulating trading, 
summarised in Box 5.2.  
Box 5.2 Models for organising CCA trading in the UK ETS 
Model 1: Independent emissions trading 
• Each CCA facility participates independently in the UK ETS. There is no mutually supportive 
action at the sector level. 
• Any facility ‘over-achieving’ its target would be free to sell or bank UK ETS allowances and 
would not automatically contribute its over-achievement to the sector association. 
• Any facility ‘under-achieving’ its target would need to buy additional allowances. There will be 
no surplus held at the sector level. 
• Individual underlying agreement targets would only be tested if the sector failed. 
• Any risk of cross-subsidy between firms would be avoided  
Model 2: sector emissions trading 
• The sector association participates in the UK ETS, while individual target holders voluntarily 
surrender their right to participate in the UK ETS. 
• The sector association will purchase allowances to achieve overall sector compliance and will be 
responsible for organising the verification required for any sale of allowances by the sector. 
• The sector association and the individual target holders would need to agree the allocation of 
costs and proceeds. Some element of cross subsidy is involved.  
• Individual target holders would be free to stay outside Model 2 if they wished, and trade 
independently. In these circumstances, their emissions would be removed from the aggregate 
target for the sector and they would be assessed individually for compliance with their target. 
Model 3: first refusal trading 
• Target holders would agree to offer first refusal to the sector association, at market price, of any 
generated allowances. If the allowances were refused, the target holders would be free to sell or 
bank. 
• The sector association would co-ordinate all intra-sector transactions needed to meet the sector 
target.  
• Constraining the freedom to trade allowances implies a potential economic loss to participating 
firms. Difficulties could also arise if a firm lost its CCL discount as a result of a mistake by the 
sector association. 
• Individual target holders would be free to stay outside Model 3 if they wished, and trade 
independently. In these circumstances, their emissions would be removed from the aggregate 
target for the sector and they would be assessed individually for compliance with their target. 
Source: DEFRA, 2002b 
 
Model 1 appears to be the rational course of action for a cost minimising firm, since both 
Model 2 and Model 3 imply potential cross subsidy of competitor firms. However, Models 2 
and 3 may reduce transaction costs for individual firms by allowing them to avoid many of 
the complications of the UK ETS. In practice, all three models are represented in actual 
agreements. 
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The point here is that the introduction of the EU ETS could completely undermine Model 2 
and Model 3 agreements. The sector association could attempt to play the same role in the 
EU ETS as in the UK ETS, but this will be complicated by the fact there is no equivalent to 
the umbrella agreement in the EU ETS. Overall compliance by the sector will not ‘cover’ for 
lack of compliance by an individual site. Instead, the sector association would need to buy 
and sell EU ETS allowances and distribute them appropriately. Further complications are 
introduced by the fact that only a subset of facilities within a sector may be eligible for the 
EU ETS – the others will be subject to the CCAs alone. The most obvious course of action 
for individual facilities is to leave the Model 2 or Model 3 agreements and to trade 
independently.  
 
These complications are a subsidiary issue to the double regulation and double crediting 
problems discussed above. But they are a further indication of the potential of the EU ETS to 
unravel existing arrangements within UK climate policy. 
5.4.3 Summary 
In summary, the dual participation of Group 4 sites in both the EU ETS and CCAs leads to 
complex problems of double regulation, double coverage and double crediting. These apply 
both to fuel and electricity consumption in both the combustion and process plant. The 
implications for electricity are identical to those for Group 3 sites. The implications for fuel 
result from the sites having two separate targets for direct emissions: one absolute target 
under the EU ETS, with associated allowance-based trading; and one (normally) relative 
target under the CCAs, with associated credit-based trading. 
 
The implications of this unlikely arrangement can be illustrated in a stylised form, using 
simple optimisation equations. If the CCA targets are fixed (with no associated trading 
arrangements), the behaviour of the firm is only affected if the CCA target is binding relative 
to the EU ETS target. If so, both marginal and total abatement costs are increased relative to a 
situation with no CCA target. This double regulation distorts the operation of the EU ETS 
and may either reduce shareholder dividends or reduce the market value of Group 4 firms. If 
Group 4 firms have market power in the allowance market, this could also lead to an effective 
subsidy of (non-Group 4) competitors by reducing the EU ETS allowance price.  
 
The size of the cost increase will depend on a wide range of factors. One possibility is that 
the abatement costs created by the CCA will be much larger than those resulting from the EU 
ETS, as a consequence of low EU ETS allowance prices. These in turn may be a consequence 
of the interface between the EU ETS and the international carbon market after 2008, with the 
associated problems of hot air trading. Under these circumstances, there may be a case for 
retaining the CCA targets for fuel consumption as a form of ‘backup’ regulation. But in all 
circumstances, the coexistence of the CCAs and the EU ETS is likely to entail substantial 
administrative costs for Group 4 firms and be extremely unpopular. 
 
If the CCA trading arrangements are retained, marginal abatement costs should be equal to 
the sum of the allowance prices in the two separate markets. For individual firms, marginal 
abatement costs may be higher or lower than with fixed CCA targets, but in all cases total 
abatement costs will be equal to or less than in the non-trading scenario. Again, considerable 
complexity is implied, such as when a Group 4 firm is a buyer in one market and a seller in 
the second. 
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Dual participation in the two trading markets also leads to double coverage of emissions 
increases above the CCA target, and double crediting of emission reductions below the CCA 
target. Since most of the CCAs use relative targets, these problems only result from changes 
in the emissions intensity of fuel use - not from changes in output. In practice, this means that 
some emissions increases/reductions are double covered/credited and some are not. This 
double coverage/crediting does not threaten the environmental integrity of the EU ETS or the 
CCAs, but introduces further complexity and confusion into an already confused regulatory 
situation.  
 
In summary, while the analysis of the coexistence of the two instruments has highlighted 
some important issues, it appears an unlikely outcome in practice. The desire for ‘backup’ 
regulation is unlikely to be sufficient to outweigh the numerous disadvantages that such an 
arrangement would bring. 
5.5 Multi criteria Evaluation 
From the narrow perspective of static economic efficiency, the coexistence of the EU ETS 
with the CCL/CCA package is clearly undesirable as it fails to achieve least cost abatement. 
But in practice, policy decisions are made using a broader set of criteria, with particular 
attention to political acceptability. The overall desirability of the policy package may 
therefore be explored using a multi-criteria assessment (MCA) (Weimar and Vining, 1999). 
Box 5.3 lists some appropriate criteria. 
Box 5.3 Generic objectives for policy instruments 
• environmental effectiveness: defined as the likelihood of the policy achieving a specific 
environmental objective. 
• static economic efficiency: defined as the potential to minimise the direct costs of meeting an 
environmental objective; 
• administrative simplicity: defined as the administrative burden on both the target group(s) and the 
implementing organisations; 
• competitiveness: defined as avoiding damage to the competitiveness of national industry. 
• political acceptability: defined as the acceptability of the proposal by key groups in the economy. 
 
In a case such as this, any MCA must necessarily be highly qualitative and subjective. 
Furthermore, the evaluation under each criteria will be sensitive to unknown factors, such as 
the anticipated price of EU ETS allowances. Hence, the MCA framework will be used here in 
a very simple way to classify and highlight some of the more important conclusions from the 
preceding analysis. This provides a useful starting point for the assessment of alternative 
policy options in section 7. 
 
Tables 5.6 to 5.9 provide a MCA of each Group in turn. These include a ‘score’ from 1 to 5 
indicating the desirability of the identified outcomes. 
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Table 5.6 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 1 (CCL only) 
Criteria Relevant issues for Group 1  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for electricity efficiency; 
• retains positive environmental impact of policy measures funded by CCL 
revenues (e.g. ECAs); 
• retains price incentive for electricity efficiency in the case of low allowance 
prices (backup option); 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel with consequent negative 
environmental impacts; 
3 
Static efficiency • external costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel  
2 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• no greater burden for Group 1 sites; 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCL; 
4 
Competitiveness • Group 1 not compensated for electricity price increases; 3 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of electricity likely to be opposed by Group 1;  
• Group 1 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices 
2 
Total  14 
Table 5.7 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 2 (CCL & EU ETS) 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for both fuel and electricity efficiency; 
3 
Static efficiency • external costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity and fuel; 
• distorts operation of EU ETS - minimum cost abatement no longer achieved; 
1 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• burden for Group 2 sites is not significantly different from that with the EU 
ETS alone; 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCL; 
4 
Competitiveness • double regulation of fuel could undermine competitiveness of Group 2 sites, 
particularly if allowances auctioned; 
• possible subsidy of competitors if there is an effect on allowance prices; 
• Group 2 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
2 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of both fuel & electricity likely to be opposed by Group 2;  
• Group 2 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• retention of CCL provides potential substitute for allowance auctioning; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices; 
2 
Total  12 
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Table 5.8 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 4 (CCA & EU ETS) 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for fuel & electricity efficiency; 
• retains target incentive for fuel & electricity efficiency in the case of low 
allowance prices (backup option); 
3 
Static efficiency • external costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity and fuel; 
• distorts operation of EU ETS - minimum cost abatement no longer achieved; 
1 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• major administrative burden for Group 4 sites- two sets of targets, two sets of 
monitoring/reporting requirements, and simultaneous participation in two 
trading schemes; 
• administration of trading schemes complicated by double coverage/crediting; 
• simultaneous participation of Group 4 sites in two trading schemes prevents 
fungibility of EU ETS and UK ETS allowances; 
• double counting in climate program 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCAs; 
1 
Competitiveness • double regulation of fuel & electricity could undermines competitiveness of 
Group 4 sites; 
• additional administrative costs could undermine competitiveness of Group 4 
sites 
• possible subsidy of competitors if there is an effect on allowance prices; 
• Group 4 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
1 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of both electricity & fuel likely to be opposed by Group 4;  
• Group 4 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices; 
1 
Total  7 
Table 5.9 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 3 (CCA only) 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for electricity efficiency; 
• retains positive environmental impact of downstream energy efficiency 
targets; 
• retains target incentive for electricity efficiency in the case of low allowance 
prices (backup option); 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel; 
3 
Static efficiency • External costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity and fuel; 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel; 
1 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• burden for Group 3 sites is no different from that with the CCAs alone; 
• administration of trading schemes complicated by double coverage/crediting; 
• double counting in climate program 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCAs; 
2 
Competitiveness • Double regulation of electricity could undermine competitiveness of Group 3 
sites; 
• Group 3 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
2 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of electricity likely to be opposed by Group 3;  
• Group 3 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices; 
2 
Total  10 
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5.6 Summary 
This section has explored the interaction between the operation of the EU ETS and the that of 
the CCL/CCA package - assuming that the latter remains unchanged. It has demonstrated that 
the interactions are complex and include several overlapping examples of double regulation, 
double coverage and double counting. The interactions can be grouped into four categories: 
 
• price - price: where the indirect impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices is additional to 
the direct price impact of the CCL; 
• price - target: where the indirect impact of the EU ETS on electricity prices is additional 
to the direct impact of a target under the CCAs; 
• target - price: where the direct impact of an emissions target under the EU ETS is 
additional to the direct price impact of the CCL; 
• target - target: where the direct impact of a target under the EU ETS is additional to the 
direct impact of a target under the CCAs. 
 
Table 5.10 summarises the interactions within these four categories. 
Table 5.10 Categorising the operational interactions between the EU ETS and the CCL/CCA 
package 
Type of 
interaction 
EU ETS CCL/CCA 
package 
Category 
price - price indirect price direct price Group 1 electricity 
   Group 2 electricity 
price - target indirect price direct target Group 3 electricity 
   Group 4 electricity 
target - price direct target direct price Group 2 fuel 
target - target direct target direct target Group 4 fuel 
no interaction - - Group 1 fuel 
 - - Group 3 fuel 
 
The scale and consequences of each interaction depends upon a range of factors, the most 
important of which is the allowance price in the EU ETS. This in turn is a function of a 
number of variables including the stringency of the aggregate targets under the EU ETS and 
the extent to which the EU ETS is interfaced to other trading schemes and the international 
carbon market post 2008. If the allowance price is very high, the interaction between the EU 
ETS and CCL/CCA package could lead to substantial economic impacts for affected groups 
and therefore create pressure to modify the CCL/CCA package. Conversely, if the allowance 
price is very low, the economic consequences of the interaction could be relatively small. In 
these circumstances there may be some appeal in retaining the CCL/CCA package 
unchanged, in order to maintain downstream incentives to improve energy efficiency. This 
would also ensure continued funding of policy initiatives such as the ECAs (the ‘backup’ 
scenario).  
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Also relevant is the method of allowance allocation under the EU ETS. Theory suggests that 
the scale of price-price and price-target interactions in Table 5.10 should be independent of 
the method of allowance allocation, but in practice this may not be the case (section 2.1.3). 
Similarly, the impact of the target-price interactions in Table 5.10 is much greater for 
allowance auctioning than for free allocation. 
 
As a consequence of the above uncertainties, it is difficult to make a judgement on the overall 
desirability of retaining the CCL/CCA package. But one factor which can be assessed with 
relative confidence is the impact on administrative costs, both for target groups and for the 
government. Generally, this is undesirable. In particular, the coexistence of the EU ETS and 
CCL/CCA package creates substantial administrative complexity for the energy intensive 
companies in Group 4 who would have two separate regulatory targets and would be 
simultaneously participating in two separate trading schemes. This seems a clear case of 
redundancy in regulation. 
 
The policy choice here is not simply whether to continue with or remove the CCL/CCA 
package. Instead, the package can be modified in a variety of ways to ameliorate the negative 
impacts of interaction with the EU ETS. Similarly, the design of the EU ETS may be changed 
in a variety of ways to facilitate more positive interaction - although in this case the decisions 
will need to be taken at EU level. Section 7 explores these options in more detail. 
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6. Confusion over instrument timing  
The implications of the EU ETS for UK climate policy depend finely upon timing. This 
section examines the timing issues for each instrument and explores the possibility of the UK 
opting out of Phase 1 of the scheme. 
6.1 EU ETS 
Phase 1 of the EU ETS runs from 2005 to 2008, while Phase 2 corresponds to the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol - 2008 to 2012. In Phase 1, participation will be 
mandatory, allowances will be freely allocated and the compliance penalty will be set at 
EUR50/tonne, or twice the market price, whichever is higher. In Phase 2, some allowances 
may be auctioned and the compliance penalty will be increased to EUR100/tonne (or twice 
the market price).  
 
As discussed in section 1.2, the timetable for approval of the Directive and launching of the 
scheme is optimistic. Problems at both the EU and Member State level could delay the start 
of Phase 1. This would undermine the learning benefits of the scheme and also threaten EU 
compliance with the Kyoto targets, unless equivalent policies and measures were in place for 
the EU ETS target groups. If the start of Phase 1 is delayed by one year, it would have a total 
duration of only two years – which is feasible, but unwanted. If the start of Phase 1 is delayed 
by two years, there seems little point in having a pre-2008 scheme at all. In this instance, one 
option would be to abandon Phase 1 altogether and to begin the EU ETS in 2008, while a 
second would be to combine the first two phases into one six-year phase stretching from 2007 
to 2012. But there may be difficulties in having a compliance period that straddled the 
beginning of the first commitment period. 
6.2 Kyoto 
The year 2008 is a watershed because it coincides with the beginning of the first commitment 
period. This is particularly important for the EU ETS. After 2008 (i.e. EU ETS Phase 2), 
cross-border trades in EU ETS allowances will need to be coupled to transfers of AAUs 
between the relevant Member States. If this were not the case, a net-buying Member State 
would run the risk of non-compliance with its Kyoto obligations, despite all EU ETS 
participants being in compliance with their individual targets.65  
 
One way of implementing this requirement would be to devolve AAUs to the participant 
level. But this may not be the best way, owing to the complications that result from national 
eligibility criteria under the Kyoto Protocol such as the Commitment Period Reserve. Instead, 
a preferable option would be to keep EU ETS allowances and AAUs separate and to arrange 
a net transfer of AAUs between Member States at the end of the commitment period. The 
volume transferred would correspond to the net transfer of EU ETS allowances between 
participating Member States over the preceding four years.  
 
                                                 
65 The threat is to individual Member State compliance, not to the EU overall. 
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Prior to 2008 (i.e. Phase 1), Member States do not have any AAUs available to transfer. 
There is a risk that a Member State that hosts net buyers of EU ETS allowances will make 
insufficient modifications to its national emission path during Phase 1, leaving it poorly 
placed for subsequent compliance with the Kyoto targets.  
 
This risk is made worse by the banking provisions under the EU ETS. These mean that 
emission reductions achieved prior to 2008 can be banked into the commitment period. 
Banked allowances will allow higher emissions during the commitment period, but these 
emissions will not be backed by AAUs. Again, the compliance of a Member State which is a 
net buyer of banked allowances could be threatened. Furthermore, the compliance of the EU 
as a whole may be threatened if there is extensive use of banked allowances (although this 
appears less likely, as the installations which sold the allowances are unlikely to increase 
their emissions). A further problem is that the Directive proposes to give discretion to 
Member States over the extent to which installations within their country can bank 
allowances into the commitment period. But restrictions on banking can be easily 
circumvented. If one Member State outlawed the banking of allowances, installations could 
simply sell their surplus to another country and bank it there. A better approach would be to 
harmonise banking rules across the EU ETS. 
 
The above suggests that Phase 1 trading may create risks for Member States compliance with 
their Kyoto targets. The options available to reduce this risk include: 
 
• Making a net transfer of AAUs in 2008, corresponding to the net transfer of EU ETS 
allowances that occurred during Phase 1. 
• Making it clear to EU ETS participants that any free allocation of allowances in 2008 will 
be based upon stringent baseline standards, rather than current or historic emissions, 
thereby giving an incentive to make early emission reductions. If partial allowance 
auctioning is anticipated for Phase 2, this will also give an incentive for early emission 
reductions, in order to reduce the cost of allowance purchases. 
• Securing a certain level of emission reductions from EU ETS participants prior to 2008, 
separate from their EU ETS objectives. One way this could be achieved is through the 
retention of existing policies such as the CCL/CCAs as a ‘backup’, alongside the EU ETS. 
The national climate plan could then incorporate the projected emission reductions from 
these ‘backup’ regulations, rather than the allocations under the EU ETS.  
 
Since EU ETS participants typically account for some 40-50% of Member State emissions, 
the timing issues for the EU ETS are of considerable importance for national climate policy.  
6.3 CCL and CCAs 
There is no definite timetable for the CCL and it is within the power of the UK Treasury to 
modify it at any time. However, the CCL plays a central role in the UKCP and is anticipated 
to continue at or above its current level until 2012. Also, any change in the CCL will have 
consequences for the CCAs and vice versa.  
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The CCAs are legal agreements between the government66 and either individual firms or 
sector associations. In the majority of cases, these agreements continue in force until the 31st 
March 2013. Hence, the CCAs extend beyond the end of the Kyoto commitment period. 
However, for the majority of agreements, energy/emission targets have only been specified 
up to the 30th September 2010, which is halfway through the commitment period. 
 
The government reserves the right to terminate individual agreements before 2013. Also, 
individual agreements may change over their lifetime as a consequence of facilities entering 
and exiting the agreements, the agreement reviews at the end of 2004 and 2008, the results of 
CHP appraisals, changes in output level and product mix, and negotiated changes in the 
currency of underlying agreements. This means that the number of facilities and the volume 
of emissions covered by the agreements is subject to change, as is their ultimate contribution 
to UK carbon targets.  
6.4 The UK opt-out 
The draft Directive anticipates the EU ETS beginning in 2005, with mandatory participation. 
If the Directive goes ahead as the Commission plans, the UK government will be faced with a 
choice in 2004 between either accepting the coexistence of the EU ETS with the CCL/CCA 
package, with all the attendant problems of double regulation and double counting, or 
modifying the CCL/CCA package (and possibly other policy instruments) only a couple of 
years after it was introduced. Neither option appears attractive, both may be unpopular and 
both run the risk of stranded investment. The extent of disruption will depend on the nature of 
the changes that are proposed, but at the time of writing the UK government does not appear 
to have given a great deal of thought to the specific options available.67 
 
Given the above, a simple and attractive option for the UK is to negotiate a national opt-out 
of the Directive in Phase 1, thereby postponing the point at which changes need to be made. 
Proposals for this were included in earlier drafts of the Directive, but were dropped from the 
published proposals. The opt-out option appears to have widespread support within UK 
industry68 and has become the central negotiating position of the UK government. Germany 
also wants to opt-out of the scheme up to 2008, in order to protect its negotiated agreements. 
If one or two other Member States adopt the same position, there will be a blocking majority 
under Council voting rules. This suggests that the a UK opt-out to 2008 is plausible scenario. 
However, the UK government appears to be in a minority of one in desiring an opt-out 
beyond that date. 
 
Opt-out provisions raise equivalence of effort issues (section 2.4.2). A UK opt-out would 
mean that energy intensive industry in the UK would be subject to relative rather than 
absolute targets which are based upon cost effectiveness criteria that are arguably weaker 
than the allocation requirements under the EU ETS (section 4.5). Similarly, the UK electricity 
industry will have no aggregate carbon targets, being subject merely to the indirect impact of 
other policy measures such as the Renewables Obligation. Both may be argued to give 
competitive advantage to UK companies. 
 
                                                 
66 Specifically the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions. 
67 This judgement is based upon interviews with government officials during the spring and summer of 2002. 
68 This judgement is based upon interviews with industry representatives during the spring and summer of 2002, 
together with the discussion in two workshops. 
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If an opt-out to 2008 is achieved, the transition to the EU ETS becomes considerably easier. 
First, industry will have had longer to prepare for the transition and the CCAs will be more 
than halfway through their intended life. Second, the energy and social policy issues 
described in section 4.6, such as fuel poverty, should be less of an obstacle. Third, there may 
be advantages in joining the EU ETS in that it may provide access to lower cost abatement 
through the EU or international market. In contrast, if the CCAs and the wider UK ETS 
remained disconnected from the EU ETS, access to the international market may be more 
problematic. In this context, it is worth noting that government has indicated its intention to 
close the Gateway in the UK ETS at the start of the Kyoto commitment period (DEFRA, 
2001b).  
6.5 Summary 
The differences in timing between the EU ETS, the CCL/ CCAs and the Kyoto commitment 
period create some complications. The EU ETS is in phase with the Kyoto commitment 
period but is due to begin well before the CCAs end. In contrast, the CCAs extend beyond the 
end of the Kyoto commitment period, but targets are only negotiated up to 2010. The timing 
of the CCAs is established but the timing of the EU ETS is still uncertain. In addition, the 
possibility of trading prior to the Kyoto commitment period and banking allowances into the 
commitment period may create difficulties for Member State compliance. 
 
The situation is greatly simplified if the UK can negotiate a national opt-out of the EU ETS 
up to 2008, thereby postponing the point at which changes need to be made. However, 
opting-out beyond 2008 is likely to be counterproductive if it restricts access to the 
international carbon market. 
 
While a transition to the EU ETS would be easier 2008, it still raises difficult questions. But 
these are identical to the those would be raised by a transition in 2005 - it is merely the 
political context that would have changed. Given this, section 7 describes a number of 
options for modifying the CCL/CCA package and the EU ETS, without reference to whether 
these changes take place in 2005 or 2008. The discussion also explores a couple of options 
for modifying the EU ETS, notably the inclusion of opt-in/opt-out provisions at the 
installation level. 
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7. Reducing the confusion: policy options 
The coexistence of the CCL/CCA package with the EU ETS creates problems of double 
regulation, double coverage and double crediting. These problems may be ameliorated to 
varying degrees by modifying the CCL/CCA package, the EU ETS or both. Any changes to 
the CCL/CCA package are the responsibility of the UK government and may be introduced at 
any time - although changes are subject to clearance by the European Commission under 
State Aid rules. In contrast, any modifications to the EU ETS will require agreement at the 
EU level and must be negotiated in the near future if they are to gain inclusion in the final 
text of the Directive. 
There are a wide range of possible modifications available, and each may ameliorate some of 
the problems indicated in section 5. But all involve trade-offs. For example, removing the 
CCL on electricity will eliminate the possibility of double regulation of electricity, but at the 
same time reduce the incentive for downstream electricity efficiency. The evaluation and 
choice of options will therefore depend upon the relative weight given to different policy 
objectives, and this in turn will differ between various stakeholder groups. Similarly, the 
desirability of a particular option may be very dependent on contextual factors such as the 
allowance price in the EU ETS. Since most of these factors are uncertain or unknown, there is 
an irreducible element of uncertainty in any appraisal of policy options.  
 
This section will introduce and evaluate a number of options for modifying the CCL/CCA 
package, the EU ETS or both. The selection of options is not intended to be exhaustive and it 
is not the intention to identify a single ‘preferred’ option. Instead, the aim is to illustrate the 
type of difficulties that arise and the nature of the trade-offs that can be made. The selection 
of options is based upon combinations of the following variables: 
 
• CCL: either: a) leave unchanged; b) remove the CCL on electricity; or c) shift to a carbon 
tax.  
• CCA: either: a) leave unchanged; or b) shift to fuel only; 
• EU ETS: either: a) leave unchanged; b) include opt-in provisions at the installation level; 
or c) include opt-out provisions at the installation level; and 
• trading interface between CCAs & EU ETS: either: a) interface via a Gateway; or b) 
prevent trading.  
 
Two or more options are developed for each of the Groups identified in section 5. In each 
case, the rationale for the option is identified, together with its main advantages and 
disadvantages. The option is then appraised using the MCA framework developed in section 
5.5. The aim of the appraisal is to compare the option with the coexistence scenario discussed 
in section 5, and not with a scenario of no EU ETS. While the latter may be preferred by 
some groups, it is not explored here. The aim of the appraisal is to identify whether the 
proposed modification appears likely to make the evaluation under any objective better or 
worse compared to that given in section 5.5, and to identify why this is the case. 
 
The options are developed without reference to whether they are introduced in 2005, 2008 or 
some other date. This is because the issues are essentially the same - it is simply that the 
longer any changes can be postponed, the more feasible they become  
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Each option is discussed primarily in terms of its impact on the individual Group for which it 
is proposed. This is artificial, as any change in the CCL will have corresponding implications 
for the CCAs, and vice versa. But the aim is to separate out the issues as clearly as possible, 
before bringing the analysis together and developing some recommendations on the way 
forward for UK and EU climate policy. 
7.1 Group 1: CCL only 
Group 1 sites are subject to the CCL but are not participating in the EU ETS. They are 
indirectly affected by the EU ETS through increases in electricity prices. Coexistence of the 
EU ETS and CCL effectively leads to double regulation of electricity.  
 
The multicriteria evaluation of the coexistence scenario for Group 1 is reproduced in Table 
7.1. 
Table 7.1 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 1 (CCL only) 
Criteria Relevant issues for Group 1  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for electricity efficiency; 
• retains positive environmental impact of policy measures funded by CCL 
revenues (e.g. ECAs); 
• retains price incentive for electricity efficiency in the case of low allowance 
prices (backup option); 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel with consequent negative 
environmental impacts; 
3 
Static efficiency • external costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel  
2 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• no greater burden for Group 1 sites; 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCL; 
4 
Competitiveness • Group 1 not compensated for electricity price increases; 3 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of electricity likely to be opposed by Group 1;  
• Group 1 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices 
2 
Total  14 
7.1.1 Option 1a: modify the CCL rate for electricity  
Rationale 
Double regulation of electricity could be unpopular, particularly if the EU ETS allowance 
price was high. Conversely, removal of the CCL for electricity would run the risk of reducing 
the downstream incentive for electricity efficiency if allowance prices were low.  
 
Given this, option 1a tries to steer a middle course. By reducing the size of the CCL on 
electricity (CCLe), it attempts to mitigate the impact of double regulation. At the same time, 
by retaining some level of CCLe, it attempts to retain the downstream incentive for electricity 
efficiency. There are various ways to implement this. One would be reduce the current level 
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of the CCLe by a fixed percentage, while another would be to make the annual CCL 
electricity rate variable, and a function of the previous year’s EU ETS allowance price.69  
 
Either approach would give a minimum level for the regulatory price signal on electricity. 
There is no corresponding maximum level, although such approaches have been discussed in 
the literature (Mckibben & Wilcoxen, 2002). Both minimum and maximum price levels 
represent approaches to mitigating the uncertainty over allowance prices in an emissions 
trading scheme. The objective of option 1a is to provide a price floor to retain incentives for 
energy efficiency, while the objective an allowance price ceiling is to prevent excessive 
economic impacts and improve the political acceptability of a trading scheme by reducing 
risk. The second is more commonly discussed in the literature, but the first may be relevant to 
UK policy objectives. 
Advantages and disadvantages 
The advantage of this option is the retention of a downstream price signal for electricity 
efficiency, which would be of particular benefit in the context of low allowance prices. In 
addition, some or all of the revenue benefits of the CCL would be retained, thereby reducing 
the need to change either other forms of government taxation or government spending.  
 
The disadvantage of a fixed percentage cut in CCLe is that the choice of level would be 
arbitrary. Similarly, the disadvantage of a variable CCLe is that it creates uncertainty, leads to 
fluctuations in government income and could be complicated to implement. The option fails 
to remove the double regulation, or to correct the distortions that exist between fuel and 
electricity pricing. 
 
Table 7.2 provides a multicriteria assessment of this option, in terms of the difference 
between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.2 Multi criteria assessment of option 1a: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues for Group 1  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Slightly worse: since price signal for electricity efficiency would be reduced 2 
Static efficiency • Unchanged 2 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Worse: if CCL rate is variable 3 
Competitiveness • Better: impact reduced since electricity price reduced 4 
Political 
acceptability 
• Slightly better: goes some way to mitigate competitiveness concerns while 
retaining incentives for electricity efficiency 
3 
Total  14 
7.1.2 Option 1b: remove the CCL on electricity  
Rationale 
This option eliminates the double regulation of electricity and places primary reliance on the 
EU ETS to meet emission targets for electricity generation. The EU ETS provides a price 
signal for electricity efficiency and may also incentivise electricity generators to engage in 
demand-side management if this offers lower cost abatement than supply side measures. 
                                                 
69 For example: IF [PPEU(i-1) <= X] THEN [CCLe (i)= X - PPEU(i-1)] ELSE [CCLe (i)= 0]. Any such 
arrangement would require separate rules for the first year of the scheme. 
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While this option may be combined with other demand-side policies, such as information 
programmes, there is no additional regulatory intervention on electricity prices. 
Advantages and disadvantages 
This option is administratively simpler than Option 1a, and reflects a greater reliance on the 
efficiency benefits of emissions trading. The EU ETS is assumed to internalise the external 
cost of CO2 emissions with an appropriate portion of this cost being passed on to electricity 
consumers. While other policies may be retained to overcome various non-price barriers to 
energy efficiency, there is no need to reinforce the price signal. The adverse impact of double 
regulation on industrial competitiveness would be removed, with a corresponding 
improvement in political acceptability. 
 
The primary disadvantage is that, if allowance prices were low, the downstream price signal 
for electricity efficiency would be reduced, with a consequent reduction in investment. 
Abatement would be achieved through other means, such as purchase of allowances from 
other Member States and increased investment in fuel switching in electricity generation. In 
turn, this may conflict with other objectives in UK energy policy, such as the 20% target for 
CO2 emissions and the desire to avoid excessive reliance on imported gas. A second 
disadvantage is that, in the absence of allowance auctioning, the revenue raised by CCLe 
would be lost. This may lead to increases in other forms of government taxation or reductions 
in spending. It is possible that other aspects of the climate programme, such as the ECAs 
would be put at risk, with a corresponding implications for the UKCP. The overall fiscal 
implications could be made neutral by increasing the remaining CCL to make up the lost 
revenue. But this could undermine the acceptability of the proposal and attract opposition 
from fuel intensive users. Finally, since the implicit carbon price provided by the remaining 
CCL will be different from the EU ETS allowance price, the price distortions between fuel 
and electricity for Group 1 sites will be reduced but not eliminated. However, this is an 
inherent feature of a separate tax regime. 
 
Table 7.3 provides a multicriteria assessment of this option, in terms of the difference 
between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.3 Multi criteria assessment of option 1b: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues for Group 1  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: price signal for electricity efficiency would be reduced. May be less 
domestic abatement. Loss of revenue may threaten climate policy measures 
funded by the CCL. 
2 
Static efficiency • Better: electricity price reflects external costs of CO2 without other 
distortions 
3 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Unchanged: administration straightforward once CCLe removed 4 
Competitiveness • Better: impact reduced since electricity price reduced 4 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Builds industrial support by mitigating competitiveness concerns. But 
loss of revenue (or need to recoup revenue from other sources) may impact 
on other stakeholder groups. Loss of environmental effectiveness may be 
opposed.  
3 
Total  16 
7.1.3 Option 1c: remove the CCL on electricity and make it a carbon tax 
Rationale 
The rationale for removing the CCL on electricity is given above. This option goes one step 
further and changes the remaining (fuel only) CCL to a carbon tax.  
 
This option recognises that the design of the CCL was constrained by a number of objectives 
including the desire to protect UK coal producers (section 4.2). These objectives were 
achieved through the design of the CCL itself, rather than explicitly through subsidiary 
policies and measures. In particular, the government chose a downstream energy tax rather 
than an upstream carbon tax. The choice of a downstream tax is of most importance to the 
coal industry as electricity generation provides its largest market (~25Mtoe in 2000). The 
industrial coal market is much smaller (~2Mtoe/year), concentrated in a number of energy 
intensive sectors and declining. Since protection of the UK coal industry appears to be 
diminishing in political importance, there should be an opportunity here to rationalise the 
taxation of business fuel on the basis of carbon content. 
Advantages and disadvantages 
Taxing business fuel on the basis of carbon content would ensure that the tax level was 
directly related to the fuel’s contribution to climate change. This is in contrast to the present 
situation where the most damaging fuel - coal - is the least heavily taxed. A uniform carbon 
tax would also ensure that all business fuels were taxed on the same basis. At present, HFO 
and gasoil are exempt from the CCL but liable for excise duties, which are in turn a legacy of 
policies imposed in the 1970s to reduce dependence upon imported oil. Since the UK has 
been a net oil exporter for nearly two decades, these duties no longer have an economic 
rationale. It would be better to remove them altogether and bring all fuels within the same tax 
regime. This would also make business fuel taxation administratively simpler and reduce the 
distortions both between fuels and between fuel and electricity use (although the price of 
carbon would still differ between the CCL and EU ETS regimes). The fiscal impact of a shift 
to a carbon tax could be identical to option 1b, since the level of the tax could be chosen to 
deliver comparable revenue to the fuel component of the current CCL. Finally, the reform of 
business energy taxation may be linked to the ongoing process to harmonise EU energy taxes 
(Newbery, 2001). 
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The primary disadvantages of this option are the negative impact on the industrial coal 
market and the additional boost it gives to natural gas - with corresponding implications for 
fuel diversity and energy security. But not only is the industrial coal market a small fraction 
of the electricity generation market, it is also concentrated in a small number of energy 
intensive sectors, such as iron & steel. These are subject to CCAs and hence not eligible for 
the full rate of the CCL. As a result, the level of opposition from coal producers and users 
should be less than was encountered in 1998/99 when an upstream carbon tax option was 
under consideration (Marshall, 1998). Similarly, natural gas is so obviously the fuel of choice 
throughout the industrial, public and commercial sectors that shifting to a carbon tax should 
have little impact on future patterns of fuel switching. The consequences for oil markets will 
depend upon the proposed level of the carbon tax relative to excise duties. As indicated in 
section 4.2, current levels of excise duty correspond to a carbon tax rate which is slightly 
greater than that for gas and more than twice that of coal.70 Hence, HFO and gasoil should 
become relatively cheaper. 
 
Table 7.4 provides a multicriteria assessment of this option, in terms of the difference 
between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.1). This assessment combines both 
the removal of the CCL on electricity (option 1b) with the additional shift to a carbon tax. 
Table 7.4 Multi criteria assessment of option 1c: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: price signal for electricity efficiency would be reduced, with 
possibility of reduced domestic abatement. Loss of revenue may threaten 
climate policy measures funded by the CCL. The environmental 
effectiveness of fuel taxation should be improved, although in practice the 
effect may be relatively small. 
2 
Static efficiency • Better: both electricity and fuel prices reflect external costs of CO2 without 
other distortions 
4 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Better: once the change has been made, administration should be simpler 
than the current combination of CCL and excise duties 
5 
Competitiveness • Better: overall impact on industrial competitiveness reduced since electricity 
price reduced. Impact of changes in fuel taxation will depend upon fuel mix 
in individual sectors. 
4 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Builds industrial support by mitigating competitiveness concerns over 
electricity prices. Impact of changes in fuel taxation will depend upon overall 
level, and could be broadly neutral. But loss of revenue (or need to recoup 
revenue from other sources) may impact on other stakeholder groups. Interest 
groups may oppose the loss of environmental effectiveness and the threat to 
industrial coal markets.  
3 
Total  18 
                                                 
70 The numbers are £8.15/tCO2 for natural gas, £4.55/tCO2 for coal, £8.9/tCO2 for HFO and £11.6/tCO2 for 
gasoil. 
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7.2 Group 2: CCL and EU ETS 
Group 2 sites are subject to the CCL and are participating in the EU ETS - most likely as a 
consequence of having combustion plant of >20MW thermal input. As a result, they are 
subject to double regulation of both fuel and electricity. The implications for electricity costs 
are identical to those for Group 1, while the implications for fuel costs depend upon the 
method of allowance allocation. 
 
The multicriteria evaluation of the coexistence scenario for Group 2 is reproduced in Table 
7.5. 
Table 7.5 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 2 (CCL & EU ETS) 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for both fuel and electricity efficiency; 
3 
Static efficiency • external costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity and fuel; 
• distorts operation of EU ETS - minimum cost abatement no longer achieved; 
1 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• burden for Group 2 sites is not significantly different from that with the EU 
ETS alone; 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCL; 
4 
Competitiveness • double regulation of fuel could undermine competitiveness of Group 2 sites, 
particularly if allowances auctioned; 
• possible subsidy of competitors if there is an effect on allowance prices; 
• Group 2 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
2 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of both fuel & electricity likely to be opposed by Group 2;  
• Group 2 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• retention of CCL provides potential substitute for allowance auctioning; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices; 
2 
Total  12 
7.2.1 Option 2a: remove the CCL on electricity  
Rationale 
This option is identical to option 1b. The rationale is to prevent double regulation of 
electricity, a problem which is common to both Group 1 and Group 2. Instead, primary 
reliance is placed on the EU ETS to meet emission targets for electricity generation.  
Advantages and disadvantages 
The advantages and disadvantages for this option are very similar to those for option 1b.  
 
The primary difference is that for Group 1 this option leads to only single regulation for 
electricity and fuel (CCL for fuel and EU ETS for electricity), while for Group 2 this option 
still leaves double regulation of fuel -which is subject to both the CCL and the EU ETS. 
Double regulation of fuel distorts the operation of the EU ETS and the choice between fuel 
and electricity, as well as disadvantaging Group 2 sites relative to competitors which are not 
regulated under the EU ETS. In other words, this option only solves half the problem. 
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Table 7.6 provides a multi-criteria assessment of this option for Group 2, in terms of the 
difference between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.5). 
Table 7.6 Multi criteria assessment of option 2a: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: price signal for electricity efficiency would be reduced. May be less 
domestic abatement. Loss of revenue may threaten climate policy measures 
funded by the CCL. 
2 
Static efficiency • Better: electricity price reflects external costs of CO2 without other 
distortions 
2 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Unchanged: administration straightforward once CCLe removed 4 
Competitiveness • Better: impact reduced since electricity price reduced. But still disadvantaged 
by double regulation of fuel. 
3 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Builds industrial support by mitigating competitiveness concerns. But 
loss of revenue (or need to recoup revenue from other sources) may impact 
on other stakeholder groups. Loss of environmental effectiveness may be 
opposed by some groups. 
3 
Total  14 
 
A further option here is to change the remaining CCL to a carbon tax. The rationale, 
advantages and disadvantages of this option are similar to option 1c. 
7.2.2 Option 2b: remove the CCL on electricity and exempt Group 2 from 
the CCL 
Rationale 
This option eliminates double regulation for both fuel and electricity. As in option 2a, all 
electricity consumption is made exempt from the CCL. In addition, any fuel consumption 
covered by the EU ETS is made exempt from the CCL. For most Group 2 sites this would 
mean that fuel used in the combustion plant was exempt, while fuel used in the process plant 
was not.  
Advantages and disadvantages 
The advantages and disadvantages for electricity use are identical to those discussed for 
option 2a. To this is added the impact on combustion plant fuel.  
 
The primary advantage of fuel exemption lies in the improvement in static efficiency. Not 
only is double regulation avoided, but the relative price of different fuels, and that of fuel and 
electricity, now reflects their relative carbon contents. Fuel costs for Group 2 sites may then 
be greater or less than their non-Group 2 competitors depending upon the fuel mix, the 
relative cost of carbon in the CCL and EU ETS regimes, and the method of allowance 
allocation. With free allocation, the overall cost burden for Group 2 sites should be less than 
if they paid the full rate of the CCL. 
 
The primary disadvantage is that, if allowance prices are low, the incentive for fuel efficiency 
at Group 2 sites will be reduced with a consequent reduction in energy efficiency investment. 
A second disadvantage is that, in the absence of allowance auctioning, the revenue raised by 
the CCL on fuel at Group 2 sites would be lost. In practice, neither of these problems is likely 
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to be significant since the total volume of fuel use accounted for by Group 2 sites is likely to 
be very small.  
 
Table 7.7 provides a multi-criteria assessment of this option for Group 2, in terms of the 
difference between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.5) 
Table 7.7 Multi criteria assessment of option 2b: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: incentives for both fuel and electricity efficiency reduced. May be 
less domestic abatement as a result. Loss of revenue from CCL may threaten 
climate policy measures funded by the CCL. 
2 
Static efficiency • Better: both electricity and fuel prices reflects external costs of CO2 without 
other distortions 
3 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Slightly worse: should be fairly straightforward. But some complications with 
CCL on process plant fuel use, but not on combustion plant fuel. 
3 
Competitiveness • Better: impact reduced since both electricity and fuel costs reduced. 3 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Builds industrial support by mitigating competitiveness concerns. But 
loss of revenue (or need to recoup revenue from other sources) may impact 
on other stakeholder groups. Loss of environmental effectiveness may be 
opposed by some groups. 
4 
Total  15 
7.3 Group 3: CCA only 
Group 3 sites are subject to a CCA but are not participating in the EU ETS. They are 
indirectly affected by the EU ETS through increases in electricity prices. Coexistence of the 
EU ETS and CCL leads to double regulation of electricity in that a price increase coexists 
with a CCA target. In addition, if the CCAs retain the baseline & credit trading arrangements, 
there are likely to be additional problems of double coverage and double crediting of 
electricity-related emissions.  
 
The multicriteria evaluation for the coexistence scenario for Group 3 is reproduced in Table 
7.8. 
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Table 7.8 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 3 (CCA only) 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for electricity efficiency; 
• retains positive environmental impact of downstream energy efficiency 
targets; 
• retains target incentive for electricity efficiency in the case of low allowance 
prices (backup option); 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel; 
3 
Static efficiency • External costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity and fuel; 
• distorts choice between electricity and fuel; 
1 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• burden for Group 3 sites is no different from that with the CCAs alone; 
• administration of trading schemes complicated by double coverage/crediting; 
• double counting in climate program 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCAs; 
2 
Competitiveness • Double regulation of electricity could undermine competitiveness of Group 3 
sites; 
• Group 3 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
2 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of electricity likely to be opposed by Group 3;  
• Group 3 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices; 
2 
Total  10 
 
A wide range of options for Group 3 sites could be developed. For brevity, only three will be 
considered here (Table 7.9). 
Table 7.9 Options examined for Group 3 
Option CCL CCA target Trading interface EU ETS 
3a Fuel only Unchanged Gateway Unchanged 
3b Fuel only Fuel only Gateway Unchanged 
3c Fuel only Fuel only No trading Opt-in 
7.3.1 Option 3a: remove the CCL on electricity  
Rationale 
This is identical to option 1b. The primary rationale is to prevent double regulation of 
electricity for Group 1 and Group 2 sites. Electricity prices internalise carbon abatement costs 
without additional distortions from the CCL. 
  
The rationale for Group 3 sites is less obvious. Since CCA targets are retained, there is still 
double regulation of electricity. But since this option is relevant to other groups, it is 
discussed here to illustrate its consequences for Group 3. 
Advantages and disadvantages 
For Group 3 sites, the advantages of this option are marginal and derive from the removal of 
the residual 20% of the CCL on electricity. This should have a small positive impact on 
competitiveness compared to the coexistence scenario.  
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The primary disadvantage of this option for Group 3 is that the rationale for the electricity 
component of the CCA targets is undermined.71 The CCAs were adopted by Group 3 sites to 
avoid paying the full rate of the CCL, and the penalty for non-compliance with the CCA 
targets is a return to paying the CCL. But here, the CCL on electricity is removed and 
replaced with price increases of uncertain size from the EU ETS, which are paid regardless of 
whether the CCA target is met. Removal of the electricity component of the CCL also 
removes a large component of the non-compliance penalty. Non-complying facilities would 
still be required to pay the full CCL on fuel consumption, but in most cases this represents 
less than half of their current CCL costs (Table 5.3). The incentive for complying with the 
targets is therefore reduced and it is possible that the incidence of non-compliance could 
increase. In practice this is unlikely, since low cost abatement would still be available through 
the purchase of UK ETS allowances.72  
 
This option would also not remove the double coverage and double crediting problems 
associated with electricity emissions. 
 
Table 7.10 provides a multi-criteria assessment of this option for Group 3, in terms of the 
difference between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.8) 
Table 7.10 Multi criteria assessment of option 3a: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: price signal for electricity efficiency marginally reduced. Loss of 
revenue may threaten climate policy measures funded by the CCL. Slight risk 
of greater non-compliance with CCA targets.  
2 
Static efficiency • Better: electricity price reflects external costs of CO2 without other 
distortions 
2 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Neural: 2 
Competitiveness • Slightly better: due to removal of residual 20% of CCL 2 
Political 
acceptability 
• Worse: Rationale for Group 3 electricity targets undermined.  1 
Total  9 
7.3.2 Option 3b: remove the CCL on electricity and change the CCA target 
to fuel only  
Rationale 
This is a logical extension of option 3a. The rationale is to remove the double regulation of 
electricity for Group 3 sites and place primary reliance on the EU ETS to meet emission 
targets for electricity generation. The CCAs operate as before, but are confined to direct 
emissions from fossil fuel.  
Advantages and disadvantages 
The primary advantage is that there is no longer double regulation of electricity at Group 3 
sites. A second advantage is that the conflict over the ownership of Group 3 electricity 
emissions is removed, thereby avoiding double coverage and double crediting problems. 
                                                 
71 Since the CCL targets are denominated in relative or absolute energy or emissions, the electricity component 
of the target is not identified separately. 
72 UK ETS allowances would only be required to cover the excess emissions over the CCA target, whereas the 
CCL penalty would apply to all fuel consumption over the following two years. 
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The primary disadvantage is the loss of the downstream incentives for electricity efficiency 
provided by the CCA targets. As discussed in section 4.3, these targets make an important 
contribution to the overall UKCP and were estimated by ETSU to deliver significantly 
greater emission reductions than would have been achieved through the CCL alone. If 
correct, this suggests that the price impact from the EU ETS would need to be much greater 
than that from the full CCL if the same level of downstream electricity efficiency were to be 
achieved. As with the options for Groups 1 & 2, the net result may be reduced investment in 
electricity efficiency.  
 
A second disadvantage is that is the CCAs may need to be renegotiated. The agreements do 
not have separate targets for fuel and electricity, but subsume both within an overall target for 
energy use or carbon emissions. Removal of electricity will necessarily require a new set of 
agreements and is likely to trigger to a new round of negotiations. For example, if a sector 
perceives fewer opportunities for fuel efficiency than for electricity efficiency, it is unlikely 
to accept a level of stringency for a fuel-only target which is comparable to that in the 
existing agreements. Experience suggests that any renegotiation could be both time-
consuming and costly.  
 
Table 7.11 provides a multi-criteria assessment of this option for Group 3, in terms of the 
difference between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.8). 
Table 7.11 Multi criteria assessment of option 3b: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: CCA electricity targets would be lost, and improvement in electricity 
efficiency likely to be less. Possibility that renegotiated targets for fuel 
emissions will be weaker than before. Price signal for electricity efficiency 
marginally reduced.  
2 
Static efficiency • Better: electricity price reflects external costs of CO2 without other 
distortions 
2 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Worse: Renegotiation of agreements likely to be required 1 
Competitiveness • Better: Due to removal of double regulation  3 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Costs for Group 3 less than in coexistence scenario.  3 
Total  11 
7.3.3 Option 3c: remove the CCL on electricity, change the CCA target to 
fuel only and allow opt-in to EU ETS  
Rationale 
The previous option leaves Group 3 in a similar situation to EU ETS participants, in that they 
have a target for fuel emissions and face price rises for electricity. But there are two key 
differences: 
 
• Targets: The nature and stringency of the targets will differ between the EU ETS and CCA 
regimes, together with the basis on which the targets are derived and the process through 
which they are developed. Most Group 3 targets will be for energy rather than carbon 
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emissions and will be relative rather than absolute. EU ETS targets take the form of an 
allowance allocation.  
• Trading: Group 3 installations will have baseline and credit trading arrangements as part 
of the UK ETS, while EU ETS participants use allowance trading. The UK ETS may or 
may not interface to the EU ETS and any such interface is likely to require Gateway 
arrangements (section 5.3.2).  
 
In this context, the rationale for Option 3c is to give individual Group 3 participants a choice 
between the two schemes. They may choose either to continue with their (modified) CCAs, 
or take on absolute targets and join the EU ETS. The opt-in option considered here operates 
at the level of the individual installation, but an alternative is for entire sectors to be allowed 
to opt-in. While many issues are common to both cases, there are some important differences. 
For example, sector opt-ins would need to be negotiated by the sector association and then 
may be difficulties in gaining agreement if the sector is inhomogeneous. 
 
The choice made by an individual installation will depend upon an assessment of costs and 
benefits. This in turn will depend upon a variety of factors including: the choice between 
relative and absolute targets; the relative stringency of the CCA target and the anticipated EU 
ETS allowance allocation; the allowance prices in the two schemes; the interface 
arrangements between the two schemes; the nature of the interface between each scheme and 
the international carbon market; and the relative costs of monitoring and verification. With 
regard to the latter, it is worth noting that verification costs for the CCAs are relatively high 
(partly as a result of the need to measure product output and product mix) and that the scope 
for allowance sales is limited.73 
 
The primary attraction of joining the EU ETS is likely to be either low cost abatement 
through allowance purchase, or higher prices for allowance sales. In turn, the scale of 
opportunities will be partly determined by the interface between the UK ETS and the EU 
ETS. The incentive to join the EU ETS may be increased if there were no fungibility between 
UK ETS and EU ETS allowances. In this scenario, the UK ETS would remain entirely 
isolated from the European market, the trading opportunities will be less and marginal 
abatement costs and allowance prices will differ between the two schemes.74 An alternative 
scenario is closure of the Gateway, such that CCA companies could purchase EU ETS 
allowances but were not able to sell into the EU ETS. During the development of the CCAs, 
the UK government indicated its intention to close the UKETS Gateway in 2008, reflecting a 
desire to move towards absolute targets during the commitment period. This suggests that a 
combination of the opt-in option with restrictions on UK ETS trading, such as closure of the 
Gateway, may be attractive.  
                                                 
73 Allowances can only be generated ex post by CCA participants that have exceeded their milestone target (that 
is, at two yearly intervals). Allowances can only be generated between the end of the milestone period (which 
can be any time from 1st October to 31st December) and the end of the reconciliation period, which is the 31st 
January of the following year. This gives a total period of between one and four months in which to generate 
allowances. Also, allowances can only be generated for overcompliance during the milestone period. 
Overcompliance in the year preceding the milestone period does not count and cannot be banked. 
74 Fungibility will bring the marginal abatement costs and allowance prices in two schemes closer together. If 
the UK ETS allowance price is increased, this will benefit allowance sellers but create high costs for allowance 
buyers. If the UK ETS allowance price is reduced, this will benefit allowance buyers but reduce revenues for 
allowance sellers.  
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Advantages and disadvantages 
The primary advantage of this option is that it widens the scope of the EU ETS and hence 
brings more installations under the absolute emissions cap. This in turn gives both Member 
States and the EU ETS greater assurance of meeting their Kyoto obligations. Effectively, this 
option provides an opportunity to convert Group 3 CCAs from relative to absolute targets 
well before their planned end date of 2013. Moreover, the conversion is made voluntarily by 
the installations themselves, rather than through government modification of the agreements. 
 
A second advantage of opt-in provisions is that they encourage Group 3 sources with low-
cost emission reduction opportunities to make those reductions available to EU ETS 
participants. This in turn should increase allowance supply, lower allowance prices and bring 
marginal abatement costs down. As with project credits, such a mechanism allows low cost 
abatement opportunities to be exploited such that the aggregate EU ETS emissions cap is 
achieved at less cost.  
 
A second possibility is that a Group 3 source chooses to opt-in because purchasing 
allowances in the EU ETS offers lower cost abatement than is currently available in the UK 
ETS. This is only likely to be the case if there are restrictions on the fungibility of EU ETS 
and UK ETS allowances. This mechanism will raise allowance demand in the EU ETS, 
increase allowance prices and raise marginal abatement costs. Both types of opt-in should 
bring marginal abatement costs within the cap closer to those within Group 3, although the 
former route is more likely in practice. One consequence of allowing opt-ins is that Group 3 
firms should not be at a competitive disadvantage relative to EU ETS participants, since they 
also have the option of joining the scheme.  
 
The primary disadvantage of this option is that it requires agreement at the EU level. The opt-
in process could also complicate the administration of the EU ETS, since the number of 
sources will be increased and allocation criteria may need to be defined for installations lying 
outside of the core sectors.75 Particular complications could result if installations were 
allowed to join at different times, although this could be avoided if opt-ins were only 
permitted at the beginning of Phase 1 or Phase 2. Administrative difficulties have been 
encountered with comparable provisions that allow industrial installations to opt-in to the US 
Acid Rain Program (Sorrell, 1994). 
 
Opt-in provisions also create the risk of injecting hot air into the EU ETS. There is an 
important difference between: a) a source with low marginal abatement costs opting into the 
scheme, reducing emissions below its allowance allocation and selling the surplus; and b) a 
source opting into the scheme, receiving an allowance allocation that exceeds its current 
emissions (or its required emissions under regulations such as IPPC) and selling the surplus. 
The first is legitimate and lowers marginal abatement costs inside the cap, while the second 
introduces hot air into the scheme and raises aggregate emissions.76 Technically, this is a 
problem of adverse selection and results from asymmetric information between the regulator 
and firm when defining the allowance allocation. The problem may be particularly acute if 
allowance allocations are based upon historic emissions. While in theory the allocation 
criteria in the EU ETS should eliminate this problem, the criteria may be difficult to 
implement in practice (section 4.5). Analogous problems have been encountered in both the 
US Acid Rain Program (Montero, 1998) and in the UK ETS (ENDS, 2002d) and have 
                                                 
75 Particularly important if some form of benchmarking is to be used.  
76 Since the hot air allowances will be sold and used to cover emissions elsewhere in the scheme.  
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threatened the credibility of each scheme. The hot air problem is also directly analogous to 
the problem of ‘additionality’ in project based schemes (Begg et al, 2002).  
 
In practice, the decision to opt-in will be influenced by transaction costs and the information 
available ex ante on likely allowance allocations under the EU ETS.  
 
Table 7.12 provides a multi-criteria assessment of this option for Group 3. This adds the 
consequences of the opt-in provisions to the evaluation given for option 3b in the previous 
section. 
Table 7.12 Multi criteria assessment of option 3c: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: CCA electricity targets would be lost, and improvement in electricity 
efficiency likely to be less. Possibility that renegotiated targets for fuel 
emissions will be weaker than before. Price signal for electricity efficiency 
marginally reduced. Opt-in provisions bring more installations within the 
absolute cap, but create risk of injecting hot air into the EU ETS.  
2 
Static efficiency • Better: electricity price reflects external costs of CO2 without other 
distortions. Opt-in provisions encourage convergence in marginal abatement 
costs between installations within and outside the EU ETS. 
3 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Worse: Renegotiations of agreements likely to be required. Opt-in provisions 
create administrative complications for both regulator and participating 
companies. 
0 
Competitiveness • Better: Removal of double regulation of electricity. Opt-in provisions may 
reduce competitive distortions. 
4 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Costs for Group 3 less than in coexistence scenario. Opt-in provisions 
may have industry support. 
4 
Total  13 
7.4 Group 4: CCA and EU ETS 
Group 4 sites are subject to a CCA and are also eligible for the EU ETS. There is double 
regulation of electricity, in that an indirect price increase coexists with a CCA target, and also 
double regulation of fuel, since fuel emissions are subject to targets in both the CCA and the 
EU ETS. Group 4 sites participate in both EU ETS allowance trading and UK ETS credit 
trading, with consequent problems of double coverage and crediting. The precise coverage of 
combustion plant and process emissions may differ between the two schemes.  
 
The multicriteria evaluation of the coexistence scenario for Group 4 is reproduced in Table 
7.13. 
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Table 7.13 Multi criteria assessment of the coexistence of the EU ETS with an unchanged 
CCL/CCA package: Group 4 (CCA & EU ETS) 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• overall environmental impact greater than either instrument acting alone, due 
to greater incentives for fuel & electricity efficiency; 
• retains target incentive for fuel & electricity efficiency in the case of low 
allowance prices (backup option); 
3 
Static efficiency • external costs of CO2 internalised twice for electricity and fuel; 
• distorts operation of EU ETS - minimum cost abatement no longer achieved; 
1 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• major administrative burden for Group 4 sites- two sets of targets, two sets of 
monitoring/reporting requirements, and simultaneous participation in two 
trading schemes; 
• administration of trading schemes complicated by double coverage/crediting; 
• simultaneous participation of Group 4 sites in two trading schemes prevents 
fungibility of EU ETS and UK ETS allowances; 
• double counting in climate program 
• UK government must administer both EU ETS and CCAs; 
1 
Competitiveness • double regulation of fuel & electricity could undermines competitiveness of 
Group 4 sites; 
• additional administrative costs could undermine competitiveness of Group 4 
sites 
• possible subsidy of competitors if there is an effect on allowance prices; 
• Group 4 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
1 
Political 
acceptability 
• double regulation of both electricity & fuel likely to be opposed by Group 4;  
• Group 4 not compensated for electricity price increases; 
• possible advantage as backup regulation in event of low allowance prices; 
1 
Total  7 
 
Two options are available to address the double regulation of electricity: 
 
• remove the CCL on electricity; and 
• make the CCA fuel only 
 
These correspond to options 3a and 3b, in the previous section. The implications for Group 4 
sites are identical to those for Group 3. But these options only address half the problem for 
Group 4 as they do not deal with the double regulation of fuel.  
 
The additional options explored here are: 
 
• replacing the CCAs with the EU ETS; and 
• allowing opt-outs of the EU ETS at the installation level. 
7.4.1 Option 4a: replace the CCAs with the EU ETS and exempt Group 4 
from the CCL 
Rationale 
As described in section 5.4, the double regulation problems for Group 4 exhibit a baroque 
complexity. The coexistence of the CCAs with the EU ETS appears to be a clear case of 
redundancy. 
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The rationale for this option is to remove this complexity. Primacy is given to the EU ETS in 
regulating emissions from Group 4 sites - both directly through participation in the scheme, 
and indirectly through electricity price increases that reflect carbon abatement costs.  
 
For double regulation to be fully eliminated, Group 4 sites must also be made exempt from 
the CCL (they were previously exempt from 80% of the CCL). There are two options: 
 
• exempt Group 4 sites from the CCL on both fuel and electricity; or 
• remove the CCL on electricity and exempt Group 4 sites from the CCL on fuel; 
 
These options are equivalent in terms of their impact on Group 4 sites, although the wider 
impacts of the second are very different. An alternative is require Group 4 sites to continue 
paying 20% of the CCL as at present, regardless of their compliance with EU ETS targets. In 
practice, the inclusion or otherwise of 20% of the CCL on fuel is unlikely to make a major 
difference. 
Advantages and disadvantage  
The primary advantage is that all of the double regulation problems are removed and 
administrative costs are greatly reduced. In addition, abatement costs for most Group 4 sites 
are reduced, economic efficiency is improved and the distortions to competition created by 
the double regulation are eliminated. The operation of the EU ETS is no longer distorted and 
abatement can be achieved at least cost. 
 
A second advantage is that the double coverage and double crediting are eliminated. The 
ownership of fuel and electricity emissions are clarified and the complexity described in 
section 5.4 is removed. Also, this option allows fungibility between UK ETS and EU ETS 
allowances. As described in section 5.4.2, the dual participation of Group 4 sites in both 
trading schemes would have prevented this fungibility  
 
The primary disadvantage is political - there is opposition to the EU ETS amongst Group 4 
companies who would prefer to continue with relative targets under the CCAs. As described 
in section 6, the UK government would also prefer to leave the CCAs unchanged.  
 
As with option 3b, this option removes the downstream incentive for electricity efficiency 
provided by the CCA targets. Hence, if EU ETS allowance prices are low, a possible result is 
reduced investment in electricity efficiency. Aggregate fuel emissions from Group 4 sites will 
also be higher than in the coexistence scenario (section 5.4.2), with the magnitude of the 
difference depending upon the relative price of EU ETS and UKETS allowances.77 If 
allowance prices are low, Group 4 companies will cover their obligations through allowance 
purchase leading to domestic UK emissions being higher than anticipated in the UK climate 
program. In other words, the ‘backup’ regulation is removed. 
 
Table 7.14 provides a multi-criteria assessment of this option for Group 4, in terms of the 
difference between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.13). 
                                                 
77 This assumes that, in the aggregate, the CCA targets are binding relative to the EU ETS allowance allocations 
(section 5.4.1). Note also that this result depends upon the relative price of allowances in the two schemes and 
not upon the relative stringency of CCA targets and EU ETS allowance allocations at individual sites (section 
5.4.2). 
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Table 7.14 Multi criteria assessment of option 4a: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: CCA electricity targets would be lost, and improvement in electricity 
efficiency likely to be less. Price signal for fuel and electricity efficiency 
marginally reduced. Fuel emissions will be higher. 
2 
Static efficiency • Better: Fuel and electricity costs reflect external cost of CO2 without other 
distortions. EU ETS can minimise abatement costs.  
3 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Better: Greatly improved for both Group 4 and government. No double 
regulation, double counting or double crediting. 
3 
Competitiveness • Better: Removal of double regulation of electricity and fuel. Abatement cost 
reduced 
2 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Costs for Group 4 less than in coexistence scenario. Likely to be 
greatly preferred to coexistence scenario, although not preferred relative to a 
scenario of no EU ETS.  
2 
Total  12 
7.4.1 Option 4b: allow Group 4 installations to opt-out of the EU ETS and 
continue with their CCL 1 As. 
Rationale 
While the previous option may have advantages compared to the coexistence scenario, it runs 
counter to the preferences of both energy intensive industry and the UK government who 
would prefer to continue with the existing CCAs (at least during Phase 1). As discussed in 
section 6, the UK is attempting to achieve this through the negotiation of a national opt-out. 
An alternative is to allow opt-outs at the installation level, with the aim of giving Group 4 
participants a choice between the continuing with their CCAs or joining the EU ETS. If such 
a provision were included in the EU ETS, it would be subject to the demonstration of 
‘equivalence of effort’ by the opt-out installations in terms of the stringency of emission 
targets, the associated, monitoring, reporting and verification requirements and the provisions 
for non-compliance.  
 
If opt-outs are allowed at an installation level, this could lead to a situation where some 
installations in a sector are included in the EU ETS and some are not. An alternative would 
be to allow opt-outs at the sector level, so that each sector was either included or excluded 
from the EU ETS. A sector opt-out could also be achieved through the installation opt-out 
provisions if all the installations in a sector chose to act together. There are pros and cons 
with both approaches, but for brevity only the installation level opt-out will be considered 
here. 
 
Group 4 installations would be eligible to opt-out if they could demonstrate that the CCAs 
met the equivalence of effort criteria. In contrast, it would be much more difficult for 
installations in non-CCA sectors such as electricity generation and oil refining to opt-out, 
since these installations have relatively few existing regulations that could be considered 
equivalent to the EU ETS. Hence, even if all Group 4 companies chose to opt-out, this option 
would not be equivalent to a national opt-out provision since electricity generators, oil 
refineries and other companies would still be subject to the cap. 
 
Since the generators are in the scheme, any installation that chose to opt-out and retain its 
existing CCA would be subject to double regulation of electricity. This may be one incentive 
to not to opt-out. Alternatively, the options outlined for Group 3 could be considered, 
including changing the CCA targets to fuel only. But this could complicate the demonstration 
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of equivalence of effort, as the targets that are being assessed for equivalence are themselves 
subject to change. 
 
The opt-out option has similarities to the opt-in option. With an opt-in provision, Group 4 
companies are included in the cap and have no opportunity to leave, but Group 3 companies 
have the opportunity to join. With an opt-out provision, Group 4 companies are included in 
the cap and have an opportunity to leave, but Group 3 companies have no opportunity to join. 
With an opt-in provision the cap can increase in size, but cannot shrink, while with an opt-out 
provision, the cap can shrink but cannot increase. In principle, both opt-in and opt-out could 
be accommodated at the same time, but since each option could be burdensome to administer, 
a combination of the two is likely to be excessive.  
 
As with opt-ins, the choice made by Group 4 installations will depend upon an assessment of 
the costs and benefits. This in turn will depend upon a range of factors, many of which - such 
as EU ETS allowance prices – are likely to be uncertain. In principle, the primary attraction 
of opting-out of the EU ETS would be to minimise abatement costs. Movements out of the 
cap (by high cost participants) should lower allowance demand, lower allowance prices, 
reduce marginal abatement costs and bring abatement cost within the cap closer to those 
outside. But in practice, factors such as expected output growth (or decline), transaction costs 
and the future evolution of the CCA and EU ETS regimes would also need to be taken into 
account. As with opt-ins, the incentive to opt-out of the EU ETS would be reduced if there 
were no fungibility between UK ETS and EU ETS allowances, or if CCA companies could 
purchase EU ETS allowances but were not able to sell into the scheme (i.e. one way trading, 
or a closed Gateway). Conversely, if there were full fungibility between UK ETS and EU 
ETS allowances, an installation that opted out could retain the benefits of relative targets and 
still have full access to EU ETS trading. Hence, if there were restrictions on UK ETS trading, 
fewer companies are likely to opt-out.  
Advantages and disadvantages 
The primary advantage of this option is political: the opportunity to opt-out will make the EU 
ETS more acceptable to industry and certain Member State governments. An opt-out option 
at the installation or sector level could be a suitable compromise to gain agreement in the 
Council of Ministers, without going as far as exempting a Member State completely from 
Phase 1. The fact that electricity generators are unlikely to be able to use this option is 
important, as it reduces the risk of competitive distortions in cross-border electricity trade. 
This is of limited concern for the UK as cross-border electricity trade is relatively small (and 
almost entirely one-way), but it is important for other Member States. 
 
There are, however, several disadvantages. Since an absolute cap has greater environmental 
integrity than relative targets, opt-out provisions would lower the environmental effectiveness 
of the EU ETS regime. This could threaten both Member State and EU compliance, although 
much depends on the effectiveness with which ‘equivalence of effort’ is interpreted and 
applied. But demonstrating equivalence of effort presents three difficulties: 
 
• Scope: As section 3 has demonstrated, there are differences in the scope of the EU ETS 
and the CCAs, including their coverage of electricity. How can their emission reductions 
be considered equivalent when they cover different emission sources in different ways? 
• Form: The CCAs have relative targets while the EU ETS has absolute. These cannot be 
considered equivalent because: a) absolute targets gives certainty in the environmental 
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outcome, while relative targets do not; b) absolute targets give scope for auctioning and 
revenue raising while relative targets do not (although this is not relevant for Phase 1); and 
c) relative targets act as a subsidy on production, leading to higher emissions for the same 
level of marginal abatement cost (Gielen et al, 2002). Group 4 installations that have 
chosen to opt-out may have a competitive advantage and the resulting increase in output 
from these installations may lead to a net increase in emissions.  
• Stringency: There are likely to be differences in stringency between CCA and EU ETS 
targets, since the basis on which they are derived and the process through which they are 
developed is different. Section 4.3 suggested that the current CCA targets are relatively 
weak and may fall short of the allocation criteria listed in the Directive. 
 
For this option, equivalence of effort will need to be determined at the level of individual 
installations, since some installations in a sector may choose to join and some to leave. Most 
probably the assessment would need to take place only once the beginning of Phase 1, since 
giving installations the opportunity to opt-out during Phase 1 is likely to be counterproductive 
and impractical. The process of demonstrating equivalence of effort could be both costly and 
time-consuming. One option would be to estimate the allocation to different installations 
under the EU scheme, and then to assess whether their existing targets are ‘equivalent’ to this 
estimated allocation. But this implies considerable effort to assess bottom-up allocations, 
which seems unnecessary when the intention is not actually to allocate allowances. It is likely 
that assessing equivalence of effort for this option would be more burdensome than for the 
national opt-out option, since the latter would require only a single decision on the overall 
equivalence of the UK climate program. A sector level opt-out option may be a suitable 
compromise here, as equivalence of effort will only need to be assessed at the sector level. 
But any administrative advantages are likely to be obtained at the expense of accuracy, since 
in principle a sector level assessment would need to be obtained by summing the 
opportunities at each individual installation. 
 
Table 7.15 provides a multi-criteria assessment of this option for Group 4, in terms of the 
difference between this option and the coexistence scenario (Table 7.13). This adds the 
consequences of the opt-in provisions to the evaluation given for option 4a in the previous 
section. 
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Table 7.15 Multi criteria assessment of option 4b: changes compared to coexistence scenario 
Criteria Relevant issues  Score 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
• Worse: CCA electricity targets would be lost, and improvement in electricity 
efficiency likely to be less. Price signal for fuel and electricity efficiency 
marginally reduced. Fuel emissions will be higher. Opt-outs reduce the 
environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS. 
1 
Static efficiency • Better: Fuel and electricity costs reflect external cost of CO2 without other 
distortions. EU ETS can minimise abatement costs. But opt-out options 
undermine efficiency of EU ETS. 
2 
Administrative 
simplicity 
• Better: Greatly improved for both Group 4 and government compared to 
coexistence scenario. No double regulation, double counting or double 
crediting. But opt-out option could create major complications.  
1 
Competitiveness • Better: Removal of double regulation of electricity and fuel. Abatement cost 
reduced. Opt-out option may benefit Group 4 installations but introduce 
competitive distortions. 
2 
Political 
acceptability 
• Better: Costs for Group 4 less than in coexistence scenario. Likely to be 
preferred to coexistence scenario, although not preferred relative to a 
scenario of no EU ETS. Opt-out option should reduce industry concerns over 
the competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS and may help secure agreement 
at the EU level.  
3 
Total  9 
7.5. Summary and recommendations 
Table 7.16 provides a summary of the multicriteria evaluations of each option. A total score 
for each option is derived very simply by summing the individual scores under each criteria. 
The scoring process is highly subjective and in practice different stakeholder groups may 
both assign different scores to each option and give different weightings to each criteria. 
Nevertheless, with the scorings given here we may conclude that: 
 
• All of the options offer an improvement on the coexistence scenario. In other words, 
leaving the CCL/CCA package unchanged is likely to be the worst possible option. 
• The majority of the options improve economic efficiency at the expense of environmental 
effectiveness. But most of the options which improve economic efficiency also improve 
political acceptability. 
• Allowing opt-ins to the EU ETS can offer a number of advantages, particularly if 
combined with restrictions on the fungibility of EU ETS and UK ETS allowances. In 
contrast, the opt-out option scores badly on all criteria except political acceptability. 
• Removing the CCL from electricity offers a number of advantages, as does exempting EU 
ETS participants from the CCL. 
 
To draw stronger conclusions than this, it would be necessary to: first, decide the priority to 
be given to individual criteria; and second, take a view on the future course of EU ETS 
allowance prices. If allowance prices were anticipated to be low, this could provide grounds 
for retaining some elements of the CCL/CCA package as ‘backup regulation’. For example, 
the CCL on electricity could be retained. Conversely if allowance prices were anticipated to 
be high, the need for backup regulation would be reduced and greater priority could be given 
to economic efficiency. The difficulty is that forecasts of future allowance prices are highly 
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speculative. They depend in part upon assumptions about the interface between the EU ETS 
and the international carbon market after 2008, but the development of these interfaces is 
only partly within the UK's control. Key decisions on UK climate policy will need to be taken 
before 2008, and possibly before 2005 – that is, well before allowance prices can be forecast 
with any confidence.  
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Table 7.16 Summary evaluation of options for modifying the CCL/CCA package or the EU ETS 
Options Description Environmental 
effectiveness 
Static efficiency Administrative 
simplicity 
Competitiveness Political 
acceptability 
Total 
Group 1 Coexistence scenario 3 2 4 3 2 14 
1a Modify CCL rate for 
electricity 
2 2 3 4 3 14 
1b Remove CCL on 
electricity 
2 3 4 4 3 16 
1c As 1b, and make CCL a 
carbon tax 
2 4 5 4 3 18 
Group 2 Coexistence scenario 3 1 4 2 2 12 
2a Remove CCL on 
electricity 
2 2 4 3 3 14 
2b As 2a and exempt Group 
2 from CCL 
2 3 3 3 4 15 
Group 3 Coexistence scenario 3 1 2 2 2 10 
3a Remove CCL on 
electricity 
2 2 2 2 1 9 
3b As 3a and change CCA 
to fuel only 
2 2 1 3 3 11 
3c As 3b and allow opt-in 
to EU ETS 
2 3 0 4 4 13 
Group 4 Coexistence scenario 3 1 1 1 1 7 
4a Replace CCA with EU 
ETS and exempt from 
CCL 
2 3 3 2 2 12 
4b As 4a and allow opt-out 
from EU ETS 
1 2 1 1 3 8 
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8. Eliminating the confusion: policy 
recommendations 
8.1 Principles 
This report has thrown some light on the ‘climate confusion’, highlighted the need for policy 
decisions and illustrated the nature of the trade-offs that need to be made. To make specific 
recommendations, it is necessary to establish some core principles and and considerations. 
These are listed below. The basic recommendation is that greater priority should be given to 
economic efficiency and administrative simplicity when developing future policy options.  
 
The report recommends that greater priority should be given to economic efficiency and 
administrative simplicity when developing policy options. The principles and considerations 
which underlie this choice are as follows: 
 
• Need for change: The EU ETS will provide the framework for trading in the long-term, 
whether the UK joins in 2005 or 2008. But coexistence of the EU ETS with the existing 
CCL/CCA package appears untenable. This means that evaluation of possible changes to 
the CCL and CCAs needs to begin now. 
• Goals: The development of policy options should not be based upon short-term 
expedients, but upon clear principles and long-term goals. For climate policy, a stable an 
effective policy framework is required during the commitment period. This means that 
policy should be developed by working back from where we want to be in 2008, rather 
than making minor adaptations to the existing mix.  
• Complexity: The existing UK policy mix is excessively complex and the relationship 
between different instruments is poorly understood by individual target groups. Hence, 
any changes should aim to simplify this mix and not to add further complexity. 
• Objectives: The objectives of individual policies should be clear. At present, the efficiency 
of the CCL is undermined because it is trying to meet several objectives at once in a 
manner that is far from transparent. Whether or not all these objectives are sensible, it 
should be possible to achieve several of them by combining a more efficient price 
instrument with supplementary measures to ameliorate unwanted impacts on, for example, 
the fuel poor. 
• Carbon pricing: Energy users in all sectors should pay for carbon emissions, whether 
through taxation or emissions trading. In the long term, organisations in the public, 
commercial and industrial sectors should either be paying a carbon tax or participating in 
a trading scheme. The CCAs should be seen as a transitional measure only. Supplementary 
policies will be required to address other barriers to energy efficiency and to achieve other 
policy objectives (e.g. promoting renewables). But for each target group, only a single 
instrument should be used for carbon pricing.  
• Revenue raising: Revenue recycling should be used to enhance the economic efficiency, 
environmental effectiveness and political acceptability of a carbon tax (as with the CCL). 
Similar benefits are only possible with the EU ETS if allowance auctioning is used. A 
pragmatic solution is to auction a small proportion of the allowances initially, and to 
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increase that proportion over time. While industrial opposition to allowance auctioning is 
understandable, there appears to be no good reason why the UK government should 
continue to oppose any allowance auctioning in the EU ETS. 
• Electricity: The treatment of electricity emissions is of central importance. The EU ETS 
gives ownership of these emissions to electricity generators (direct allocation), while UK 
climate policy gives ownership to electricity consumers (indirect allocation). The former is 
preferable because: first, it gives ownership of electricity emissions to the companies 
directly responsible for the control of those emissions, thereby incentivising both fuel 
switching and energy efficiency; and second, it facilitates cross-border electricity trade in 
the EU. 
• Targets: Absolute targets are to be preferred over relative targets because of their greater 
environmental integrity and consistency with the national emission targets under Kyoto. 
The argument that absolute targets provide a ‘cap on growth’ is difficult to defend in the 
context of global carbon trading and projections of low allowance prices.  
• Trading: Allowance based trading (i.e. EU ETS) is to be preferred over baseline and credit 
trading (i.e. CCAs) due to its greater economic efficiency, lower transaction costs and 
consistency with the Kyoto framework. 
• Supplementaritry: A combination of the US withdrawal from Kyoto, excessive ‘hot air’ 
and generous sink provisions means that the international carbon market during the first 
commitment period is likely to be oversupplied. This creates a real risk that abatement in 
the EU will be achieved through purchasing cheap hot air rather than through domestic 
action. But domestic abatement may be incentivised by either restricting the interface 
between the EU ETS and the international carbon market, or by retaining (or establishing) 
‘backup’ regulations for EU ETS participants. This is an important and difficult policy 
choice for the UK, since future allowance prices are highly uncertain and the UK has only 
limited control over the future evolution of the EU ETS. However, since both the 
Commission and other Member States would like the EU ETS to encourage domestic 
abatement, there appears a good chance that the import of hot air into the EU ETS will be 
restricted. This suggests that ‘backup’ regulations should be abandoned as they are likely 
to undermine economic efficiency, be more complex to administer and lead to additional 
costs for the target groups. 
8.2 Recommedations 
These principles and considerations lead to the following recommendations for changes to the 
policy mix when the EU ETS is introduced:  
 
• The CCL should be removed from electricity and extended to all fossil fuels. The CCL 
should replace excise duties on oil products. 
• The basis of the CCL should change from energy to carbon content. 
• The level of the fuel-only CCL should be increased and the existing programmes funded 
by the CCL should continue.  
• Eligible installations should join the EU ETS and their existing CCA agreements should 
be terminated. 
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• CCA facilities not eligible for the EU ETS should renegotiate their agreements such that 
the targets relate to fuel consumption only. 
• Participants in the EU ETS should be exempt from the CCL. 
• Before 2008, trading between the UK ETS and the EU ETS should be controlled by a 
Gateway. After 2008, there should be no trading between the two schemes 
 
The analysis has also suggested that opt-in provisions at the installation or sector level could 
be a valuable addition to the EU ETS, while opt-out provisions at this level appear 
undesirable. A preferable approach may be to expand the sectoral coverage of the EU ETS 
over time.  
 
The recommendations are conditional upon restrictions being placed on the import of hot air 
into the EU ETS. If these conditions are not met, ‘backup’ regulations should again be 
considered. 
 
The changes proposed above will be far more difficult to implement by 2005 than by 2008. A 
national opt-out of Phase 1 therefore appears an attractive alternative as a transitional 
measure. 
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